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THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN EU POLICY TOWARDS THE EASTERN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD: 
THE CASE OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Summary  
This thesis investigates the EU policy-making process concerning the external 
dimension of migration focusing on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.  
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on integrating a comprehensive 
migration dimension into the broader external policies of the EU. In 2004, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed as an overarching foreign policy tool 
integrating the EU’s existing policies towards its southern and eastern neighbourhood 
under a single framework with the objective of ensuring security and stability in the 
EU's neighbourhood. The management of cross-border movements along the EU’s new 
eastern frontiers in particular has moved up on the EU agenda with the eastern shift of 
the EU borders following the 2004/2007 eastern enlargements. With the increasing 
integration of migration policy objectives into the EU’s broader neighbourhood policy, 
the EU has progressively established a more streamlined form of cooperation with its 
immediate eastern neighbours concerning different dimensions of migration policy. The 
thesis examines the EU policy-making process with the aim of answering the question 
of how the EU policy has been shaped in the view of diverging national preferences and 
institutional roles and influence concerning the external dimension of migration policy. 
As a salient policy area central to national sovereignty and interest, the EU member 
states traditionally seek to control the impact of institutional constraints in the area of 
migration policy and support mechanisms by which they could exert national control 
over the policy outcomes. On the other hand, the increasing ‘communitarisation’ of the 
policy area since the Amsterdam Treaty has enhanced the role of the EU institutions.  
 
Drawing on the new-institututionalist approaches to EU policy-making, the thesis 
questions a purely intergovernmental understanding of policy-making dominated by the 
preferences of the member states in the external dimension of EU migration policy.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
This thesis analyses EU decision-making in the area of external dimension of migration. 
Within this ‘grey’ policy area between home affairs and external relations policies, the 
thesis takes a closer look at the intergovernmental and institutional dimensions of EU 
decision-making processes. Focusing specifically on the EU's migration policy towards 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus within the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), the thesis assesses the relative influence of the EU Member States' policy 
positions and the EU's institutional framework in the course of the decision-making 
process. The introduction is formed of three parts. The first part outlines the subject 
matter of the project, introduces the main research question and explains the selection of 
the case studies. The second part deals with the research design of the project presenting 
the conceptualisation of the research question. Finally, the third part introduces the 
chapter structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1. Aim and Scope  
The EU had a relatively weak form of engagement with the Western Newly 
Independent States (WNIS) after their independence compared to its relations with 
Russia and the countries of central eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War in 
1989.1 In the past decade, the eastern shift of the EU borders in 2004 and 2007 paved 
the way for a significant increase in the political and financial commitment of the EU in 
the WNIS region. In the early 2000s, an EU level debate was launched regarding the 
need to enhance security and stability in the broader eastern neighbourhood in view of 
the then forthcoming 2004 enlargement. The EU was committed to reinforcing its 
cooperation with its new immediate neighbours ‘to avoid new dividing lines in Europe 
and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union’.2 There was a shared concern about the repercussions of potential political and 
economic instabilities along its eastern frontier. Enhanced political and financial 
                                               
1 Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are also known as the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS). The 
European Union official documents occasionally use this category to refer to these three countries as a 
group. For simplicity, the thesis will refer to these countries as ‘the eastern neighbours’.  
2 Council of the European Union, “Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December Presidency 
Conclusions,'' 15917/02, January 29, 2003, accessed January 1, 2011, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/european-council.aspx?target=2002 
&bid=76&lang=en&id=. 
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commitment to the region was also seen as a way to consolidate the role of the EU both 
as a regional and international actor through being more involved with its politically and 
economically unstable eastern neighbourhood. In 2004, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) was put forward as a new foreign policy tool that integrated the EU 
policies towards the EU’s broader neighbourhood under a single framework.3  
 
The geographical scope of the ENP was an issue of high importance due to the 
diverging regional preferences of the Member States within the neighbourhood. In 
2002, the Copenhagen European Council highlighted the commitment of the EU to 
enhance cooperation with both the enlarged EU’s eastern neighbours (involving Russia, 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) and the southern Mediterranean neighbours with the 
aim of encouraging reforms in its near abroad.4 Although the initial debates focused 
solely on the need for restructuring the EU policy towards the new eastern neighbours 
following the 2004 eastern enlargement, it was clear that a consensus among the 
Member States depended upon having a balanced approach towards both the southern 
and eastern neighbours. In March 2003, the European Commission presented the ‘Wider 
Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours’ document.5 Despite being offered to both the southern and 
eastern neighbours, the ENP has gradually adopted a geographically ‘differentiated 
approach’. In 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched directed 
towards the southern neighbours in the leadership of France owing to its particular 
interest and historical connections with the countries in the region.6 Put forward by 
Poland and Sweden as a joint proposal in 2008, the development of the Eastern 
Partnership followed the introduction of the UfM to enhance both bilateral and regional 
cooperation with the six eastern neighbours from Eastern Europe and the Southern 
                                               
3 The ENP is offered to Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.  
4 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002,” 
15917/02, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-
releases/european-council.aspx?target=2002&bid=76&lang=en&id=.  
5 European Commission, “Wider Europe–neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern 
and southern neighbours,” COM (2003) 104 final, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
6 European Commission, “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean,” COM (2008) 319 final, 
May 20, 2008, accessed January 2, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319:EN:HTML. 
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Caucasus in 2009.7 In terms of geographical scope, the thesis focuses exclusively on 
the three Eastern European partners, i.e. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The reason for 
narrowing down on these partner countries is the fact that the EU has had a comparable 
approach towards these three eastern European countries since the end of the Cold 
War.8 The importance of these countries has increased as the EU has been directly 
affected by the instabilities in the region after the eastern enlargement.  
 
With the launch of the ENP, the EU and the partner countries committed to 
strengthening their bilateral relations on a diverse set of policy areas. Owing to the 
eastern shift of the EU borders following the 2004/2007 enlargements, the management 
of the cross-border movements along the EU’s new eastern frontiers particularly has 
moved up on the EU agenda. Cooperation with the neighbours concerning migration 
was deemed as a high priority for the EU’s new neighbourhood policy starting from the 
initial ENP strategy paper and the specific reports that were prepared by the European 
Commission with respect to the partner countries.9 Within this broad foreign policy 
framework, the EU has progressively established a somewhat streamlined cooperation 
with the eastern partners in the area of migration.  
 
The literature on the external dimension of the EU's migration policy has laid 
considerable emphasis on the predominance of intergovernmental cooperation among 
the Member States due to the notable sensitivity of the policy domain.10 This state-
centric viewpoint clashes with the recent emphasis that has been put on the influence 
and constraints that are imposed on EU decision-making process by the EU’s 
institutional framework. Despite the rapid communitarisation in the area of migration 
                                               
7 The Eastern Partnership concerns: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. For 
more information on the Eastern Partnership: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm. 
8 The end of the Cold War brought about a considerable transformation concerning the Union’s relations 
with its eastern neighbours. Although the focuses on the post-1999 period when the policies towards the 
region were started to be reviewed, a brief review of the EU policy towards the region in the aftermath of 
the Cold War is presented in Chapter 3. 
9 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper,” COM (2004) 373 final, 
2004, accessed January 1, 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
After the launch of the ENP, the European Commission prepared ENP Country Reports for each partner 
country (except Belarus in the east and a number of countries in the south) reviewing their bilateral 
cooperation of the EU with them with the aim of identifying the main areas of cooperation. For the ENP 
Country reports see: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.                            
10 Sandra Lavenex, “EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’,” Journal of European Public Policy 11 
no. 4 (2004): 689. 
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policy over the past decade, the influence of the EU institutions in the area of migration 
has been overlooked. The objective of the thesis is to understand the EU decision-
making process in the area of external dimension of migration examining both the 
impact of the Member States’ official policy positions as well as the EU’s institutional 
framework concerning the policy area. This thesis aims to answer the following 
question: ‘What are the primary determining factors shaping EU decision-making in its 
policy towards eastern neighbours in the field of immigration?’. 
 
The ENP has attracted considerable scholarly attention. The initial studies focused more 
on assessing the ability of the policy to transform the EU's neighbourhood rather than 
investigating particular dynamics of decision-making process in different policy areas 
that are incorporated into the ENP framework. Parallel to the broader EU external 
relations literature that has mainly concentrated on ‘conceptualisation of the EU as an 
actor’ at the international level11, the literature on the ENP has assessed the potential 
ability of the EU to promote reform in its ‘near abroad’ under the ENP framework. 
Building on the enlargement literature, there are several studies comparing the policy 
tools of the ENP with the enlargement process particularly in the context of the relations 
with the immediate eastern neighbourhood. 
 
Both the academic and policy debates regarding the ENP mainly focused on the 
question as to the degree the ENP as a foreign policy tool could be successful in 
externalizing the EU’s policies and norms without the promise of enlargement 
particularly with respect to the countries in the eastern neighbourhood that are eligible.12 
In the beginning, cooperation concerning different sectoral areas that are incorporated 
under the ENP did not receive as much attention as the broad policy framework. As the 
ENP has gradually transformed into an umbrella policy integrating cooperation with the 
neighbouring countries in several policy areas with different pace and objectives, there 
has been increasing scholarly attention to cooperation in specific sectoral areas.13 This 
                                               
11 Ben Rosamond, “Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics,” European Foreign 
Affairs Review 10 no.4 (2005): 463–478.  
12 A comprehensive literature review with respect to the ENP is presented in the first section of the 
following Chapter. 
13 Sandra Lavenex, “A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration 
beyond conditionality?,’ Journal of European Public Policy 15, no.6 (2008): 938–955; Ulrich 
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was also linked to the externalisation literature and directed towards the governance and 
implementation dimensions. There is still a gap concerning detailed studies of decision-
making process in different sectoral areas of cooperation in the literature. It is worth 
noting that it is not the objective of this thesis to provide an evaluation of the EU 
policies and their effectiveness. Focusing on migration cooperation within the 
neighbourhood policy, this project aims to identify the primary determining factors 
concerning the EU decision-making process in the light of the enhanced cooperation 
with the region since the introduction of the ENP framework. In terms of the legal 
framework of the decision-making, the thesis focuses mainly on the changes that have 
been introduced since the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 until the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. However, where relevant, the changes that are 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty will also be discussed. 
 
1.1.1. The Migration Cooperation with the Eastern Neighbourhood  
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on integrating a comprehensive 
migration dimension into the external policies of the EU.14  The EU has made 
considerable efforts to establish a dialogue in particular with the main countries of 
origin and transit of migrants. The emphasis has been particularly on the fight against 
irregular migration into the EU. Since the early 2000s, cooperation in the area of 
irregular migration has become a precondition for an intensified partnership with the 
EU.15 Cooperation with the eastern neighbours of the EU has particularly become 
important given that the region is identified as an important point of transit for irregular 
migrants entering the EU.16 The 2004/2007 enlargements have in particular increased 
                                                                                                                                         
Sedelmeier, “The European neighbourhood policy: a comment on theory and policy,” in Governing 
Europe’s Neighbourhood, eds K. Weber, M. Smith and M. Baun (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2006): 195-208. 
14 The integration of migration policy within the external policies of the Union was first referred at the 
Tampere Council meeting conclusions in 1999. In 2002, the Seville European Council meeting underlined 
that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the 
European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of 
migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration’.  
15 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions. Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002,” 13463/02, 
2002, accessed http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/european-
council.aspx?target=2002&bid=76&lang=en&id=. 
16 European Commission Staff Working Document, “Third annual report on the development of a 
common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, external borders, and 
the return of illegal residents,” SEC(2009) 320 final, 2009. 
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the concerns of the Member States in relation to the acceleration of migratory pressures 
from the new eastern neighbours.17 The extension of the Schengen borders to the new 
Member States triggered concerns amongst the Member States with respect to the 
management of cross-border movements along the EU’s eastern border. These concerns 
were particularly shared by the old Member States that have traditionally been subject 
to high levels of migration from the region. 
 
On the other hand, the facilitation of mobility for the citizens of the eastern neighbours 
is of high importance to the new EU Member States taking into account their close 
trade, cultural and social relations and mobility (of people, goods, labour) facilitated by 
the legacy of visa-free regime in the region prior to their accession to the EU. The 
integration of the CEE Member States to the Schengen border regime impeded the 
traditional flexible cross-border relations with their immediate eastern neighbours. To 
abide by the requirements concerning the accession to the EU and the Schengen border 
zone, the new Member States had to align their visa policies with the EU and cease all 
former visa free travel arrangements with their non-EU neighbours.18 Since their 
accession, the CEE Member States, Poland in particular, have been pushing for further 
liberalisation of the EU’s migration policy towards the region. 
 
Although the policy positions of the Member States are highly central to the debate, the 
research aims to look into the influence of the EU’s institutional framework to piece 
together a clearer picture of EU decision-making processes. The main argument in the 
literature is that the migration policy area has traditionally been dominated by a circle of 
national actors or ‘transgovernmental’ networks.19 As the importance of the issue of 
migration increased for the Member States since the end of the Cold War, the officials 
                                               
17 The EU policy regarding external dimension of immigration, the Global Approach to Immigration, is 
extended to the eastern and south-eastern neighbours in 2007. Council of the European Union, “Press 
Release 2808th General Affairs Council Meeting Council Conclusions on extending and enhancing the 
Global Approach to Migration,” Luxembourg, 10654/07, 17-18 June 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-
releases/search?command=d&id=&lang=en&doclang=EN&dockey=94803. 
18  European Commission, “Comprehensive Monitoring Report for Poland's preparations for 
membership,” 2003, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/organisation/docs/CMR_PL.pdf. 
19 Helen Wallace, “An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Models” in Policy making in the European 
Union eds. Helen Wallace, Marc .A. Pollack and Alasdair .R. Young, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010): 102.   
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from ministries of interior started to cooperate within intergovernmental or 
transgovernmental networks. Despite the emphasis on ‘sovereignty’, the competences of 
the EU institutions and their involvement in the decision-making process have gradually 
increased since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Given these 
observations, the thesis examines the way in which EU decision-making on migration 
policy regarding the eastern neighbours has been evolved in the view of diverging 
national preferences and institutional influence. 
  
1.1.2. Case Studies 
 
Thematically, the thesis focuses on four sub-policy areas of cooperation with respect to 
the external dimension of immigration policy: (i) irregular migration20 ; (ii) visa 
cooperation; (iii) labour migration and (iv) asylum cooperation. These areas are chosen 
based on a review of the EU cooperation with the eastern neighbours in the area of 
migration, justice and home affairs Action Plans and the corresponding sections of the 
ENP progress reports.21  
 
1.1.2.1. Irregular Migration 
 
The fight against irregular migration has been a priority area of cooperation between the 
EU and the eastern neighbours.22 Sharing a long land border with the EU after the 
2004/2007 enlargements, the region has been considered a major source of and transit 
for irregular migration into the EU. The return of the irregular migrants residing in the 
EU to the countries of transit or origin has particularly been an important dimension of 
migration cooperation with third countries. Conducted traditionally at the national level, 
the readmission of undocumented migrants over the years has been integrated into EU 
policy to a great extent. Under the EU level readmission agreements, partner countries 
                                               
20 It should be noted that some Member States use the term illegal migration instead of irregular 
migration. In the EU documents, these terms are used interchangeable.  
21 Although there is not an Action Plan with Belarus, the Commission is given the mandate to start 
negotiations regarding cooperation in the field of immigration. As it is stated in the ENP Strategy Paper in 
2004 and strengthened in the EaP, the bilateral dimension of the policy is conditioned to the development 
of the level of democracy in the country.  
22 European Commission, “Wider Europe–neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our 
eastern and southern neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 final, March 11, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
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are expected to receive back their nationals who are illegally residing in the EU. This is 
essentially a duty of a state irrespective of a special agreement on readmissions.23 In 
addition, these agreements most of the time oblige partner countries to receive 
undocumented migrants irrespective of their nationality if it is proven that migrants 
entered the EU through their territory.24  
 
The readmission of third country nationals or stateless persons is much more important 
in the case of the agreements with neighbouring countries bearing in mind that they are 
transit countries. The EU has aimed to conclude such agreements with its neighbours 
that are considered major transit points. Based on these readmission agreements, the EU 
could return the nationals of partner countries who reside in the EU who do not possess 
necessary documents or other undocumented migrants irrespective of nationality if it is 
proven that they have crossed the borders of the partner country to enter the EU.  
Although readmission agreements are predominantly to the advantage of the EU 
Member States rather than third countries, they have become a requirement for these 
countries to advance their relations with the EU. Among the three eastern European 
neighbours, Ukraine was particularly important for the EU due to its population and the 
long shared land border. The ENP Action Plans for both Ukraine and Moldova put 
considerable emphasis on the conclusion of readmission agreements.25 Readmission 
agreements were concluded with Ukraine and Moldova in 2007 and they became 
                                               
23 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Beyond Asymmetries: Cooperation on Readmission in the EU neighbourhood” 
(paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, 
Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011) accessed January 1, 2011  
http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/3b_cassarino.pdf 
24 European Commission, “Commission Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation,” COM(2007) 504 final, September 5, 2007, accessed January 1, 
2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007PC0504%2801%29:EN:HTML; 
European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the signing of the Agreement 
between the European Community and Ukraine on readmission,” COM(2007) 197 final, April 18, 2007, 
accessed January 1, 2011  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0197:FIN:EN:PDF.   
These agreements are reciprocal as the EU Member States also take responsibility regarding return of 
irregular migrants that cross their borders. However, it is mainly the EU Member States that use these 
tools to return irregular immigrants to partner countries.  
25 European Commission, “EU/Ukraine ENP Action Plan, 2004 (adopted 21 February 2005); European 
Commission, “EU/Moldova ENP Action Plan, 2004 (adopted on 22 February 2005). 
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effective in 2008.26 Due to the EU decision to suspend bilateral relations with Belarus 
as a result of the undemocratic regime in place, the process to start the readmission 
agreement negotiations was delayed until the end of 2010. The European Commission 
was given a mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement with Belarus in February 
2011.27 
 
Conducting an analysis of the official policy positions of the Member States and the 
influence of the EU's institutional framework, the thesis maps out the decision-making 
process with respect to the EU level common policy on readmission cooperation with 
the eastern neighbours.  
 
1.1.2.2. Visa Cooperation 
 
Under the Schengen cooperation, short-term stay visas to the participant countries for 
duration of no more than 90 days have been harmonized.28 Being on the Schengen 
negative list, the citizens of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus should be in possession of a 
visa to travel to the EU.29 The visa requirement for short-term travel for the nationals of 
the eastern neighbours has particularly become a topical issue at the EU level following 
the eastern enlargement.  
 
To improve cooperation with the partner countries in the area of fight against irregular 
migration, the EU has developed the practice of pairing readmission agreement 
                                               
26 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 29 November 2007 concerning the conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on readmission of persons,’ OJ L 332/46, 
December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:332:0046:0047:EN:PDF; Council of 
the European Union, “2007/826, Council Decision of 22 November 2007 on the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation,” OJL 334/148, December 19, 2012, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:334:0148:0148:EN:PDF. 
27 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations 
for the conclusion of a readmission agreement between the European Union and Belarus,’’ 6623/11, May 
5 2011, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st06/st06623-ex01.en11.pdf. 
28 As national visas have remained the domain of the Member States, the EU could solely take action 
with respect to short-term travel. The UK, Ireland and Denmark are excluded from this development due 
to their opt-out from the parts of the EU acquis that are related to the Schengen agreement. 
29 The 2001 Regulation concerns the list of the third countries whose nationals should be in possession of 
visas to cross external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. The list of 
countries has been amended several times since its adoption. 
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negotiations and the facilitation of visa requirements for the citizens of the partner 
countries. Within the framework of the ENP, readmission agreements and visa 
facilitations have been offered as a package deal. Along with the agreements on the 
readmission, both Ukraine and Moldova also have signed visa facilitation agreements 
that ease the procedures and reduce the cost of obtaining a Schengen visa for their 
nationals.30 The EU has maintained its practice in the case of Belarus as well. 
 
Following the conclusion of the visa facilitation agreements with Ukraine and Moldova, 
the EU started dialogues with both partners regarding the abolition of the short-stay visa 
requirement without a strong commitment towards full visa liberalisation. 31  The 
negotiations in the EU were highly difficult due to diverging preferences among the 
Member States. Eventually, an agreement was reached in the EU to adopt Action Plans 
for these countries in Spring 2010. Action Plans were adopted with Ukraine in 2010 and 
with Moldova in 2011.  
 
Looking at both the process that brought about the conclusion of the visa facilitation 
agreements and adoption of the Action Plans on visa liberalisation, the thesis analyses 
the decision-making particularly in view of the strongly diverging views of different EU 
actors.  
 
1.1.2.3. Labour Migration 
 
The EU’s policy on labour migration32 has been a highly contentious topic given the 
reluctance of the Member States to transfer their competences to the EU level. The 
                                               
30 Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas - Protocol - Declaration - Joint Declarations,” OJ  L 332/68, 
December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1218%2802%29:EN:HTML; 
Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of 
Moldova on the facilitation of the issuance of visas,” OJ L 334/169, December 19, 2007, accessed 
January 1, 2012  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1219%2811%29:EN:HTML. 
31 As the process towards the conclusion of readmission and visa facilitation negotiations with Belarus 
has started in early 2011, the visa liberalisation section does not concern the policy towards Belarus. 
32 The EU’ and Member States’ documents and the literature use ‘economic migration’ and ‘labour 
migration’ interchangeably. The term legal migration is also used to refer to a broader concept which 
includes short and long term stays. 
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initial communication of the European Commission on the ENP has put forward labour 
migration opportunities in the EU for the nationals of partner countries as a ‘long term 
objective’ without making strong commitments.33 The ENP and the Eastern Partnership 
frameworks do not have a comprehensive labour migration dimension. However, the 
EU has taken certain steps towards increasing the link between the ‘fight against 
irregular migration’ and ‘legal migration’ policy instruments in their cooperation with 
third countries for a thorough migration management.34 The partner countries that are 
prepared to take responsibility regarding combating irregular migration and human 
trafficking, border controls and document security as well as measures with respect to 
returns and readmissions are offered by the Member States’ cooperation in the area of 
legal migration.35 The labour migration cooperation with the neighbours is based on 
voluntary cooperation of both partner countries and the EU Member States. The scope 
of legal migration cooperation is tailor made based on the needs and circumstances of 
both sides. Within the WNIS region, the only partner country that has reached a joint 
agreement with the EU is Moldova.36   
 
The thesis examines the EU policy on labour migration that is incorporated within the 
ENP framework focusing on the partnership with Moldova.  
 
1.1.2.4. Asylum Cooperation 
 
Although the traditional policy on refugee protection has its roots in international 
                                               
33 European Commission, “Wider Europe–neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our 
eastern and southern neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 final, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
34 Council of the European Union, “Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency 
Conclusions,” 11638/03, October 1, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf. 
35 European Commission, “On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union 
and third countries,” COM (2007) 248 final, May 16, 2007, accessed January 2, 2012 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal
&an_doc=2007&nu_doc=248. 
36 Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European 
Union and the Republic of Moldova,” 9460/08 ADD 1, May 21, 2008, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09460-ad01.en08.pdf. 
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human rights, the EU policy on asylum has evolved closely linked to migration.37 The 
EU policy on asylum mainly focuses on the management of the responsibilities among 
the Member States. Along with this strong internal dimension, the EU has started to 
cooperate with third countries on the issue of asylum and refugee protection as well. 
With the aim of increasing the capacity of third countries with respect to the 
management of asylum applications, the EU has pushed for the concept of ‘international 
protection’ for refugees.38 The main focus has been on the regions that asylum seekers 
come from or transit to the EU. In line with this, cooperation with the neighbouring 
countries has become highly important. Being subject to high levels of asylum 
applications, the compatibility of its immediate neighbours with the European standards 
concerning asylum and refugee policies is deemed highly significant for the EU.   
 
In its 2004 communication, the European Commission proposed the establishment of 
‘Regional Protection Programmes’ (RPPs) as a scheme to cooperate with a third country 
on issues related to enhancing the protection capacity in the region, resettlement, and 
improvement of local infrastructure, integration of the asylum seekers to the host 
country, legal migration, migration management and returns.39 The RPPs are integrated 
into the broader migration cooperation with these countries under of the ENP. The 
Progress Reports underline both legal developments and problems in the partner 
countries. The eastern neighbourhood of the EU is identified as a priority region for the 
establishment of the RPPs. In its follow-up communication in 2005, the Commission 
proposed to develop the RPPs in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus stating that there was a 
clear interest among the Member States regarding cooperation with the eastern 
neighbours on asylum.40  
 
                                               
37 Ingrid Boccardi, Europe and refugees: towards an EU asylum policy (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), xvi. 
38 European Commission, “Communication on the Managed Entry in the EU of Persons in Need of 
International Protection and the Enhancement of the Protection Capacity of the Regions of Origin 
‘Improving Access to Durable Solutions’,” COM (2004) 410 final, June 4, 2004, accessed January 1, 
2012  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0410:FIN:EN:PDF. 
39 European Commission, “Communication on Regional Protection Programmes,” COM (2005) 388, 
September 1, 2005, accessed January 1, 2012  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0388:FIN:EN:PDF. 
40 In addition to the WNIS, a pilot programme also started in Tanzania.  
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The thesis analyses the EU decision-making with respect to the integration of the RPPs 
into the ENP cooperation with the WNIS.  
 
1.2. Research Design 
 
As stated previously, the overarching research question is ‘What are the primary 
determining factors shaping EU decision-making in its policy towards eastern 
neighbours in the field of immigration?’. 
 
As the external dimension of immigration policy fits into the category of ‘high 
politics’41 issues that are subject to limited institutional constraints at the EU level, the 
decision-making is traditionally dominated by the Member States’ policy preferences. 
The Member States traditionally try to control the impact of the institutional constraints 
in this policy area and support mechanisms that they could exert national control in the 
course of decision-making process. In view of increasing communitarisation in the area 
of migration policy, the thesis aims to find out the ways in which the EU’s institutional 
framework influence and shape the policy outcome with respect to the external 
dimension of migration. 
 
To answer the research question identified above, two sets of predominant factors are 
identified below: (i) the member states’ policy positions and (ii) the EU’s institutional 
framework. These two factors are explained below: 
 
1. Member States’ Policy Positions  
 
The thesis first looks at the Member States’ policy preferences. The thesis aims at 
sketching out the main policy cleavages among the Member States with respect to their 
policy positions concerning migration cooperation with the eastern neighbours. It could 
be assumed at the outset of the thesis that the Member States’ policy positions are the 
                                               
41 Hoffmann introduced the term ‘high politics’ to identify the policy areas that nation states by and large 
prefer to preserve control. He has first used this concept in: Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? 
The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95, no. 3, Tradition and Change 
(Summer, 1966): 874.  
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primary determinants of the EU level policy outcome in a ‘high politics’ policy domain 
as migration. According to the intergovernmentalist approaches to EU decision-making, 
the EU Member States traditionally have kept their dominance due to the sensitivity of 
the policy area and have been subject to limited institutional constraints.  
 
With the aim of analysing the impact of the Member States on the EU level policy 
outcome, this study closely looks at the Member States that have been active and shown 
interest in shaping the EU decision-making process. The thesis focuses on five Member 
States: France, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. They are identified 
as the main actors that have actively taken part in the decision-making process 
concerning the eastern neighbours and have resources to shape and influence the EU 
policy. These Member States have been quite influential regarding the development of 
the broad EU policy towards its ‘near abroad’ as well. The initiative of the British 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw during the Spanish Presidency in 2001 accelerated the EU 
level debate on the priorities of the EU vis-a-vis Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.42 
France, Germany and Sweden were highly active in the course of discussions regarding 
the formation of the ENP framework. In a response to Straw’s letter, Swedish Foreign 
Minister Anne Lindh and trade minister Leif Pagrotsky wrote a letter advocating a 
policy for the broader cooperation with the neighbourhood including Russia and the 
Middle East.43 Both France and Germany shared the concerns reflected by Sweden with 
respect to the geographical scope of the policy. Due to their economic power in the 
region and their resources, an agreement among these countries was essential to agree to 
an EU level community policy towards the EU’s neighbourhood.  
 
Although Poland was not a Member State when the debates initially started regarding 
the reformulation of EU policy towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, it has over the 
years become highly active due to its intensive relations with the three eastern 
neighbours.44 Poland’s special engagement with the region particularly related to the 
                                               
42  Michelle Comelli, “The challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” The International 
Spectator 39, no.3 (2004): 99. 
43 Ibid. 
44 A non-paper with proposals concerning an EU policy towards the new Eastern neighbours after EU 
enlargement was presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in December 
2002.  
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shared history and the geographical proximity has increased the involvement of Poland 
as an important regional actor in the decision-making process. Poland also represents 
the common interests of the other new Member States (Visegrad Group45 and Baltic 
States in particular) that are interested in the EU policy towards eastern neighbours. 
There is a high degree of convergence with respect to the preferences of the new 
Member States concerning migration cooperation with the eastern neighbours.  
 
Furthermore, these five Member States represent the main cleavages with respect to 
diverging policy preferences within the EU. Although a more detailed analysis is 
presented in Chapter 4, two broad cleavages could be given to support this argument. 
First, the main cleavage regarding the degree to which security or mobility oriented 
policies are supported is represented. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have 
adopted security-oriented approaches emphasising their shared concerns related to 
future migratory pressures from the region as potential destinations for the new comers. 
These priorities are shared by most of the EU Member States which have been subject 
to high levels of migration. On the other hand, the Member States that stress mobility 
dimension, such as Poland and the rest of the new Member States that entered the EU in 
2004 and 2007, have historically been either source or transit countries of immigration. 
Similar to Poland and the new Member States, Sweden has been in favour of further 
liberalisation of mobility for the citizens of the eastern neighbours. Second, these 
Member States' policy positions diverge concerning the long term engagement with the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. Despite the reluctance of Germany and France with respect to 
giving the immediate eastern neighbours an accession prospect, Sweden and Poland 
have been in favour of the accession of Ukraine to the EU in particular. Although the 
UK has manifested its concerns with respect to potential migratory pressures from the 
region, it sees the prospect of enlargement as an effective foreign policy tool for the EU 
to realise its objectives in the region.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
45 In 1991, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia formed the Visegrad Group to cooperate 
with respect to EU integration. See http://www.visegradgroup.eu/. 
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2. The EU’s Institutional Framework 
Although the policy positions of the Member States are quite central to the EU decision-
making process, the role of the EU institutions is considered important drawing on the 
institutionalist approaches to EU decision-making. This section will outline how the 
thesis examines the role of the EU's institutional framework. In this thesis, the phrase 
‘institutional framework’ refers to (i) the legal framework of decision-making and (ii) 
the influence of the main decision-making institutions of the EU. Below, these two sets 
of measures are explained.  
 
(i) The Legal Framework of EU Decision-making: The legal framework refers to the 
constitutional legal basis of the external dimension of EU migration policy and the 
decision-making procedures. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty created an 
intergovernmental legal basis for the justice and home affairs policy area. With the 
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty regarding ‘visa, asylum, immigration and other 
policies relate to free movement of persons’ in 1999, an EU level basis was created.46 
The increasing communitarisation concerning the decision-making procedures is 
considered an important factor that limits the influence of the Member States.  
 
(ii) The Institutional Dynamics (the Council of the European Union, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council): In line with the 
increasing use of co-decision procedure and the transfer of executive competences to the 
European Commission, the resources and capacities of the EU institutions with respect 
to the domain of migration have increased. The institutional dimension analyses the 
degree to which the EU Institutions could effectively exercise their legal competences in 
the area of the external dimension of migration. Although the Council of the EU is 
considered as ‘the intergovernmental institution’ of the EU, the Council structure 
incorporates several mechanisms that limit intergovernmental bargaining among the 
Member States. On the other hand, the increasing power of the European Council with 
the Lisbon Treaty could strengthen intergovernmental decision-making processes. 
 
                                               
46 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and related acts, Official Journal C 340/173, November 10, 1997, accessed January 2, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11997D/AFI/CE:EN:HTML. 
17 
 
  
It is worth underlining that the study is ‘a thematic’ policy area within the framework of 
the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. This is so as to further shed light on decision-
making in a specific policy area (i.e. the external dimension of migration) based on the 
findings from the four sub-policy areas of cooperation.47 
 
1.3. Chapter Structure 
  
Chapter 2 has three parts. It presents a review of the literature on the ENP and EU’s 
migration policy, the theoretical framework and the operationalisation of the research. 
The Chapter first presents a review of the scholarly literature on the ENP and the 
external dimension of the EU’s immigration policy. Drawing from the theoretical 
debate on EU decision-making, the second section addresses the assumptions of the 
intergovernmentalist and institutionalist approaches to the EU. The final part deals with 
the operationalization of the hypotheses and the methodology.  
 
Chapter 3 is formed of two sections. The first section assesses the development of EU 
policy towards Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War and the launch of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The second section deals with the evolution 
of the EU cooperation in the area of immigration and the overlap between the EU’s 
external relations and migration policies. The following chapters are organized based on 
two primary determinants that are identified as being the Member States’ policy 
positions and the EU’s institutional framework. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the intergovernmental dimension of the EU decision-making and 
the official policy positions of the EU Member States concerning the EU cooperation in 
this area. It does this by looking at five main actors (France, Germany, Poland, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden). Chapter 4 also maps out the dominant national 
preferences in the policy area. It presents a preliminary model regarding the main 
cleavages which have emerged among the Member States concerning migration 
cooperation in the eastern neighbourhood and the coalitions that are formed around 
these cleavages.   
                                               
47 The analytical framework identifies the theoretical approaches in Chapter 2. 
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Moving on to the EU level decision-making, Chapter 5 outlines the role of the EU’s 
institutional framework concerning the external dimension of the EU’s immigration 
policy to analyse its impact on the policy outcome. It first maps out the evolution of the 
legal framework. Secondly, it presents the institutional structure of the main decision-
making bodies (i.e. the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the European Council) in relation to the external dimension of 
migration. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the decision-making process examining the main EU policy 
documents and the policy tools that are developed in the policy area. Focusing on the 
four case studies identified above, it traces the process with respect to the development 
of these policy tools.  
 
Building on the analysis of these policy documents and tools, Chapter 7 concludes the 
thesis by testing the hypotheses that are identified in Chapter 2 to examine the degree to 
which they are instrumental in order to understand the EU decision-making process and 
discusses the broad contributions of the thesis to the existing EU literature.  
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CHAPTER 2: The Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
 
This Chapter provides a framework for the rest of the thesis by initially reviewing the 
extant literature with the aim of locating gaps in the knowledge regarding the EU 
decision-making processes in the area of external dimension of migration. The literature 
review identifies a number of holes in relation to the existing literature, principally a 
lack of analysis of the decision-making processes as it relates to the external dimension 
of migration cooperation with third countries and a comparative approach to this matter. 
Despite the increased emphasis that has been put on the external dimension of migration 
policies in the literature, this analysis points at the need for detailed further research 
with respect to the decision-making processes in the area of the external dimension of 
the EU’s migration policies. In addition, it is demonstrated that the existing literature 
fails to fully evaluate the increasingly holistic approach adopted by the EU in its 
cooperation with its neighbours in the area of migration -an area which has also been 
integrated within the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. Subsequently, the Chapter 
establishes the theoretical framework that permeates this thesis. In doing so, it compares 
the intergovernmentalist and institutionalist approaches to EU decision-making 
processes with the aim of assessing their explanatory capacity in this policy area. 
Critically examining the state-centric theoretical approaches to the EU decision-making 
in the area of the external dimension of migration, the theoretical framework introduces 
two specific hypotheses. Lastly, the Chapter introduces the core methodologies that 
underpin the thesis. This final section outlines the main research methods and the modes 
of acquiring and examining data.  
 
2.1. Setting the Scene: Literature Review on the ENP and the External Dimension 
of Migration 
The EU’s relations with the countries along its new and extended periphery have been 
an area of particular interest in the European studies literature. Given the challenging 
environment that enveloped Europe with the collapse of the long-established East-West 
boundaries, the majority of the research in this area focuses on the post-Cold war 
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period.48 In the aftermath of the eastern enlargement, the increasing diversity and 
concerns with respect to the EU’s new immediate neighbourhood paved the way for a 
separate ‘intermediary’ category which is the ‘near abroad’.49 Although the literature 
on the EU’s relations with its neighbours revolved around the EU enlargement and its 
ramifications until the accession of the central European countries, the discourse moved 
away to include alternative levels of integration. 
 
As the overarching policy tool that was introduced following the eastern enlargement of 
the EU, a considerable amount of research focused on the ENP. Most of the academic 
and policy studies mainly concentrated on the benefits and/or the shortcomings of the 
ENP as a policy instrument. Wallace50 and Smith51 questioned whether the policy 
could manage to develop a solid relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood 
based on bilateral agreements. Kelley52, Hillion and Cremona53 in their work asked 
whether using pre-accession tools could be beneficial for interaction with the 
neighbours. Del Sarto and Schumacher54 argued that the ENP was shaped as a response 
to the consequences of the EU’s eastern enlargement process as opposed to a 
comprehensive consideration of the changing needs and necessities in the 
neighbourhood. Focusing on the implementation of the ENP, Whitman and Wolff’s 
edited book presented a comprehensive assessment of the ENP in the eastern and 
                                               
48 Michael E. Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of 
Order,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 1 (1996): 5–28; Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “The 
European Union and Central and Eastern Europe; Governance and Boundaries,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 211-232; Sandra Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘wider 
Europe’,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, (2004): 680–700. 
49 Thomas Christiansen, Ben Tonra and Fabio Petito, “Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The 
European Union’s ‘Near Abroad’,” Cooperation and Conflict 35, no.4 (2000): 389-416. 
50 William Wallace, “Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25,” Notre Europe 
Policy Paper 4 ( 2003).  
51 Karen E. Smith, “The Outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy,” International Affairs 81, no.4, 
(2005): 757-773. 
52 Judith Kelley, “New Wine in old skins: policy adaptation in the European neighbourhood policy,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2006): 29-55. 
53 Marise Cremona and Christophe Hillion, “L’Union fait a force? Potential and Limitations of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy,” in European 
Neighbourhood Policy: the Case of Ukraine, eds N. Copsey and A. Mayhew (Brighton: Sussex European 
Institute, 2007). 
54 Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: what's at stake with the European 
neighbourhood policy towards the southern Mediterranean?,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no.1 
(2005): 17-38. 
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southern neighbourhood and its effectiveness.55 A number of scholars, including Barbé, 
Costa, Herranz and Natorski, looked at the ENP from the perspective of the 
externalisation of the EU rules outside of its borders, focusing particularly on the 
eastern neighbourhood.56 Although the early studies focused on the policy itself, there 
has been an increasing literature on specific regions (i.e. the southern and eastern 
neighbours) due to the growing regional differentiation within the ENP. While Mayhew 
and Hillion’s work questioned the added value of the Eastern Partnership57, a number of 
scholars looked at the bilateral dimension and focused on the bilateral relations with 
individual countries in the framework of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership.58  
 
Migration cooperation with the EU’s neighbourhood has attracted a considerable 
amount of scholars as a contentious topic with significant security repercussions for the 
EU Member States. The literature on the eastern enlargement and new borders of the 
Union following their accession referred to migration as one of the issues that needs 
particular attention.59 In discussing matters related to the EU’s migration and border 
policy, Monar put emphasis on the challenges of the 2004 eastern enlargement with 
respect to the management of the EU’s eastern external border in view of the Schengen 
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integration process.60 Geddes’s work pointed at the changing structure and dynamics of 
the EU’s border relationships in the post-Cold War era.61  
 
The studies on the external dimension of the EU migration policy predominantly 
concentrated on the ‘externalisation’ dimension. In parallel to the broader normative 
approach and the focus on the security-liberty nexus in the EU literature on migration, 
the externalisation literature for the most part dealt with the ‘effect’62 of the increasing 
importance attached to migration in the EU’s relations with third countries in the 
broader field of justice and home affairs. One of the early analyses on the external 
dimension offered by Boswell focused on the externalization tools and preventive 
measures that are employed by the EU.63 Lavenex and Ucarer focused on the transfer of 
the EU’s migration and asylum policies outside its borders.64 In terms of geographical 
focus, the cooperation with the neighbours of the EU in the area of migration received 
particular attention. Lavenex pointed at the ‘selective’ extension of the EU’s internal 
institutionalization in the area of justice and home affairs towards its new neighbours 
due to presupposed risks and also responsibilities after the enlargement.65  
 
Although the implementation dimension has received high attention, there is a gap in 
the literature with respect to a comprehensive decision-making analysis concerning the 
external dimension of migration. The existing literature mainly concentrates on the 
member states’ policy positions that have been manifested through the European 
Council or the Council of the EU documents. A number of studies addressed the 
decision-making process in the broader field of justice and home affairs. Monar’s work 
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on ‘the international actor-ness’ of the EU focused particularly on the legal framework 
of the broader justice and home affairs field including the aspects that are related to 
migration in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. In terms of the dynamics of 
decision-making processes, Pawlak, in his contribution to a recent special issue on the 
external dimension of justice and home affairs area, pointed at its ‘cross-pillar nature’. 
He underlined the involvement of policy-actors from justice and home affairs and 
external relations fields in the course of decision-making process.66 Particularly in the 
case of EU policy towards the eastern neighbourhood, the role of the external relations 
officials who have gained horizontal competence (across the policy areas that have been 
integrated within the ENP) have particularly increased in line with the ENP and the 
Eastern Partnership. In line with Pawlak’s view on the external dimension of the justice 
and home affairs policy area, the research on the external dimension of migration 
requires a detailed institutional analysis which looks into both the inter and intra-
dynamics of the institutions. There have been a limited number of studies with respect 
to the role of individual actors. For example, Boswell offered an intra-institutional 
analysis with respect to the external dimension of migration, focusing on the European 
Commission Directorates demonstrating different policy preferences.67 However, there 
is a lack in the literature with respect to a comprehensive analysis of the EU decision-
making processes in this policy area.  
 
There is also a gap in the literature with respect to comparative analyses of different 
forms of migration cooperation with third countries. Most of the works on the external 
dimension of migration focus on a specific policy area such as readmission or visa 
dimensions. For instance, Cassarino68 looked at the readmission agreement negotiations 
with the EU’s neighbours. Another study, offered by Trauner and Kruse, focused on the 
visa facilitation agreements and readmission agreements with the EU’s 
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neighbourhood.69 A detailed analysis of the Mobility Partnerships was offered by 
Sandra Lavenex and Rachel Stucky that assesses the evolving holistic approach of the 
EU with respect to their relations with third countries in the area of migration.70 A 
comprehensive policy analysis was presented by Geddes who looked at different 
elements of the EU’s cooperation with third countries underlying the legal, illegal and 
development cooperation dimensions that have been discussed at the EU level in the 
area of external dimension focusing on the EU-South East Europe and EU-Middle East 
and North Africa relations.71 Parallel to the increasing emphasis that the EU has put on 
adopting a holistic approach to migration 72 , further research with respect to a 
comparative analysis of different dimensions of cooperation is needed.  
 
The review above indicates that significant scope exists for further research in relation 
to the decision-making processes that have been developed in the area of the external 
dimension of migration in the EU. There is particularly a gap in the literature with 
respect to the role and involvement of institutional actors in the course of EU decision-
making processes and the dynamics in the EU institutions. This has become even more 
important bearing in mind that the regional policy frameworks such as the ENP and the 
Eastern Partnership have strengthened the involvement of different actors. In light of the 
evolution of EU cooperation in the area of external dimension of migration, the thesis 
fills this gap by looking both at the policy positions of the Member States and the 
institutional framework of the EU in the policy area.  
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In addition, scope for more research exists with respect to studies that integrate different 
areas of migration cooperation with third countries. Although the external dimension of 
the EU’s migration policy has traditionally focused on irregular migration and asylum, 
the EU has been working on integrating different areas of migration in its cooperation 
with third countries (particularly with its neighbours) since the adoption of the Global 
Approach to Migration in 2005. The ENP and the Eastern Partnership frameworks have 
incorporated this holistic approach. Looking at four dimensions of migration 
cooperation that the EU has integrated into its partnerships with the eastern neighbours, 
the thesis enables a comparative analysis.  
 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the thesis, in its attempt to fill the gap regarding 
the EU decision-making in the area of external dimension of migration, assesses the 
intergovernmentalist and institutionalist approaches to EU decision-making processes. 
In the following section, the theoretical framework introduces the main analytical 
approaches and specific hypotheses that are tested. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework  
 
The research analyses the EU level decision-making process concerning the external 
dimension of migration through two different sets of theories: (i) 
intergovernmentalist/state-centric approaches that underline the role of member states 
and (ii) institutionalist approaches that shift the focus of the EU decision-making debate 
from a purely intergovernmental examination to an analysis of institutional actors and 
dynamics within the EU.  
 
This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis in three parts. In the first 
part, an overview of how these conflicting approaches to EU decision-making relate to 
the external dimension of EU’s immigration policy is articulated. The second part 
reviews the development and main assumptions of these two theoretical approaches. 
After an overview of intergovernmental and institutional approaches, the final part 
presents the specific hypotheses drawn from them in relation to the EU policy making 
in the field of migration towards EU’s eastern neighbours. 
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2.2.1. Review of the intergovernmental and institutional approaches to EU 
decision-making  
 
2.2.1.1. Intergovernmentalist theoretical approaches to the EU  
 
In the 1960s, the state-centric theoretical approaches were advanced drawing upon the 
realist theory of international relations to explain European integration and policy-
making. This development was triggered with Hoffmann’s critique of the pluralistic 
perspective of the neo-functionalist school.73 Intergovernmentalist approaches share the 
notion that member states’ governments are the main actors at the EU level. Hoffmann 
underlines that the EU institutions and integration are not able to constrain member 
states concerning the issues that are politically salient.  
 
In 1966, Hoffmann introduced the term ‘high politics’ to identify the policy domains 
that member states seek to sustain their national control in line with state-centric 
theoretical approaches to the EU.74  According to Hoffmann, the preservation of 
national sovereignty is considered much more important in ‘high politics’ areas, such as 
foreign policy, compared to economics and social policies which are generally 
considered under the category of ‘low politics’. Although this classification could give a 
broad guideline, it is not absolute as the ‘momentary saliency’ of an issue could blur the 
distinction between these two categories.75 Hoffmann later propounded a rather more 
flexible classification to reflect potential changes in regards to the issues’ salience. He 
argued that ‘high politics’ issues tend to bring about a ‘zero-sum’ or ‘quid pro quo’ 
situation among member states. On the other hand, ‘low politics’ could be identified as 
the issues that enhance the ‘common good’ at the EU level.76 Drawing on from the 
intergovernmentalist approach to EU policy-making, Hoffmann argued that the high 
politics issues are to a large extent dominated by inter-state negotiations and subject to 
limited institutional constraints.  
                                               
73 Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western 
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Building on traditional intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik put forward an alternative 
explanation, liberal intergovernmentalism, through combining an inter-state bargaining 
approach with the assumptions of liberal theory.77 Liberal intergovernmentalism shares 
the ‘rational state behaviour’ assumption of traditional intergovernmentalism which 
claims that states predominantly make decisions based on the calculation of costs and 
benefits of an action.78 Drawing from the realist paradigm of international relations, 
intergovernmentalism considers EU member states as rational actors interacting in a 
‘zero-sum’ environment.79  It highlights the need for ‘shared interest’ among EU 
member states that could bring about the prospect of integrated policy-making at EU 
level. Member states’ governments take part in common policies at EU level based on 
the calculation of their national interest.80 Traditional intergovernmentalism has a 
monolithic notion of national interest. It is argued that states are unitary actors and 
hierarchically the governments of EU member states have an absolute control over 
policy decisions.81  
 
Diverging from traditional intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism applies 
two international relations elements one after the other in attempts to explain preference 
building at national level and inter-state bargaining at EU level.82 Although both 
traditional and liberal intergovernmentalism conduct an ‘intergovernmental analysis of 
interstate bargaining’, liberal intergovernmentalism challenges the realist ‘national 
interest’ view of traditional intergovernmentalism with a ‘neo-liberal’ preference 
building dimension at domestic level.83 According to Moravcsik, the preferences of EU 
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member states are determined as a result of ‘domestic political conflict’.84 The main 
element in the formation of national preference is considered as ‘microeconomic 
interests’ that restrict the actions of state at the international level in line with the neo-
liberal idea. 
 
The intergovernmentalist school adopts a narrow definition of supranational decision-
making. Intergovernmentalist theories assert that the EU integration process does not 
lessen the power of national governments. Acknowledging that European integration 
involves a ‘pooling of sovereignty’ among member states, it is argued that ‘negotiation 
and coalition-building take place within the context of agreements between 
governments’.85 They underline that the durability of EU level negotiations depends on 
the interest calculations of member states rather than an uncontrollable spill-over affect. 
Hoffmann argued that the EU institutions do not have independence from member 
states. EU Institutions are subject to member state influence and in particular to the 
superseding power of the European Council.86 
 
Moravcsik underlined the relative bargaining power of the member states concerning 
policy-making at the EU level and argued that EU decision making exemplifies ‘inter-
state bargaining’.87 Like Keohane and Hoffman, Moravcsik also stressed that the 
perceived interests of member states make cooperation possible at the international 
level. According to Moravcsik, there is not a collective interest development at the EU 
level in line with the intergovernmental approach.88 Equally, the competences and 
autonomy of the supranational institutions are marginal in liberal intergovernmentalism 
as well.89 Similar to traditional intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism 
also argues that states are ‘unitary actors’ at the EU level. Although Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism focuses on explaining EU treaty negotiations under the unanimity 
principle where member states are not bound by day-to-day policy-making procedures, 
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he claimed that liberal intergovernmentalism could be explanatory for the EU’s routine 
decision-making process as well.90 Beyond the grand bargains of treaty negotiations, it 
was underlined that unanimity is central to decisions reached at European Council 
summits in which member states broadly direct general EU decision-making process. 
Studies on decision-making of the Council of Minister meetings also demonstrate that 
there is a tendency to seek consensus among member states irrespective of formal 
decision-making procedures. Unanimity among member states was particularly 
underlined concerning the policy domains in which member states still retain their 
formal veto.91  
 
The intergovernmentalist approach emphasises the prevalence and use of bargaining 
among member states to protect their national interests. Both the application of 
traditional intergovernmental approaches and two-level liberal intergovernmentalism of 
Moravcsik to EU policy-making process face with criticism particularly due to their 
sole focus on the role of states as units/actors and inter-state bargaining. New 
institutionalist theoretical approaches challenge the focus on ‘self-interested’ individual 
behaviour approach underlining the impact of EU’s institutional dynamics.  
 
2.2.1.2. Questioning the intergovernmental dominance in external dimension of 
immigration 
 
Migration by and large has been considered a ‘high politics’ issue in Western Europe as 
a result of its increased salience since the end of the Cold War in 1989.92 The political 
instabilities and economic problems in various eastern bloc countries paved the way for 
high levels of migration, mainly based on humanitarian grounds, to Western European 
countries by the early 1990s. For a number of European governments who had been 
trying to limit mass migration since the early 1970s, the increase in migratory 
movements, that put pressure on asylum systems in particular, further triggered the 
salience of the issue. Although the domestic level had been the exclusive domain for the 
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EU member states to address migration related concerns, the considerable increase in 
east-west migratory pressures prompted European level action. There was an EU level 
agreement regarding the need to address the potentially destabilising effects of 
migration from the countries of the former eastern bloc in view of the highly weak post-
war political and economic conditions in the region. In 1992, the EU member states 
agreed to adopt a set of principles on ‘governing external aspect of migration policy’ at 
the Edinburgh European Council outlining their shared concerns.93 Addressing the 
issues at the EU level was particularly significant for some member states’ governments 
such as Germany and France that had been constrained at the domestic level by the 
parties in opposition or due to disagreements among the coalition partners to adopt 
restrictive migration policies.94 According to state-centric approaches to EU decision-
making, the Europeanization of the policy area further strengthened the role and control 
of ‘the executive’ over policy outcomes.95 
 
As underlined in the previous Chapter, the external dimension of the EU’s migration 
has evolved as a policy domain between the EU’s external policy and its migration 
management practices. Third countries have been increasingly obliged to take on further 
responsibilities regarding fighting against unwanted migration as a precondition for 
cooperation with the EU in other fields.96 Being at the intersection of external relations 
and justice home affairs policy domains, the management of external dimension of EU 
migration policy was firmly tilted towards the intergovernmental circle of justice and 
home affairs officials in its initial years. 97  While the Member States made 
commitments towards the communitarisation of migration policy with the ratification of 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the justice and home affairs officials in the Member 
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States in particular have tried to retain an intergovernmental control over the decision-
making process. 
 
Drawing on international relations, intergovernmentalist theoretical approaches to the 
EU predominantly put their state-centric models to the test with negotiations concerning 
further integration and treaty reform among EU member states. On the other hand, the 
analytical tools of intergovernmentalist theories are also adjusted to explain the routine 
decision-making mechanism of the EU. This is mostly relevant for ‘high politics’ areas 
that are central to national sovereignty.98 
 
Intergovernmentalism has been perceived in the literature as relevant to the EU 
decision-making in the area of external dimension of migration due to its salience for 
the member states. Due to the salience, the so-called supranational institutions, 
particularly the European Commission, are cautious to avoid a backlash by member 
states who would perceive the Commission to be usurping their role. Moreover, there 
has been a re-nationalisation at the EU level with the increasing emphasis put on 
cooperation among smaller groups of states outside of the EU framework.99 Despite the 
communitarisation in the policy area since the Amsterdam Treaty, these trans-
governmental networks that operate alongside the formal EU institutional frameworks 
have an inclination to dominate the formal institutional decision-making mechanisms.100 
 
Taking into account the complex institutional structures and decision-making 
mechanisms in the EU, it is challenging to explain EU decision-making from the 
perspective of macro-level international relations theories. The main criticism to the 
historical dominance of international relations theories in explaining EU decision-
making came from comparative politics scholars.101 Questioning the state-centric focus 
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of the intergovernmentalist approach, Hix argued that the ‘internal institutional 
dynamic’ that was created within the EU could influence state behaviour and 
preferences at the EU level. Drawing from comparative politics, the new institutional 
approaches to the EU, according to Hix, could be considered as an alternative to analyse 
the ‘decision-making environment’ within the EU.  
 
According to Peterson, EU decision-making process could be evaluated at three levels. 
The first level is ‘history-making decisions’ that lead up to changing ‘the way the EU 
works as a system’.102 This could occur if the treaty changes are negotiated or major 
strategic (policy or budgetary) decisions are taken by the heads of states or 
governments. The second level is the ‘policy-setting’ level where broad choices 
regarding different policy options are made. These decisions are taken among the EU 
institutions (mainly dominated by the Council of Ministers). The last level is the policy-
shaping or sectoral level where the decisions regarding the specific details of how 
policies are made. Peterson underlined the role of directorates-generals in the European 
Commission and preparatory technical working groups in the Council of Ministers. The 
role of ‘political control’ is less effective at this level. Peterson argued that although 
‘macro-theories’ (such as neofunctionalism, neorealism, intergovernmentalism) are 
instrumental in explaining ‘history-making decisions’, they are not helpful in terms of 
portraying the levels below due to the impact of the institutional framework of the 
EU.103 He affirms that ‘‘The EU's institutional architecture ‘loads’ the decision-making 
process in favour of certain outcomes when policies are set. The new institutionalism 
helps us to come to grips with the way in which policy outcomes reflect the preferences 
of EU institutions (not only member states); different systems for deriving national 
preferences; and (most importantly), the effects of institutional change or 
continuity.’’104 
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According to Cram, the role of the EU institutions is important ‘in explaining the way in 
which policy agendas are set, the shape in which proposals are presented for approval 
by national governments, the means by which policy intervention is justified, the types 
of policy instruments which are selected for policy implementation and the way in 
which support is mobilised for EU action’.105 Acknowledging the traditional supremacy 
of member state in the course of EU decision-making processes, Cram argued that the 
impact of the so-called supranational institutions of the EU could go beyond the day-to-
day decision-making and have an impact on ‘constitutional’ choices.106  
 
The following section presents an overview of the main assumptions of new 
institutionalism regarding EU policy-making process. The aim is to analyse the extent to 
which an institutionalist approach provides greater explanatory value to the case of the 
external dimension of the EU’s migration policy.  
 
2.2.1.3. New Institutionalism  
 
The new institutionalist perspective to politics was developed in the 1980s and 1990s 
building on traditional institutionalist theories.107 The older institutionalist approaches 
underlined the importance of formal institutional structures to understand different 
political contexts. As the focus shifted away from institutions in the 1950s, the old 
institutionalist approach was challenged by individual level analyses, such as 
behaviouralism and rational choice, which refused the institutional restrictions on 
individual actors. 108  The new institutionalism has revived the old institutionalist 
approaches to political science through questioning the supremacy of purely self-
interested individual behaviour.109 
 
The definition of institutions offered by North was cited by a number of scholars. He 
defined institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are humanly 
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devised constraints that shape human interaction’. 110  The new institutionalist 
approaches to politics stress the ‘role’ of political institutions. Institutions are 
considered ‘political actors’ with certain level of independence.111  Although new 
institutionalism does not underestimate the influence of political circumstances and 
preferences of individuals in policy and decision making process, ‘preferences’ are not 
considered as stable according to the new institutionalist approach.  
 
According to Bulmer, institutions stretch ‘beyond the formal organs of government to 
include standard operating procedures, so called soft law, norms and conventions of 
behaviour’. 112  In line with its comprehensive definition of institutions, the new 
institutionalism defines institutions not only as strict and formed administrations. 
Instead, they are considered actors outside the formal structure of government that have 
associations and concerns in relation to policy-making.113 Opposing purely ‘rationalist 
and functionalist’ approaches, new institutionalism considers official administrative 
bodies interrelated with institutional ‘norms’ such as ‘beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures 
and knowledge’.114   
 
Despite their broad agreement on the fact that institutions make a difference, there are 
three main divisions within the new institutionalist approach: (i) rational choice, (ii) 
historical and (iii) sociological variants of institutionalism. These three main variants 
diverge based on their focus and assumptions regarding the involvement and impact of 
the institutions on politics of the EU.  
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Rational Choice Institutionalism  
 
As put by Armstrong and Bulmer, rational choice institutionalism is the ‘thin’ form of 
new institutionalism.115 Rational choice institutionalism concentrates on the short-term 
impact of institutional procedures in the course of policy-making process rather than 
looking at the long-term transformative power of political institutions.116 Building on 
neoclassical economics, North argued that rational actors aim at maximizing their gains 
operating in a certain institutional structure.117 The preferences of these self-interested 
actors are regarded as fixed and not subject to influence from institutional structures.  
 
In the EU framework, the rational choice variant of institutionalism focuses on the 
behaviours of policy-makers who are assumed to act as strategic actors with exogenous 
preferences.118 It is argued that the main aim of strategic national actors is to increase 
the efficiency and bring down the cost of EU level decision-making. However, the 
behaviours of rational actors are constrained within the EU institutional structure, 
thereby forcing them to ‘recalculate’ their actions at the EU level.119 According to 
rational choice institutionalism, institutions are described as ‘formal legalistic entities 
and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-interested political 
actors’.120  Rational choice institutionalism attempts to explain the way in which 
national actors interact with each other within the EU’s institutional structure.121 In line 
with the rational choice approach, the EU member states are restricted by the decision-
making procedures at EU level for the policy areas that unanimity rule does not apply. 
Rational choice institutionalism argues that member states are forced to change their 
strategies concerning the decisions that should be taken using the Community 
method.122  
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Historical Institutionalism  
 
As put by Pierson, historical institutionalism is ‘historic because it recognizes that 
political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time’ and 
“institutionalist because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these 
temporal processes are embedded in institutions-whether these be formal rules, policy 
structures or norms’.123 The historical institutionalism introduces the concept of ‘path 
dependence’. 124  Hall and Taylor stated historical institutionalism affirms that 
institutions, as enduring actors to a great extent, construct certain ‘paths’.125 In other 
words, historical institutionalism stresses that decision-making is influenced by the 
practice and boundaries of former institutional structures.126   
 
Pierson identified how historical institutionalism contradicts the assumptions of the 
inter-governmental approach and neo-functionalism. 127  The main aspects of 
intergovernmental bargaining criticised by Pierson are: ‘centrality of sovereignty, 
instrumentality of institutions, and centrality of intergovernmental bargaining’. 128 
Pierson underlined that historical institutionalism accepts the intergovernmentalist 
argument that member states are the predominant ‘institution builder’ actors and that the 
main aim of member states is to realize their own interest. However, member states are 
not considered to have the sole control of decision making processes. According to 
historical institutionalism, although member states aim to realize their interests and limit 
the power of supranational institutions, ‘institutional evolution’ is hard to restrain. As 
institutions are given power by member states to realize states’ aims and also to 
maintain efficient decision-making, the member states eventually empower the 
supranational institutions rather than limiting their role. According to historical 
institutionalism, it is asserted that the ‘EC organisations will seek to use grants of 
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authority for their own purposes, especially to increase their autonomy’.129 Although 
neo-functionalism puts forward the expansion of the power of supranational institutions, 
Pierson argued that the arguments of neo-functionalism fail to explain why member 
states are not successful in reacting against supranational institutions.130 Firstly, the 
governments of member states are mostly worried about immediate benefit rather than 
long term. Secondly, the unforeseen outcomes of decisions and also the changing 
preferences of member states are considered the ways in which institutions find loop 
holes to empower themselves. Another criticism of new institutionalism is that the 
intergovernmentalist approach fails to consider the changing preferences of member 
states.131 
 
Sociological Institutionalism  
 
Sociological institutionalism attempts to explain the long term impact of institutional 
frameworks on the policy-making process.132 The cognitive and psychological features 
of the institutions are underlined by sociological institutionalism.133 As opposed to 
rational choice institutionalism that considers preferences of policy makers to be 
exogenous, sociological institutionalism argues that preferences of policy-makers are 
also influenced by the EU’s decision-making process.134 In relation to the assumptions 
related to policy-actors, this approach also draws from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
concept of March and Olsen.135 As opposed to ‘logic of consequences’ which solely 
evaluates the relation between actors’ actions and their exogenous preferences to 
explain actor behaviour, ‘logic of appropriateness’ argues that the relation between 
behaviour and ‘identities, rules and institutions’ should be taken into account to explain 
actors’ actions.136 Adopting a constructivist approach, sociological institutionalism 
argues that institutions do not only affect the actors’ plan of actions and strategies at the 
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EU level as proposed by rational choice institutionalism. Going beyond formal rules 
(such as the legal basis of decision-making procedures) that are taken into account by 
rational choice institutionalism, it is argued that institutions, as informal rules and 
norms, also influence the identity of actors.  
 
As presented above, the three approaches drawn from new institutionalism vary 
concerning their assumptions on actors and the way they conceptualise the impact of the 
EU's institutional framework on decision-making process. Overlapping with the 
assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism, rational choice institutionalism focuses on 
self-interested actors with exogenous/given preferences who undertake bargaining at the 
EU level. On the other hand, the other variants argue that preferences of member states 
could be altered/developed and that they are ‘endogenous’ to the political course of 
action.137 As opposed to rational choice institutionalism that only looks at official 
institutional structure, historical and sociological institutionalist approaches also 
examine internal structure and decision-making process within institutions.138  
 
The differences among different variants of new institutionalism could call into question 
the extent to which new institutionalism is a ‘unified body of thought’.139 Although 
each institutionalism has a different focus concerning the relations between actors and 
institutions, they are connected with a common analytical ground.140 Despite their 
differences, Hall and Taylor argue that an interchange, rather than strict differentiation, 
among these variants could enhance the explanatory power of new institutionalism as 
each variant focuses on a partial dimension.141 In the EU context, all three main 
variants of new institutionalism challenge the sole focus of intergovernmentalism on 
member states despite their different views concerning the characteristics and extent of 
institutional influence. Instead of differentiating the three variants of new 
institutionalism, the research integrates these three approaches to assess the impact of 
the EU's institutional dynamics on EU decision-making. In the following section, the 
research presents the hypotheses that are drawn from the broad assumptions of 
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intergovernmental and institutional approaches regarding the EU decision-making 
process.  
 
2.2.2. The Hypotheses  
 
In explaining EU decision-making, the intergovernmentalist and new institutionalist 
approaches differ in how they identify (i) main policy actors, (ii) the mode of policy-
making process and (iii) policy outcomes (See Table 1). According to 
intergovernmentalism, member states are the sole policy actors. Although 
institutionalists agree that member states are central to EU decision-making process, 
they consider the ‘autonomous’ roles of EU institutions as well. These two approaches 
also diverge concerning decision-making process at the EU level. The 
intergovernmental approaches argue that decisions are reached based on an ‘inter-state 
bargaining’ among member states at the EU level. On the other hand, new 
institutionalist theories consider the intervening role of EU institutions. Regarding the 
policy outcome level, the intergovernmental approach argues that EU policy outcomes 
reflect the policy preferences of powerful member states. Institutionalists challenge this 
argument stating that policy outcomes are subject to the EU's institutional structure.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of intergovernmental and institutionalist approaches  
    Intergovernmentalist 
approaches 
New Institutionalist approaches  
Policy-actors member states member states; institutions  
Decision-making process  inter-state bargaining without 
institutional constraints  
member states are central; but 
institutions act as intervening 
variables 
Policy-outcome dominated by policy 
preferences of powerful 
member states  
policy outcomes are subject to 
institutional influences  
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This thesis is mainly concerned with explaining the EU decision-making process. The 
intergovernmental and institutionalist approaches differ based on the mode of decision-
making process in the EU. The intergovernmental approaches argue that EU decision-
making is a result of an inter-state bargaining process. Drawing from state-centric 
approaches to EU decision-making, Moravcsik argued that the exogenous preferences 
of member states define ‘a bargaining space’ for the member states in which they could 
reach certain policy outcomes.142  He underlined that member states have certain 
preferences among possible policy outcomes as the advantages and disadvantages of 
potential policy outcomes differ among member states.143 The member states that are 
relatively more concerned about an issue take the role of ‘policy entrepreneur’. These 
policy entrepreneurs put forward proposals regarding policy directions, deals and 
concessions taking into account the preferences of powerful and concerned member 
states.144 
 
The ‘inter-state bargaining’ approach is challenged by the theoretical approaches that 
consider institutions as policy actors that have intervening roles in the course of 
decision-making processes. The policy preferences of member states are traditionally 
central to EU policy concerning the external relations of the EU and the area of 
immigration and asylum. However, alternative explanations could be drawn from 
institutionalist approaches regarding the comparative impact of member states and the 
intervening role of EU’s institutional structure pertaining to the decision-making 
process.  
 
Based on the intergovernmental and the institutional approaches outlined above, two 
main hypotheses were derived with respect to the way in which EU’s institutional 
structure affects decision-making process. The hypotheses focus on the relative impact 
and involvement of the member states and the EU’s institutional structure on decision-
making processes.  
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Intergovernmentalist approach 
 
H1 The EU decision-making process in the area of external dimension of migration is a 
result of inter-state bargaining among the Member States with aggregated exogenous 
policy preferences. 
 
Drawing from the assumptions of intergovernmental approaches to EU decision-
making, H1 argues that EU decision-making processes could be characterized as 
‘bargaining’ and the member states are the sole important actors. This hypothesis is also 
in line with the broader EU literature on EU decision-making concerning the external 
dimension of migration policy that argues that the preferences and concerns of the 
major EU member states (such as Germany, the UK and France) have been the main 
determinant factors of the EU policy outcomes regarding this area.   
 
Institutionalist approach 
 
H2 The EU's institutional framework acts as an intervening factor with respect to EU 
decision-making process in the area of external dimension of immigration by 
constraining inter-state bargaining at the EU level.  
 
The second hypothesis is drawn from new institutionalist approaches that consider the 
EU's institutional structure as an intervening factor. This hypothesis does not over rule 
the importance of member states’ policy preferences. Instead, it offers a complementary 
dimension through looking at the intervening impact of the EU’s institutional structure 
with the aim of enhancing the explanation of the intergovernmental approaches.  
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Table 2. Intergovernmentalist and News Institutionalist Hypotheses  
Intergovernmentalism 
 
 
inter-state bargaining 
 
H1 The EU decision-making process 
in the area of external dimension of 
migration is a result of inter-state 
bargaining among the MS with 
aggregated exogenous policy 
preferences. 
 
New Institutionalism 
 
 
institutional decision-making 
 
H2 The EU’s institutional 
framework acts as an 
intervening factor with respect 
to EU decision-making process 
in the area of external dimension 
of migration by constraining 
inter-state bargaining at the EU 
level. 
 
 
This analysis integrates different approaches within the new institutionalist theory with 
the aim of maximising the findings regarding the intervening role of the institutional 
structure in the course of decision-making processes and the way it constrains the 
impact of member states. The hypotheses that are presented above are tested based on 
an analysis of the impact of the EU’s institutional framework in the course of EU 
decision-making processes. To analyse the impact of the EU’s institutional framework, 
the thesis focuses on two dimensions:  
 
1. The legal framework of EU decision-making regarding the external dimension of 
migration 
 
With the aim of answering the research question, the thesis, first, examines the degree to 
which the legal basis of EU action and decision-making procedures reinforce or restrict 
the impact of member states or institutional framework in the area of external dimension 
of immigration. A constitutional legal basis is essential for the EU to act and adopt 
measures in a policy area. In the area of migration policy, the EU legal basis has 
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evolved since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. However, due to the 
intergovernmental legal basis under the Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament did not have strong competences. The communitarisation 
process started with the Amsterdam Treaty which has triggered a gradual transfer of 
competences to the EU institutions. However, the legal basis of the EU was 
predominantly developed with respect to the internal issues in the area of migration. 
The external dimension has been a rather novel phenomenon.  
 
This first dimension of analysis is mainly in line with the assumptions of the rational 
choice institutionalism. As the rational choice institutionalism considers decision 
makers as rational actors who aim at maximising their interest, it is argued that the 
actions of policy makers are constrained due to the abolition of unanimity principle. As 
opposed to the ‘bargaining approach’ of intergovernmentalism, the extension of the 
Community method to areas such as immigration and asylum policies restricts the 
impact of member states according to institutionalist approaches. On the other hand, the 
legal and constitutional rights of the member states are taken into account. Member 
states could limit each other or EU institutions based on the legal framework. Parallel to 
this, decision-making procedures could enhance the role of EU institutions. The 
institutions could also constrain the behaviour of each other or national actors at 
different stages of EU decision-making process.  
 
The competences of the EU Institutions and the Member States differ with respect to the 
four case studies analysed in the thesis. By adopting a comparative approach, the thesis 
aims to present the expansion of the legal basis and the decision-making procedures in 
the EU in the area of external dimension of migration. 
 
2. The Institutional Dynamics 
 
Although the legal basis and the decision-making procedures are highly important for 
the EU or the Member States to act, it is also important to analyse the degree to which 
these different actors exercise their competences that are given under the EU’s legal 
framework. As a second dimension, the impact of the formal institutions of the EU on 
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decision making is analysed. The intergovernmentalist and institutionalist approaches 
differ substantially regarding the impact of the institutions on decision-making process. 
Although the ‘inter-state bargaining’ approach of intergovernmentalism assigns a 
limited role to the supranational EU institutions and underlines the role of the European 
Council (or the role of transgovernmental networks in this policy area), historical 
institutionalism in particular emphasizes the ultimate empowerment of the supranational 
institutions due to increasing resources and capacities in the course of EU integration.  
 
The research analyses the degree to which the EU Institutions have been able to exercise 
their competences. Although it is hard to disentangle different aspects of institutional 
influence, the thesis aims to analyse the extent to which the Member states and the EU 
Institutions have been able to effectively exercise their competences under the presented 
legal framework and the decision-making procedures. It particularly looks at the 
dynamics among the member states in the course of negotiations in the light of different 
decision-making procedures (i.e. unanimity and qualified majority voting), the 
independence of the European Commission’s agenda on an issue area from the policy 
preferences of the strong Member States while drafting its proposals, the role of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament in the course of policy 
negotiations. Looking at both the legal basis/decision-making procedures and the 
institutional involvement, the thesis aims to present a thorough analysis of the impact of 
the EU's institutional structure.  
 
With respect to empirical observations, the research evaluated the impact of the member 
states’ preferences and the institutional structure with respect to the external dimension 
of immigration policy focusing on four case studies: 1) irregular migration, 2) visa 
cooperation, 3) labour migration and 4) asylum cooperation. As the research is theory-
oriented, the empirical observations based on the case studies are compared with the 
opposing theoretical explanations (drawn from state-centric and non-state-centric 
theories) and not with each other. Nevertheless, the analysis of four case studies is 
useful given that the legal basis of decision-making, the competences of the EU member 
states and the institutions as well as the informal practices of decision-making differ 
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across these four areas of immigration. As such, this enables to observe the variation on 
the outcome.  
 
2.3. Methodology  
Given that the thesis is based on a case study analysis seeking in-depth answers to the 
research question identified in the previous Chapter, the use of qualitative research 
methodology is particularly relevant. Using traditional non-quantitative methods of data 
collection that are identified in this section, the research question is analysed based on 
four case study areas adopting a comparative approach and through the use of the 
process-tracing method. 
 
2.3.1. Case study analysis and the process-tracing method 
The thesis looks at the relevance and relative strength of the state-centric and 
institutional theories through drawing hypotheses based on these two theoretical 
approaches regarding the role and interaction of different actors in EU decision-making. 
The research does not attempt to draw ‘universal’ conclusions that could be horizontally 
relevant for the EU decision-making process based on the findings drawn from the four 
case studies of the research. Instead, the research examines the applicability of the 
theoretical concepts. Through examining the relation between state-centric and 
institutionalist theories and the case studies, the research aims at testing two competing 
theoretical frameworks in terms of their ability to explicate the EU decision-making 
concerning the eastern neighbours with respect to immigration issues. The testing of 
two hypotheses drawn from these theories across four different dimensions of 
immigration cooperation enables a demonstration of variance with respect to 
competences of the EU institutions, member states and practices of decision-making.145  
The competences of the EU Member States and the EU institutions and the practices in 
these areas differ in the four case studies of the thesis (i.e. irregular migration, visa 
cooperation, labour migration and asylum cooperation).  
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The research employs the process-tracing method146 due to its interest in mapping the 
process of decision making in the EU with respect to the eastern neighbours focusing on 
the case studies related to the immigration dimension of cooperation. Bearing in mind 
the complex structure of the EU decision-making process, process-tracing is considered 
as a useful method to analyse ‘intervening causal processes’. As such, the process 
tracing method allows us to conduct a detailed analysis of how the EU’s institutional 
structure affects policy outcome. With its complex structure, the EU decision-making 
process encompasses closely affiliated causal relations which are developed and 
extended in time. The research aims at exploring the linkages between different 
elements of the EU decision-making process in the context of the external dimension of 
migration. This is relevant for both the analysis of the legal basis and decision making 
procedures as well as the influence of the EU institutions in the course of decision-
making process. The four case studies that are chosen from the same policy area 
(immigration) are helpful in terms of comprehending the linkage and interaction 
between different actors (such as states and institutions) that are identified by the two 
competing theories that are compared. The analysis of the case studies also takes into 
account the ‘context factors’ that are specific to this relatively new (but fast developing) 
EU level cooperation in the area of migration policy. The case studies are used to 
understand the ‘interaction effects’ and the ‘causal mechanisms’ between different 
actors/components in this particular policy area.  
 
2.3.2. Data Collection  
The research collects data from three main sources: document analysis, elite 
interviewing and through secondary sources. Document analysis and interviews with the 
EU and member state officials who were involved in the decision-making process 
provided the data essential for conducting process tracing so as to identify the main 
causal linkages.147 
 
 
 
                                               
146 For the use of process-tracing method, see George and Bennett, 2005.    
147 For process-tracing method and elite interviewing, see Oisin Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite 
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2.3.2.1. Document Analysis 
As indicated above, primary data retrieved from official sources are highly important 
for tracing the process bearing in mind that the research is interested in the decision-
making process. With the aim of gathering data from primary resources, empirical 
research starts with the analysis of official documents pertaining to EU policy towards 
the Eastern neighbours that have been published by the EU Institutions and Member 
States. Primary data (retrieved from documents published including policy documents, 
reports and declarations) with respect to national and EU level decision-making as well 
as with respect to Eastern neighbours allows the research to conduct an in-depth 
analysis. Bearing in mind the varying level of involvement and commitment among the 
member states pertaining to the eastern neighbourhood, the project focuses on analysing 
the policy efforts of the most influential member states in this regard (France, Germany, 
Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom as noted above). Documentary data is 
obtained through official documents and reports that have been released based on 
bilateral and multilateral agreements or associations of these member states in relation 
to the new Eastern neighbours of the Union. These documents include agreements, 
meeting conclusions, proceedings, institutional reports, governmental or ministerial 
declarations regarding the position of these individual member states with respect to 
relations of the EU with new Eastern neighbours. Regarding the EU institutions, data 
gathering is carried out through tracing the process with respect to the evolution of 
decision-making process with respect to the development of EU level policy in the four 
case study areas of the thesis.  
 
2.3.2.2. Elite Interviews 
 
Interviews with policy officers and administrators both within the EU and member state 
institutions constitute the main data gathering part of the project. The consideration 
regarding conducting interviews with policy officer level actors is to ensure that 
interviewees have factual knowledge regarding the decision-making processes. Semi-
structured interviews with officials that are actively involved in the decision-making 
process are considered as ‘critical sources of information’ to analyse this decision-
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making process.148 The elite actors that are interviewed in Brussels, Berlin and London 
include member state officials based at the EU Permanent Representations and at the 
national ministries/agencies, EU officials based at the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Due to the cross-cutting 
nature of the external dimension of EU’s migration policy, the interviewees are selected 
both from the units in these institutions that are responsible with the regional dimension 
and also thematic dimension. This is particularly important due to the dynamic nature of 
the policy area with the introduction of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. These 
policies have increased the role of the regional officials by giving them horizontal 
mandates with respect to the EU’s cooperation with these countries. Although the 
migration field is known for being under the strong dominance of justice and home 
affairs officials, the thesis aimed to look at the involvement of actors who have regional 
and thematic focus. The interviews are conducted both with the officials who have 
regional competence regarding the region and the officials with sectoral focus on the 
immigration dimension.  
 
Instead of structured interview questions, empirically informed questions that are drawn 
from the chosen analytical framework (detailed earlier in this chapter) are asked to the 
interviewees with the aim of unfolding the informal processes of EU decision-making 
processes. As the research is interested both in the formal and informal dimensions of 
EU’s institutional framework, the interviews provide the insight and data on the internal 
mechanisms shaping the EU policy towards the region and specifically regarding 
immigration. To cross check the information provided and verify findings, a number of 
interviews with researches in think tanks and research institutions are also conducted.  
 
2.3.2.3. Secondary Sources 
 
The research uses both academic literature and documents produced by relevant 
organisations. Starting from the early stages of the research, academic literature on EU 
policy making, external relations and cooperation on the migration issues are consulted. 
Academic sources also fed into the following chapters and complemented the primary 
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data gathered through document analysis and elite interviews. In addition, both 
qualitative and quantitative data retrieved from other sources, such as Eurostat (the 
statistical office of the EU), the European Migration Network (that provides 
comparative data regarding immigration and asylum systems in the EU member states) 
and Frontex (the EU agency specialised in border management and security 
cooperation) on the immigration sphere complement the data provided by the EU and 
member states and help draw conclusions regarding the migratory pressure on the EU 
borders and on specific member states.  
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CHAPTER 3: The evolution of EU’s neighbourhood policy and its migration 
dimension 
 
This chapter deals with the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as horizontal policy frameworks that incorporate 
cooperation in several policy areas. It aims to show the increased importance of the 
relations between the EU and the three eastern European republics (i.e. Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus) since the early 2000s in view of the (then) upcoming EU’s 
eastern enlargement. The chapter also aims to point at the growing emphasis put on the 
relations between the EU and third countries regarding migration cooperation. 
 
The first section of the Chapter explains the development of the ENP as the overarching 
policy and the main framework governing the EU’s relations with its immediate and 
close neighbourhood. After providing an overview of the relations between the EU and 
the WNIS region in the aftermath of the Cold War under the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), the section discusses the development of the ENP and its tools. 
The section mainly points out the diverging and converging preferences among the 
Member States with respect to the geographical priorities of the EU in the wider 
neighbourhood.  It demonstrates how the eastern European countries have become a 
priority region for the EU which has paved the way for the development of a specific 
policy for the east (i.e. the Eastern Partnership). 
 
The second section of the Chapter focuses on the evolution of the external dimension of 
the EU’s migration policy since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. It 
presents the increasing importance of the cooperation with third countries in the area of 
migration for the Member States and their specific concentration on the cooperation 
with the immediate neighbourhood of the EU.  
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3.1. Overview of the EU policy towards eastern neighbours  
3.1.1. Background of the relations with the region after the Cold War  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the bilateral relations with Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova were not a priority for the EU Member States. As opposed to the relations 
with the central European states, there was not an EU level shared commitment to 
bringing the WNIS closer to the (then) European Community.149 In 1994, the EU 
concluded the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and Moldova.150 In comparison to the Association (European) 
Agreements that were negotiated with the central European states starting in the early 
1990s151, the PCAs were relatively weak forms of cooperation.152 Although they lacked 
strong policy instruments and commitments (in relation to integration to the EU), the 
PCAs aimed to set the ground for further cooperation between the EU and these 
countries based on political proximity and increasing economic relations. In 1995, a 
PCA was negotiated with Belarus but the agreement remains frozen due to the country’s 
political state and human rights concerns.153 
 
In 1999, the EU showed increased interest in the region adopting two ‘common 
strategies’ on Russia and Ukraine in the framework of the CFSP. Introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, common strategies are policy tools for the European Council to ‘set 
out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the 
Member States’ in the matters that they have shared interests.154 However, these second 
pillar policy instruments were largely considered as ineffective.155 Nonetheless, they 
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demonstrated an increased interest. Following the adoption of the first Common 
Strategy on Russia in June 2009156, the European Council adopted the second one on 
Ukraine in December 1999. Germany in particular supported the adoption of these 
policy instruments to enhance the EU policy towards the region.157 The European 
Council also agreed on common strategies with respect to the Mediterranean neighbours 
of the EU in 2000.158  
 
3.1.2. The development of the EU’s neighbourhood policy: Intergovernmental 
dialogues  
Due to the approaching eastern enlargement of the EU in the early 2000s, the Member 
States became more concerned about the EU’s relations with their future immediate 
neighbours. This was due mainly to the concerns related to the political and economic 
instabilities in the region. Moreover, the EU Member States that would like to give 
more emphasis on the relations of the EU with eastern Europe were aware of the fact 
that the upcoming accession of the central European countries to the EU would also 
support further engagement with the eastern neighbours. Poland already reflected its 
support to further EU enlargement to the east at the opening of the EU accession 
negotiations in 1998.159 
 
The EU level dialogue concerning the WNIS region was spurred by the British foreign 
secretary Jack Straw’s letter to the Spanish foreign minister, Josep Piqué, during the 
Spanish presidency in the first half of 2002.160 In his letter, Straw pointed out the 
potential security risks to the EU originating from the then future eastern neighbours 
that were both economically and politically in poor condition. The letter emphasized the 
need for improved security measures between the EU and new imminent eastern 
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neighbourhood due to the security risks including irregular immigration and trafficking. 
This view was by and large shared in the EU. There were several preventive measures 
(such as the border management support to the accession countries or their delayed 
inclusion to the Schengen zone) introduced ahead of the enlargement to secure the 
upcoming eastern borders. Straw specifically underlined the need for developing closer 
cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The letter proposed to recognise these 
three countries in the region as ‘special neighbours’ without tabling the prospect of 
future accession to the EU.161 As the so-called big bang enlargement was already 
considered a challenge for the EU integrity and in view of the enlargement talks with 
Turkey and the Western Balkans, there were strong reservations in the EU with respect 
to making further enlargement commitments. 
 
In April 2002, the Council asked the European Commission and the High 
Representative for the CFSP to come up with suggestions regarding plans for the EU to 
improve its relations with its eastern neighbours after the 2004 enlargement.162 With 
the call from the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the Commissioner for 
External Relations, Chris Patten and the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana presented a framework for an overarching neighbourhood policy in August 
2002.163 They wrote a joint letter identifying five priority measures for the EU: 
reinforced political dialogue, economic cooperation and closer trade links, cooperation 
on justice and home affairs including border management and migration, financial 
assistance and integration to the EU policies.164  
 
The relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus were among the priorities of the 
succeeding Danish Presidency in the second half of 2002 as well. In December 2002, 
the European Council Presidency Conclusions underlined that there is a ‘need for the 
EU to formulate an ambitious, long-term and integrated approach towards each of these 
countries, with the objective of promoting democratic and economic reforms, 
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sustainable development and trade, thus helping to ensure greater stability and 
prosperity at and beyond the new borders of the Union.’165  In the interview conducted 
for this thesis, the former German Ambassador to the EU underlined that ‘It is not a 
CFSP Policy. It is a common policy. When the first discussions came up, we asked the 
question what we should do and it was never a CFSP question.’166 Different from the 
former policy frameworks that were built under the CFSP, the ENP strategy paper 
opened up the possibility for partner country participation in the community 
programmes.167 With the ENP, the responsibilities of the Commission with respect to 
the preparation of the Action Plans and the running of the project have increased. In 
December 2002, the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, stressed the 
importance of integrating neighbours to the EU in his speech ‘A Wider Europe - A 
Proximity Policy as the key to stability’. Prodi proposed the main framework of the 
model for the Union to operate with respect to its neighbourhood that includes inclusion 
to the EU common market as well as further cooperation on the fronts of illegal 
migration, crime, security threats, environmental issues and regional conflicts. He 
confirmed that the model was taken from the enlargement practice without an explicit 
‘accession’ prospect for the future neighbours.168 
 
The European Security Strategy published in December 2003 emphasized the 
importance of ‘better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home 
Affairs policies’ in the EU to tackle with organized crime including irregular 
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migration. 169  The intensification of cooperation with the neighbours aimed at 
integrating the neighbouring countries to the EU and transferring responsibility beyond 
the EU borders.170 
 
3.1.3. Diverging regional priorities of the Member States: Eastern Europe vs. the 
Mediterranean  
The initial proposals in relation to the EU’s new neighbourhood initiative focused on 
the east. However, the scope of the policy gradually began to expand towards the 
broader neighbourhood of the EU.171 The Member States that were geographically 
closer to the eastern borders of the Union, in particular Germany, Austria and the 
northern Member States were in favour of furthering the relations with the upcoming 
eastern neighbours due to their proximity and closer relations with Eastern Europe.172 
The EU was also subject to demands from the (then) candidate countries (in particular, 
Poland) concerning enhancing the relations with the new neighbours of the Union.173 
On the other hand, the southern Member States reflected their concerns regarding the 
proposals for developing a specific policy for the eastern neighbours of the EU. They 
argued that a policy focusing exclusively on the east would have a negative effect on the 
EU’s relations with the southern neighbours. France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal 
shared the concern that the existing eastern focus of the Union (which had been there 
due to the eastern enlargement process) would be further accelerated.174 France in 
particular reflected its objections in relation to the shift of financial assistance towards 
the eastern neighbours and pressured the European Commission to not decrease the 
share of the southern neighbours concerning the financial support proportion between 
south and eastern neighbours.175  In addition to the southern Member States, the 
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Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and the Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky wrote a 
letter conveying and advocating a policy for the broader cooperation with the 
neighbourhood including Russia and the Mediterranean countries including Middle 
East.176 
 
In March 2003, the Commission presented the ‘Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ document. 
Referring to the neighbourhood, the document denoted both the eastern and southern 
neighbours.  In the east, the document referred to Russia and the WNIS (Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus). The southern neighbours referenced in the document were 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, 
and Tunisia. The framework did not include the countries that already have membership 
prospects such as the Western Balkan countries and Turkey.177 Although the proposal 
did not endorse accession, it entailed further details regarding the partnership and 
increased integration between the EU and its neighbourhood through gradually opening 
up the EU’s internal markets to these countries, as well as promoting the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons.  
 
The European Commission’s Wider Europe-Neighbourhood document was accepted by 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council in June 2003.178 The Council 
conclusions underlined that the relations with the neighbouring countries were based 
upon the ‘differentiation’ principle. Bilateral Action Plans (with specific targets for each 
country and individualized time-lines for the realization of these targets) were identified 
as the main policy instruments to be used to improve cooperation with individual 
neighbours. It was agreed that Action Plans were going to be based on cooperation that 
was already in place between the EU and an individual country. These Action Plans 
were ‘political agreements’ rather than legal documents agreed upon by the Union and a 
partner country.  
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In relation to the geographical scope of the policy, the Council also pointed at the 
possibility of including the ‘Southern Caucasian’ neighbours into the process.179 The 
decision with respect to the inclusion of the Southern Caucasian countries (Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan) into the ENP was taken in June 2004.180 Despite the interest 
from the EU side, Russia wanted to keep its relations with the EU at the bilateral level 
as a ‘strategic partner’ rather than being included into the ENP arguing that the policy 
did not signal an equal relationship between the EU and the neighbouring countries.181  
In 2003, a political agreement between the EU and Russia was reached to cooperate in 
four policy areas (including economy, justice and home affairs, external security and 
research and education) within the framework of ‘common spaces’ agreement.182 
 
3.1.4. From ‘all in one basket’ to ‘differentiated’ regional approach 
 
Putting both the eastern and southern neighbours in one basket, the ENP did not have a 
strong regional focus. As explained above, the underlying reason was the fact that a 
consensus among the Member States was needed for an EU wide commitment to the 
policy. The regional differentiation gradually occurred after the adoption of specific 
policies for the southern and the eastern neighbourhood. The southern dimension of the 
ENP – the Union for the Mediterranean- is built on the former Barcelona Process 
cooperation with the initiative of the French Presidency in 2008. For the eastern 
neighbourhood, a new policy – the Eastern Partnership - is launched in May 2009 based 
on a Polish-Swedish proposal. 
 
The EU cooperation with its Southern neighbours was initiated with the launch of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. 183 The Partnership aimed to promote 
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cooperation between the EU member states and twelve Mediterranean neighbours of the 
Union (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) in several areas including security, 
economy and socio-cultural exchanges.184 It offered bilateral and regional cooperation 
between the EU and its Southern neighbours to foster peace, stability and cooperation 
with and among the southern neighbours. With the introduction of the ENP, it was 
agreed to enhance bilateral assistance to the neighbouring states through Action 
Plans.185 It was agreed that Action Plans would be based on existing Association 
Agreements with the Mediterranean neighbours (excluding the case of Libya and Syria). 
This country-based approach from the ENP aimed to promote and reward reform 
processes from individual neighbours to advance relations and integration with the EU 
as opposed to regional approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.186 On the other 
hand, the regional approach that was promoted by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
is still considered significant to increase the cooperation and dialogue among the 
Southern neighbours of the EU. The recent initiative from France launched during the 
French Presidency in June 2008, ‘the Union for the Mediterranean’, aims to further 
boost the relations with the region as well.187 
 
With regards to the relations with the eastern neighbours, the ENP proposal did not 
receive high support from the Member States that have been in favour of further 
enlargement towards Eastern Europe. Although the eastern European neighbours would 
be eligible to apply for full accession to the EU under Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the ENP does not have a clause or clearly state that the partner 
countries will necessarily achieve membership status or be considered for accession. 
The lack of this commitment is viewed as a matter of concern by the EU Member states 
such as Poland that are strong proponents for the future membership of eastern 
neighbouring countries, in particular Ukraine. Although Poland favoured a policy 
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particularly for the eastern neighbourhood, the ENP put the eastern neighbours in the 
same category with the southern neighbours. However, the distinction between 
‘European neighbours’ and ‘Neighbours of Europe’ should be made according to 
Poland.188 The difference between ‘European Neighbours’ referring to the Eastern 
European neighbours and ‘Neighbours of Europe’ referring to the southern neighbours 
of the EU was underlined by the Foreign Minister of Poland Sikorski in line with the 
Eastern Partnership proposal in May 2008 as well. Sikorski stressed that the European 
Neighbours will have the ‘right’ to apply for EU membership.189 
 
3.1.4.1. A specific policy towards East: The Eastern Partnership 
The Eastern Partnership was put forward as a joint Polish-Swedish initiative pointing at 
the necessity to have deeper integration with the Eastern neighbours of the Union.190 
This Partnership was offered to six eastern partners including Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.191 The Eastern Partnership aims at furthering 
both economic and political relations with the Eastern neighbours through enhancing 
free trade cooperation, increased mobility, and cooperation in energy security as well as 
offering economic and social support to Eastern neighbours. The Eastern Partnership 
was presented as an initiative to be rooted in the ENP structure administered by the 
European Commission.192 
 
3.1.4.1.1. The Success of Poland’s eastern policy?  
The EU’s relations with the eastern neighbourhood have been an important item in 
Polish foreign policy pursued by sub-sequent Polish governments. There has been 
agreement among different political parties with respect to the need for an active eastern 
policy. In 1998, the Polish Foreign Minister Geremek proposed at the opening of 
Poland’s negotiations on membership to develop an eastern policy at the EU level with 
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countries remaining outside of the enlarged EU.193 Following an unpublished non-
paper on EU's eastern policy by the Polish Foreign Ministry in 2001, the first concrete 
Polish policy with respect to eastern neighbourhood is the non-paper presented at the 
Copenhagen Summit in December 2002.194  The non-paper highlighted the Polish 
perspective concerning cooperation with the eastern neighbours focusing primarily on 
the advancement of the relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as well as Russia. 
The proposal that was based on three pillars (Community, Governmental/Bilateral and 
Non-Governmental) was distributed to the EU Member States, candidate countries and 
eastern European countries. In February 2003, the succeeding Polish Foreign Minister 
Cimoszewicz further stressed Poland’s will and knowledge concerning shaping the 
EU’s eastern policy and the importance of the eastern dimension for the EU 
highlighting the enhancement of relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and 
Russia.195 Poland’s contribution to decision-making with its expertise in the region was 
considered an asset. 
 
The non-paper was developed parallel to EU level discussions concerning EU’s new 
neighbourhood policy initiative towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus spurred by the 
inputs from the UK and Sweden during the Spanish and Danish Presidencies in 2002.196 
Although Poland did not have formal decision making powers until its full accession to 
the EU, there was a considerable degree of overlap with the policy instruments proposed 
by Poland and discussed at the EU level concerning the new neighbourhood. The Polish 
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position mainly differed from the other actors involved in this process with its argument 
regarding the ‘long term accession membership’ for the neighbours. 
 
Parallel to the ENP’s geographical divisions initiated with the UfM proposal of France, 
Poland put more emphasis on the need for a specialized policy for the east and 
presented the Eastern Partnership proposal with the support and input from Sweden. In 
response to the UfM which calls for closer cooperation with the Southern neighbours of 
the Union, the Eastern Partnership aims at furthering both economic and political 
relations with the Eastern neighbours.  
 
3.1.4.1.2. The involvement of Sweden 
The partnership regarding the Eastern Partnership initiative between Sweden and 
Poland developed at the capital level in the lead of the Swedish and Polish foreign 
ministers, Sikorski and Bildt.197 The partnership between Sweden and Poland with 
respect to the common concerns in the eastern neighbourhood dates back to the 
‘Sweden-Poland: Baltic Sea neighbours in the new Europe initiative’ in 1999.198 
Sweden was one of the main supporters of the EU’s eastern enlargement including the 
accession of Poland not solely due to its broad support to the central European countries 
but also due to the common concerns in the shared neighbourhood. 
 
The Eastern Partnership initiative mainly evolved based on the preceding discussions 
with respect to developing a specific policy for the eastern neighbours. It aimed to alter 
and reform the existing ENP framework which was not welcomed by the eastern 
neighbours with EU membership inspirations and their proponents within the EU. The 
cooperation on the issue of eastern neighbours between Sweden and Poland was 
successful due to several factors. As opposed to the scepticism in the EU towards the 
new member states’ interest in the eastern neighbourhood, Sweden’s support for a 
specific policy on the eastern dimension of the ENP as a member state that has a 
broader geographical involvement was perceived as a more credible standpoint with 
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respect to the region. Sweden’s contribution to the Eastern Partnership proposal also 
underlined a common European approach rather than reflecting the interests of a certain 
group of member states which was essential to convince the member states that were 
lukewarm towards further emphasis on the eastern dimension. The Eastern Partnership 
was also considered as a way to signal the commitment of the EU in the eastern 
neighbourhood particularly for the neighbours that were sceptical towards the existing 
ENP framework.199 Sweden’s involvement in the Eastern Partnership initiative along 
with Poland as a member state that supports a ‘European perspective’ particularly for 
the WNIS helped to convince them to agree to a policy evolved within the broader 
framework of the ENP. In addition, the approaching Swedish Presidency in the second 
half of the 2009 was also considered as an asset to keep the issue on the EU agenda. 
 
3.1.4.2. Reaching a consensus on the Eastern Partnership initiative   
In June 2008, Poland and Sweden managed to convince the European Council that there 
was a need to have a specific eastern dimension within the ENP. Although there were 
concerns in relation to geographical separation within the ENP framework, the Union 
for Mediterranean initiative (UfM) of French President Sarkozy during the French 
Presidency justified a particular policy for the eastern neighbours. As put by an EU 
official, ‘The EaP is almost a direct result of the UfM. If there were no UfM, there 
would not be definitely an EaP’.200 The European Council asked the Commission to 
prepare the policy proposal for Spring 2009. 201  The proposal development was 
accelerated due to the Georgian conflict during August 2008. The European 
Commission was then asked to bring forward the EaP proposal date to December 2008.  
The events in the Caucasus in Summer 2008 were quite significant for the EU’s role at 
the international scene as well. In a way, it was realized that the frozen conflicts in the 
eastern neighbourhood of the EU required more involvement as well as commitment 
from the EU side. 
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In line with its policy towards the eastern neighbours, Poland built coalitions with other 
EU member states that shared its concerns with respect to the region. Intergovernmental 
consultation among the Member States was significant with respect to the Eastern 
Partnership initiative. Concerning the development of policy, the dialogue 
predominantly was between capitals through discussions at the ministerial level.202 
High level meetings also included contacts with the United Kingdom and Germany 
concerning the proposal development process. The support of Germany for the policy 
was particularly significant concerning the Eastern neighbourhood.203 The cooperation 
between the two countries along with France within the Weimar Triangle was also 
significant with respect to the relations with the neighbours in the framework of the 
ENP.204 The partnership with Germany was particularly underlined by the Foreign 
Minister Sikorski.205 
 
The timing of the Eastern Partnership was particularly significant taking into 
consideration the upcoming Czech Republic EU Presidency in the first half of 2009. 
The need for an increased emphasis on the relations with the eastern neighbours was 
shared among the Visegrad countries. The visegrad countries agreed on several issues 
such as ‘the question of energy policy, environmental protection, neighbourhood policy 
and cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus’.206 The Czech Presidency supported and put 
forward the Eastern Partnership proposal being in favour of further EU involvement in 
Eastern neighbourhood. In addition, the Baltic States have put emphasis on the EU’s 
relations with its eastern neighbours. Particularly Lithuania has been a significant 
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partner concerning the enhancement of the EU's relations with the region due to the 
shared concerns with respect to the neighbourhood and shared scepticism towards 
Russia.207 
 
Signed between the EU and its eastern partner countries in May 2009 in the course of 
the Czech Republic’s EU Presidency, the Eastern Partnership has constituted the 
‘specific eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy’.208 Although the 
Polish-Swedish initiative was successful concerning convincing the Member States to 
develop an EU level policy with respect to the eastern neighbours, the Eastern 
Partnership does not significantly alter the former ENP framework.209 The Member 
States were very cautious concerning not giving an accession perspective to its eastern 
neighbours. The red lines of the Member States concerning heated issues such as the 
accession prospect or granting additional financial aid for the eastern neighbours are 
reflected in the Eastern Partnership. The agreement does not point out the EU 
membership aspirations of the countries in the eastern neighbours.  
 
3.1.5. The Legal Basis of the ENP 
The ENP Action Plans that have been agreed upon by each neighbouring country are 
political documents and do not have legal basis. The Action Plans display the 
commitment and willingness of partner countries to comply with the EU’s legal 
framework. The progress of neighbouring countries with regards to fulfilling their 
commitments has been ‘closely monitored’ by the EU.210 The level of integration 
between the EU and its neighbours varies and is dependent on several factors including 
geographical and political differences and priorities. The legal basis of the relations 
between the EU and the neighbouring countries rests on Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements or Association Agreements. The current legal basis of the bilateral relations 
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with its Eastern neighbours dates back to the bilateral agreements in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. The Partnership and Cooperation agreements for Ukraine, Moldova, and the 
Russian Federation were signed in 1994. The agreement which was negotiated with 
Belarus remains frozen due to the political problems that hinder further cooperation.  
 
Among the eastern neighbours of the EU, the negotiations with Ukraine started in 2007 
to have an enhanced agreement which would offer a relatively more sufficient base for 
furthering relations with the Union to take the place of the PCA.211 In September 2008, 
the EU-Ukraine Summit declared that an association agreement replacing the PCA 
would further develop integration and mutual commitments with Ukraine.212 This 
agreement would be based on Article 217 TFEU.213 Replacing the initial Action Plan, 
the EU Ukraine Association Agenda was adopted in November 2009 by the EU Ukraine 
Cooperation Council.214 In December 2011, a consensus was reached between the EU 
and Ukraine regarding the Association Agreement.215 
 
With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the relations of the EU 
with its neighbours are included in the EU’s legal framework. The Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced Article 8 TFEU which refers to the ‘development of a special relationship 
with neighbouring countries’. This article could be considered a legal basis with respect 
to the ENP. Article 8(1) TFEU states that ‘[T]he Union may conclude specific 
agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal 
rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly.’ 
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3.1.6. Instruments of the ENP 
The instruments that are applied by the ENP resemble the EU’s pre-accession 
instruments. As the case for the accession process, the ENP aims for reform via 
internalization of EU norms and acquis by the neighbouring countries as well. Although 
the partner countries are not given an accession prospect, they are expected to gradually 
incorporate the legal framework of the EU. As enlargement, the ENP comprises a wide 
range of matters aiming to facilitate cooperation between the EU and the neighbouring 
countries. The cooperation with the partner countries includes following areas of 
importance ‘political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for 
gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s internal market; justice and home affairs; 
energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and 
social policy and people-to-people contacts’.216 The bilateral Action Plans for reforms 
have been prepared with each neighbouring country to evaluate the implementation of 
policies by the neighbours. Although the ENP stresses ‘joint ownership’ between the 
EU and a partner country, the EU predictably has a strong hand in determining the 
policy priorities for bilateral partnerships.  
 
The ENP strategy paper also underlined the importance of sharing ‘common values’ 
concerning ‘rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including 
minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of 
market economy and sustainable development’ including commitment to ‘fight against 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as abidance by 
international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution’.217 The integration of the 
neighbouring countries to the EU would be based on the incorporation of EU 
legislation, carrying out essential political, economic and institutional reforms as well as 
a commitment to these common values.218 The progress of the partner countries with 
respect to integrating the EU legislation and reforms would be evaluated by the 
European Commission. Successful integration of the EU legislation could enable the 
neighbours to be a part of the EU common market and to participate in ‘the free 
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movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)’ without full 
accession to the Union.219 
 
The introduction of the ENP has also paved the way for the restructuring of the EU 
assistance being offered to its neighbours. Initially, the funding for reforms in the 
partnering countries was primarily through various assistance programmes targeting 
different geographical locations.220 In 2007, a single framework, i.e. the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), was introduced to fund the reforms and 
policies in the partner countries in line with the individual partner country Action Plans. 
This new approach combined the originally disparate programmes under the ENPI. The 
former assistance programmes for countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the 
TACIS for the eastern partners (including Russia)221 and the MEDA programme, 
targeting the Mediterranean neighbours, were merged into this new funding instrument. 
 
Regarding the scope of the assistance available under the ENPI to fund ENP Action 
Plans with the neighbouring countries, 12 billion EUR in funds are allocated for the 
2007-2013 budgetary period, which marks a considerable increase in funding compared 
to previous budgetary periods.222 In addition to the funding under the ENPI, the 
neighbouring countries have been also offered financial assistance under additional 
programmes that target specific issues such as institution-building and support for 
meeting the governance targets outlined in the Action Plans.223  
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The EU has increased its financial commitment to the eastern neighbourhood in line 
with the ENP. As outlined in the Country Reports and the Action Plans, migration was 
particularly important for the EU among the areas that have received funding. This was 
due to the increasing emphasis put by the Member States on migration cooperation with 
third countries. The second part of this Chapter focuses on the evolution of the external 
dimension of EU’s migration policies.   
 
3.2. The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policies  
3.2.1. The Increasing External Dimension in the EU Migration Policy 
With the Schengen agreement in 1985, which aimed at abolishing the common borders 
between the signatory Member States, the EU level response to migratory pressures 
included transferring responsibilities and burden beyond the EU boundaries. With the 
aim of fighting with irregular migration flows, the EU has put forward policies to lessen 
this pressure through working on an external aspect of migration and pushing forward 
cooperation with third countries in the field of migration. The main focus has been on 
irregular migration and border management in particular in line with the creation of the 
border-free zone. The responsibilities transferred to third parties included handing over 
obligations to airline companies to check the documents of the passengers as well as 
appointing liaison officers to third countries to ensure that the passengers with 
inappropriate documents are handled on the territory of the country of origin before 
persons reach to the EU territory.224 
 
The transfer of responsibility to third countries with respect to asylum application 
pressures are dealt with the ‘safe third country’ principle, mainly with the central 
European countries following the end of Cold War and in the process of EU accession 
as a condition to the EU accession deal. After the Dublin Convention in 1991, the 
Central and Eastern European countries were given the ‘safe third country’ status where 
the EU member states could return asylum seekers who entered the EU territory from 
the eastern neighbours of the Union.225 Enlargement has been an effective tool for the 
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EU to conclude readmission agreements with third countries. In line with the Schengen 
agreement procedures, accession countries have to sign readmission agreements with 
EU Member States. 
 
The EU Member States also concluded ‘readmission agreements’ with various ‘safe 
third countries’ to return irregular migrants from these countries or who used these 
countries as transit routes to enter the EU. These early measures regarding the external 
dimension of the EU migration policy display a preventive approach reflecting the 
security orientation of the migration officials who then had full competence over 
decision-making. Under the readmission agreements, the EU member states and 
partnering countries agree to ‘readmit to their territory without any formality persons 
with the nationality of that country who are residing without authorisation in the other 
country or who have crossed its frontier illegally’.226 Thus, the ‘expulsion’ of the 
irregular third-country nationals from within the borders the Union is managed through 
the countries that consent to signing a readmission agreement with the Union. 
Cooperation in the field of migration, readmission agreements in particular, has become 
a part of the EU partnership with third countries. In 1999, the European Council 
decision put forward readmission agreements as a pre-requisite to agreements with third 
countries.227 Following that, the EU member states reiterated their determination to 
include cooperation in the migration field, above all irregular migration, in future 
European Council meetings as well. 
 
Readmission agreements have been concluded with several partner countries in East 
Asia, Western Balkans and in Eastern Europe. The first agreement between an EU 
country and a partner country was signed with Hong Kong in 2001 that came into force 
in 2004. The partnership agreement with Hong Kong was followed by agreements with 
Macao (2004), Sri Lanka (2005), and Albania (2005). Agreements were reached with 
the eastern neighbours (Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) and several western Balkan 
countries (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Montenegro, the 
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Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 2007.228 Although the European 
Commission has been given the competence to settle readmission agreements with 
Algeria, China, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey, the negotiation process for readmission 
agreements have been highly challenging.229 Although the readmission agreements 
could be concluded at the EU level being part of the community competence if the 
Member States give the mandate to the Commission, the bilateral relations of member 
states with third countries are highly significant for the ‘removal’ of irregular migrants 
through bilateral readmission agreements or as a part of agreements including various 
issues as well as clauses related to removal of irregular migrants.230 
 
In line with the targets of the Hague Programme, the EU member states approved ‘the 
Return Directive’ as a measure to combat with irregular migration in 2008. The Return 
Directive that aims at coordination among the Member States puts forward regulations 
to deport persons illegally staying in the EU countries. The Directive received high 
criticism from international organizations due to concerns in relation to the ‘return of 
irregular migrants in safety and dignity’.231 
 
3.2.2. The Global Approach to Migration 
In 1994, the European Commission published a Communication on ‘Migration and 
Asylum’ with the aim of identifying key areas within which the EU Member States 
should enhance cooperation to tackle and meet the challenges of surrounding the issue 
of migration. The Communication put forward three focal issues that require EU level 
cooperation: dealing with the causes of migration pressure, controlling migration flows 
and keeping migration within the manageable structures and improving integration of 
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migrants who are legally residing in the Union.232  Although the Communication 
displayed a rather comprehensive approach with respect to migration issues, the 
Commission could not have a considerable effect on the Member States due to the lack 
of competence in the area.  
 
The integration of migration policy within the external policies of the Union was first 
referred at the Tampere Council conclusions in 1999. In 2002, the Seville Council 
underlined that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the 
European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should 
include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory 
readmission in the event of irregular immigration’.233 The Commission presented its 
first Communication in 2002 on ‘Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s 
relations with third countries’ highlighting the incorporation of the migration issue into 
the development programmes of the Union to address the root causes and reduce the 
migratory pressures to the EU. 234  The Communication indicated that ‘migration 
development’ would be part of both existing and upcoming Association and Co-
operation Agreements between the EU and third countries. On the other hand, targeted 
development programmes have been a highly contentious issue in the EU. It was argued 
that migration objectives could undermine genuine development concerns.235 
 
The European Commission proposal ‘the Global Approach to Migration’ is a result of 
increasing tendency within the EU in terms of paying further attention to the external 
aspects of migration. Considering the migration pressures to the EU, mainly from the 
Mediterranean neighbours of the Union, the significance of boosting cooperation with 
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the countries of origin and transit has increased. With the aim of having a more 
‘comprehensive approach’ to migration issues, there was an agreement to offer 
increased legal migration opportunities to partner countries.  
 
At the Informal meeting of the Heads of States in October 2005 during the UK 
Presidency, the Member States addressed the issue of migration as one of the challenges 
to be tackled as a response to globalization.236 It was mainly the Southern Member 
States of the EU that complained regarding the high risks of irregular migration across 
the Mediterranean. The meeting triggered a re-evaluation of the EU’s migration 
cooperation with third countries. Following the meeting, the Commission presented the 
communication ‘Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First 
follow-up to Hampton Court’ in November 2005.237 The Communication underlined 
the measures to be taken as a response to the threat of irregular migration from the 
Mediterranean. Although the irregular migration from Sub Saharan Africa and North 
Africa was the main item of the agenda as a response to the Southern member states 
facing migratory pressures, the Commission also underlined the importance of the issue 
of migration in relation to Eastern neighbours of the Union as well.  
 
The importance of the links between migration and development, economy and growth 
was highlighted in the Commission’s communication.238 In addition, legal migration, 
being an area relatively weak in the EU, also has become a part of the initiative to open 
up legal channels to fight with irregular migration. In December 2005, the ‘Global 
Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean’ was 
agreed at the European Council meeting. In the Council conclusions of December 2005, 
it is stated that there is a ‘need for a balanced, global and coherent approach covering 
policies to combat illegal migration and, in cooperation with third countries, harnessing 
the benefits of legal migration’.239  The Council conclusions also highlighted the 
importance of the EU’s eastern, south eastern and southern neighbours for increasing 
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cooperation and the need for sufficient financial assistance to be distributed. In its 
communication ‘Global Approach to Migration: one year on’, the European 
Commission emphasizes the importance of responding the needs of the labour market 
through allowing for the admission of specific groups of migrants such as high skilled 
migrations or seasonal workers to the labour market.240 Bearing in mind the needs 
within the EU for seasonal or high skilled workforce as well as the needs in the EU’s 
partner countries, circular migration is also considered as a significant initiative. In line 
with the objective of having a more comprehensive approach to migration, the scheme 
to coordinate mobility partnerships with third countries are put forward by the European 
Commission. In this new scheme, the EU cooperates with Moldova and Cape Verde as 
the initial pilot partners.  
 
3.3. Chapter Conclusions  
 
The aim of this chapter was to present the evolution of the EU policy with respect to the 
WNIS region since the early 2000s. Despite the reluctance in the EU to develop strong 
bilateral links with the region after the end of the Cold War, the eastern enlargement of 
the EU paved the way for an increased EU involvement in the WNIS region. Although 
the EU had established a certain level of bilateral relations with the region with the 
introduction of the PCAs, the eastern enlargement of the EU has increased the 
importance of the region for the EU. The ENP was introduced as an umbrella policy for 
the EU to enhance its bilateral cooperation with the countries in its broader 
neighbourhood. This policy was offered both to the eastern and southern neighbours 
bearing in mind diverging regional priorities among the Member States. In 2008, the 
agreement reached at the EU level with respect to launching a specific regional policy 
towards the east. The launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2009 has demonstrated that 
there is a consensus in the EU with respect to further enhanced relations with the region.  
 
As shown in the second part of the Chapter, the drive for ‘a common EU policy’ on 
immigration lays increasingly more emphasis on enhanced cooperation with third 
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countries. Cooperation with the countries that are either long-standing source or transit 
of immigrants in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU has always been on the EU’s 
agenda. Cooperation with the neighbours concerning the issue of immigration in 
particular has been stressed as one of the key objectives of the ENP due to EU member 
states’ concerns about migratory pressures from EU’s neighbourhood. The main focus 
has been on signing agreements with respect to readmission of asylum seekers and 
irregular immigrants. On the other hand, the impediments to cross-border mobility have 
moved up on the agenda of the new Member States. The shared aim in the EU to 
manage migratory pressures has led to broadening of the external dimension of EU's 
immigration policy. The following Chapter will exclusively focus on the member states 
and their specific policy preferences in relation to the external dimension of migration.  
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CHAPTER 4: Member States’ policy preferences 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the official policy positions of France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland pertaining to the EU migration policy. 
Focusing on the four case studies of the thesis (irregular immigration, visa cooperation, 
labour immigration and asylum cooperation), the chapter sketches out the main policy 
cleavages among the Member States that have considerable power and interest in 
shaping the EU policy towards their eastern neighbourhood with respect to immigration.  
This chapter is concerned with the main trends and the national positions of the Member 
States reflected at the EU level. It does not aim to present a thorough analysis of 
preference formation at national level. The main drivers of the national policy towards 
the eastern neighbours on each four case study areas are reviewed in line with the 
salience of the issue area for each of the Member States and their positions reflected in 
the course of EU level negotiations. This chapter constitutes the first level of the 
analysis presented in the research focusing on the Member States’ policy preferences. 
As mentioned earlier, an analysis of the policy preferences and concerns of the Member 
States by and large constitutes the ‘bargaining space’241 for EU level negotiations. The 
chapter first focuses on the policy preferences of the three politically and economically 
strong member states, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Following these three 
member states, the preferences of Sweden and Poland that have relatively divergent 
policy preferences from the first group are analysed.  
 
4.1. Germany 
Since the early 1970s, migration has gradually become an issue of high political 
salience in German politics. Between the 1950s-70s, Germany pursed an active post-
war labour migration policy to fulfil the needs of rapid industrialisation. Following the 
oil crises of the early 1970s, a considerable percentage of the foreign labour from 
southern Europe returned home. Although labour demand was drastically reduced, an 
equally considerable amount of migrant workers stayed and became permanent 
residents. Moreover, the political unrest and economic instability in its broader 
neighbourhood starting in the 1980s, meant Germany became the main destination for 
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asylum-seekers in the region due to its generous asylum policies. Immigration became 
one of the agenda items of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that came into power 
in 1982.242 Although Germany did not become an immigration country officially until 
the 2001 decision of the FDP-Green coalition243, immigrants constituted more than 10 
percent of the population by the end of 1990s.244  
 
With increasing interdependence among the EU Member States due to the abolition of 
the internal borders with the Schengen agreement, the importance of EU level collective 
action to manage migratory pressures has increased for Germany. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty, Germany has pushed for an EU level response to migratory pressures and 
burden sharing among the Member States.245 As one the main destinations for the 
migrants from the EU’s immediate eastern neighbourhood in the aftermath of the Cold 
War in particular, Germany has been subject to high levels of migratory pressures due 
to its geographical proximity and historical ties with the region. As the EU borders 
shifted eastwards with the 2004/2007 enlargements, ‘better control of migration’ has 
become a fundamental component of the EU's partnership with the eastern 
neighbourhood for Germany.246 The shift of the Schengen borders after the accession of 
the CEECs increased the importance of cooperation with the eastern neighbours due to 
the potential increase of immigration and cross-border threats. This section presents a 
review of the official German policy position on immigration and asylum, and the way 
in which Germany is involved in the EU decision-making process with respect to the 
eastern neighbours of the EU.  
 
Irregular Immigration  
The fight against irregular migration has been one of the main priorities of Germany in 
relation to EU level cooperation with third countries. Germany has long considered the 
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eastern neighbourhood of the EU an important source of, and transit for, irregular 
migrants. Among the WNIS, the main concern for Germany has been Ukraine due to 
the long shared land border between the EU and Ukraine.247 In 2004, it was estimated 
that Ukrainians constituted the largest illegally resident population in Germany.248 In 
2005, Ukrainian nationals constituted 7.4 percent of the irregular entries according to 
data provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).249 Although 
there has been a decrease concerning the number of irregular Ukrainian residents in 
Germany in 2006 and 2007, the region is still considered an important transit route.  
 
During the German Presidency in 2007, Germany put special emphasis on EU level 
cooperation with the eastern neighbourhood in the area of migration. Developed 
primarily in response to irregular migration pressures from the Mediterranean, the 
Global Approach to Migration initially focused on the relations between the EU and the 
African countries.250 Addressing the eastern dimension of the Global Approach was 
considered one of the goals of the German Presidency. In the course of the German 
Presidency, the geographical focus of the Global Approach to Migration policy of the 
EU was expanded to include the eastern and south-eastern neighbours.251  
 
Further EU level dialogue with the eastern neighbours was also established through the 
EU ‘migration missions’.252 Germany has shown particular interest in the EU migration 
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missions to the eastern neighbours including the ones targeted to Belarus in September 
2009 and Ukraine in September 2010.253 
 
Germany has also put great emphasis on ‘border management’ cooperation with its 
eastern neighbours at the national level, the aim being to curtail irregular immigration 
from the region. In addition to irregular cross border movement of people, the WNIS 
region has also been considered a transit for other cross-border criminal activities. A 
specialized national agency called ‘Joint Centre for Analysis and Strategy concerning 
Irregular Migration’ (Gemeinsames Analyse-und Strategiezentrum Irreguläre 
Migration) was founded following irregular immigration and cross-border crime threats 
from Ukraine in 2006.254 The aim of the centre was to address different types of cross-
border crimes linked to irregular migration. 
 
Visa Policy  
 
With the introduction of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s visa policy 
towards the eastern neighbourhood has been on the EU agenda and of its partner 
countries. The high risks of irregular immigration and cross-border crime associated 
with the region paved the way for restricted legal migration channels to the EU for the 
citizens of the WNIS. The German short-term visa policy for Ukraine, Belarus and 
Russia has become particularly restrictive following the visa fraud scandal that occurred 
in 2004-2005.255 In 1999, a lenient visa policy was adopted towards Eastern Europe by 
the Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, despite opposition from the Ministry of 
Interior that had security-related concerns. 256    Adopting a flexible approach, the 
Federal Foreign Office used the visa policy towards the region as a diplomatic 
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instrument.257 However, the permissive visa policy towards the region was ceased after 
allegations of the inappropriate distribution of short-term visas in the region without 
appropriate controls. The visa fraud scandal received high public attention and put the 
Foreign Minister Fischer under strong pressure.258 The misconduct exhibited in the 
distribution of short-term visas initiated a drastic change in the hitherto relaxed policy 
of the Federal Foreign Office, particularly concerning Eastern Europe.259 
 
During the negotiations of the Eastern Partnership, Germany maintained a very cautious 
line on EU’s commitments to enhancing mobility for the citizens of the partner 
countries. Germany wanted to ensure that the partnership with the EU’s neighbours did 
not oblige the Member States to abolish visa requirements for the citizens of the partner 
countries in the short-term.260 An interviewee underlined that the visa policy towards 
Eastern Europe has been a ‘technical’ issue in Germany. 261  Germany showed 
reluctance to support the abolition of visa requirement for the citizens of the eastern 
neighbours without carrying out a thorough evaluation of the partners’ technical 
preparedness. On the other hand, the EC visa facilitation agreements that were 
concluded with Ukraine and Moldova (that have offered certain advantages for short 
term visas, including a reduction in visa fees) in 2007 were supported by Germany.262 
The visa facilitation agreements were seen as concessions to the eastern neighbours in 
return for taking greater responsibility for migration management; the visa facilitations 
were conditional on the basis that a readmission agreement with the EU was signed. 
 
The abolition of the visa requirement for the eastern neighbours is still a red-line for 
Germany. Although the EU has reached an operational stage concerning visa-free travel 
for citizens of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova in 2010, Germany emphasises that their 
requirements have to be met, in order to realize visa liberalisation objectives. 
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Labour Immigration  
Starting in the mid-1950s, the accelerated industrialisation in the post-war period forced 
Germany to pursue an active migration policy to meet the unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour shortages.263 The temporary recruitment of low-skilled labour, mainly from 
southern and south-eastern Europe under the Gastarbeiter (guest-workers) scheme, 
aimed to fulfil the needs of rapid industrialisation until the 1970s. In the early 1970s, the 
global oil crisis precipitated an economic downturn in Western Europe, and as a result, 
paved the way for the abolition of the liberal approach to labour immigration. The 
Gastarbeiter scheme was based on the circulation and resettlement of guest-workers to 
their countries of origin after a period of time. Despite the restrictions attached to their 
temporary working permits, a considerable proportion of the guest-workers and their 
families stayed in Germany and became permanent residents.264   
 
As the plans for the resettlement of the guest-workers were not fully achieved, it paved 
the way for economic and socio-cultural concerns in Germany. In view of the economic 
downturn, German citizens had to compete for jobs along with immigrant workers. 
Moreover, the cultural differences between immigrants who became permanent 
residents in German society, and the issue of social integration, became central to the 
immigration debate. Although Germany initially recruited guest-workers from a number 
of southern European countries, the ones that stayed were predominantly of Turkish 
origin.  Rather than an economic concern, the social impact of immigration has been 
the main focus of German immigration policy.265 The labour immigration topic has 
remained to be a salient topic. 
 
On the other hand, the restrictions on labour migration increased the inflows based on 
non-economic grounds. After settling, several immigrants brought their families to 
Germany based on family unification permits. Germany was also subject to very high 
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levels of asylum applications as a result of its then generous asylum policies. For the 
period between WWII and the 1990s, Germany received the highest number of asylum 
applications in Europe.266 The sharp increase in asylum applications was financially 
very costly for the public sector. 
 
The supremacy of member states’ competence concerning economic migration policy is 
highly essential for Germany. An interviewee claimed that the lack of a ‘European 
labour market’ and the existing differences among the Member States (such as the needs 
and legislations) particularly rule out the transfer of competences to the EU level.267 In 
Germany, economic migration is a policy area in which the federal and state level share 
competences. There is also a strong pressure from the Lander on the Federal level to 
adopt a restrictive position.  
 
The European Commission’s green paper published in 2005 on the management of 
economic immigration faced several objections from Germany.268 In the paper, the 
Commission argued for the development of labour immigration policies as a solution to 
compensate for the demographic needs in the EU. In its response to the green paper, 
Germany challenged the idea that ‘continuous immigration’ could be the sole solution 
to demographic decline. Germany was also critical about the linkage that was made 
between the fight against irregular migration, and the adoption of an EU level economic 
legislation. The Commission argued that the development of EU level rules regarding 
economic migrants could help decrease irregular immigration. 269  In its response, 
Germany also pointed out the possible integration problems that might occur as a result 
of an active economic migration policy. Instead, Germany advocated that the priority 
should be given to circulation of ‘potential labour pool’ within the EU in view of the 
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restrictions in place with respect to the mobility of labour from the new EU Member 
States.270  
 
Despite these reservations about adopting further legislation at the EU level on 
economic migration, Germany has been in favour of offering flexible economic 
migration opportunities to third countries including temporary and circular labour 
migration opportunities.271 Legal migration opportunities are considered effective to 
manage migration and fight with irregular immigration in cooperation with third 
countries. At the G6 meeting in 2006, the German and French interior ministers, 
Schauble and Sarkozy, proposed an initiative on circular immigration and irregular 
immigration as a framework to manage migratory pressures.272 The G6 meetings bring 
together the interior ministers of six EU Member States (the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain) to discuss issues related to justice and home affairs 
including migration. The emphasis of the Franco-German initiative was on the 
integration of short-term economic migration opportunities into broader partnerships. 
The policy proposal that offers voluntary participation for economic migration found 
support among the Member States. The German-French proposal paved the way for the 
introduction of the Mobility Partnerships that aim to increase cooperation between the 
EU and third countries concerning migration management.  
 
Asylum Cooperation 
Germany has become one of the main targets for asylum seekers in Europe since the 
1980s particularly due to its relatively liberal asylum laws.273 The instability along its 
eastern and southern borders in the aftermath of the Cold War triggered high levels of 
migration which was permitted on humanitarian grounds. Germany has been a recipient 
of asylum seekers mainly from the post-Soviet countries since the 1950s. 10,000 annual 
asylum applications had been made by  the 1970s. As a result of the unrest in the post-
Soviet countries as well as asylum being another way of entering the country (due to 
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reduced legal immigration opportunities), 1.4 million asylum seekers came to Germany 
between 1988-93 taking advantage of the liberal asylum policy.274  
 
Situated then at the eastern end of the EU bordering the unstable and conflict prone 
post-Soviet countries, Germany pushed for an EU level solution due to the sudden rise 
in asylum applications towards the end of 1980s - the end of the Cold War.275 Due to 
the common Schengen borders, other member states, to a certain degree, shared this 
problem as well. Within the Dublin Regulations framework in the early 1990s, the 
Member States agreed on a number of ‘safe third countries’ from central Europe. 
According to the principle of this agreement, the applications of asylum seekers arriving 
the EU via a ‘safe third country’ could be denied.  
 
Germany prioritizes operational cooperation with the eastern neighbours concerning the 
refugee issue.276 However, Germany was one of the Member States that rejected the 
UK policy proposals regarding safe-havens outside of the EU put forward at the 
Thessaloniki European Council. After the Thessaloniki meeting, the European 
Commission came up with the Regional Protection Programmes, which was a 
compromise proposal. These programmes underline the importance of the compliance 
of the countries in the neighbourhood with international obligations rather than 
transferring responsibility outside. In its response to the Commission’s green paper on 
asylum, Germany showed its support to the European Commission’s proposal regarding 
the Regional Protection Programmes.277 
 
Conclusions  
This section concludes that Germany prioritizes a restrictive agenda with respect to 
EU’s migration policy towards the eastern neighbourhood. Cooperation with the eastern 
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neighbours on the issues of irregular migration and asylum is crucial as the region is one 
of the main sources of irregular migrants in Germany. There is a high level of reluctance 
concerning the policies that could enhance the mobility for the citizens of the eastern 
neighbours. Since 2004, there has been an increasing scepticism concerning the 
liberalisation of visa policy towards the region. On the issue of labour migration, 
Germany has taken an active role by proposing the circular migration proposal along 
with France. However, the supremacy of the Member States’ competence in this area is 
highly important for Germany.  
 
4.2. The United Kingdom  
 
As a member state that opted out from the EU’s common border regime, the UK is 
characterized by its strong attachment to national policy making and control regarding 
its external borders.278 The British opt-out from Title IV TEC, gained during the 
Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, provided flexibility for the UK in terms of the policies 
that it could participate in (except the visa and border policy domains that are directly 
related to the Schengen regime).279  The opt-out decision is highly linked to the 
traditional stress of the UK on external border security rather than internal security 
measures. 280 However, the increasingly global dimension of the immigration 
phenomenon and interdependencies between the EU Member States increase the 
advantages of EU level cooperation for the UK. Taking into account the leverage of EU 
level collective action, the UK takes part in the EU level cooperation concerning 
fighting with irregular migration and managing asylum policies.  
 
In 2002, the British Foreign Secretary gave a high level of support to the development 
of an EU level policy with respect to the EU's eastern neighbourhood which included 
migration related measures flagging the region as being a hub for irregular migration 
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and trafficking and route to Europe.281 The irregular migration threat from the region to 
the Schengen and UK borders has raised the importance of EU level cooperation in the 
aftermath of the 2004/2007 enlargements. Parallel to its domestic policy towards the 
region, the UK supported EU level involvement in the region. This section presents the 
general policy position of the UK focusing on the four sub-sections of migration policy.  
 
Irregular Immigration  
Cooperation against irregular migration has been one of the main policy priorities of the 
UK at the EU level. Despite the traditional reluctance of the UK regarding transferring 
competences to the EU level, it has been actively involved in intergovernmental and 
practical cooperation at the EU level regarding migration.282 During the UK Council 
Presidency in 1986, the Thatcher government started an initiative which led to setting 
up the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, intergovernmental cooperation of high level 
immigration officials from interior ministers of member states in 1988.283 The UK 
opted in a substantial amount of EU legislation concerning irregular migration including 
the Council Directive on mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third 
country nationals (2001) and the Directive on the obligations of carriers transporting 
foreign nationals (2004).284 The UK also took part in the Council Decision in 2004 on 
the organisation of joint flights for removals from the territory of two or more member 
states of third-country nationals who were subjects of individual removal orders 
agreed.285 The UK also participates in the EU level readmission agreements that are 
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signed with third countries to tackle the return of irregular migrants.286 Irregular 
migration was one of the main priority areas for the UK during its Presidency in the 
second half of 2005. The Global Approach to Migration (i.e. the EU policy framework 
on the external dimension of migration) was agreed during the UK Presidency.287   
 
In the framework of the ENP, the UK has put considerable emphasis on cooperation 
with the eastern neighbours in the area of fight against irregular migration. Although the 
external borders of the UK are geographically less threatened in comparison to other 
Member States concerning migratory pressures, it has been difficult for the UK to tackle 
these issues without cooperating with the rest of the EU. The UK has contributed to the 
EU migration missions to Belarus in September 2009288 and to Ukraine in September 
2010.289  
 
Instead of producing hard law mechanisms at the EU level, the UK traditionally prefers 
practical cooperation among the Member States.290 Trans-governmental networks in the 
area of migration are highly important to cooperate with the neighbours.291 The General 
Directors’ Immigration Services Cooperation (GDISC) could be given as an example. 
Focusing on practical cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbours, the 
GDISC has become an important platform for the EU.292 These networks offer practical 
cooperation among different actors including third countries and other international 
organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Ukraine particularly is an important partner for the UK 
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within the GDISC in the area of ‘capacity-building’ to fight against irregular 
immigration.293 
 
Visa Cooperation  
The position of the UK regarding the EU’s short-term visa policy towards third 
countries is different from the other Member States that are analysed in the thesis. Due 
to its opt-out from the Schengen agreement, the decisions regarding which countries 
would be offered UK visa waiver are taken at the national level. The UK maintains its 
full competence over short-term and long-term national visas. The decisions regarding 
abolishing visa requirements for a third country are negotiated bilaterally with the third 
country after a risk assessment outside of the EU framework. Although the UK is not a 
part of the Schengen system, it is interested in the decisions that are taken regarding the 
Schengen visa cooperation with third countries due to the repercussions of these 
decisions for its own border security. 
 
The UK Border Agency (UKBA) within the Home Office is the main governmental 
body that is responsible with the management of the visa cooperation with third 
countries. In addition to the UKBA, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is 
involved in decision-making due to the diplomatic dimension of visa decisions. In line 
with its emphasis on border security, the UKBA traditionally adopts a security-oriented 
approach towards visa waiver decisions. As opposed to the UKBA, the facilitation of 
mobility for the citizens of the WNIS to enter the Schengen zone is considered 
important for the FCO to advance the relations with these neighbours.294 The UK puts 
high emphasis particularly on the relations with Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
The EU level developments regarding the facilitation of short-term travel between the 
EU and the eastern neighbouring countries are not applicable for the UK bearing in 
mind that it is not a signatory to the Schengen Agreement.295 When the EU signed visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements with Ukraine and Moldova in 2007, the UK 
only took part in the readmission cooperation. Similarly, the visa liberalisation Action 
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Plans for Ukraine and Moldova (agreed respectively in 2010 and early 2011) are only 
valid for short-term Schengen visas. 
 
Labour Immigration  
The UK has a long history of immigration initially from Ireland, the Commonwealth 
and the British colonies based on economic grounds due to the liberal British policy 
until the 1960s. Primarily due to electoral concerns, both the Conservative and the 
Labour parties tightened up their policies concerning migration. Restrictions were 
introduced in particular on the Commonwealth immigration in the 1960s and 1970s.296 
At the end of the 1990s, the Labour government reviewed the tight immigration policy 
due in particular to the calls from employers. After 1997, the work permits for 
immigrants systematically increased.297  This was primarily for the highly skilled 
economic migration category. With the introduction of Highly Skilled Migrant 
Programme (HSMP) in 2002, the UK has opened its borders to highly skilled economic 
immigrants without pre-confirmed job offers given that they qualify for the scheme with 
their educational and professional experiences.298  
 
In 2003, the UK (along with Sweden and Ireland) announced that it was going to allow 
the citizens of the then upcoming EU Member States from central Europe to work in the 
UK. In 2008, the Tier 1 visa replaced the HSMP with minor changes regarding 
admission conditions. The main policy shift regarding labour immigration took place 
with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that came into power in 
2010. Parallel to the general reservations of the Conservative party particularly on the 
issue of migration, the conditions to apply for a Tier 1 visa became harder and an annual 
limit regarding the number of economic migrants who could be granted a Tier 1 visa 
was introduced in 2011.299  
 
                                               
296  Zig Layton-Henry, “Britain: Immigration Control to Migration Management” in Controlling 
Immigration: a global perspective ed. Wayne A. Cornelius et al. 2nd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004): 301-11. 
297 Martin Schain, The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: a comparative 
study, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 137. 
298 Ibid.  
299 Home Office UK Border Agency, Annual Limit Tier 1 and Tier 2 visa applications, 24 November 
2010, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsfragments/35-t1-t2-annual-limits. 
89 
 
  
The UK’s labour migration policy has been principally a national domain.300 However, 
the UK has given its support to voluntary schemes that include legal migration 
cooperation integrated within the broader EU cooperation with third countries. The 
Global Approach to Migration was agreed during the UK Presidency that introduced a 
holistic approach towards the management of migration in cooperation with third 
countries, including the legal immigration dimension. In line with this, the Mobility 
Partnerships as pilot frameworks that allow for voluntary cooperation with partner 
countries regarding legal migration with interested Member States were also supported 
by the UK. However, the UK is highly reluctant towards taking part in the labour 
migration dimensions of the Mobility Partnerships.301 It did not take part in the 
Mobility Partnership signed with Moldova in 2008.302 Although the UK participates in 
the Mobility Partnership cooperation with Georgia, the focus has been on ‘document 
security’ rather than labour migration.   
 
Asylum Cooperation  
In addition to the fight against irregular migration, the EU level cooperation in the area 
of asylum has been a priority for the UK. The asylum applications steadily increased 
after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The UK became one of the main destinations in 
Europe for asylum seekers. The highest levels were reached in the early 2000s.303 The 
increase in asylum demands put pressure on the UK to seek further cooperation at the 
EU level concerning tackling the asylum and irregular migration pressures. The UK 
participated in all the EU legislation concerning asylum.304 The UK also took an active 
role concerning the EU regulations on the Dublin system in relation to deciding on the 
Member States’ responsibility for processing an asylum application and the EuroDac 
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system that enables the Member States to compare the fingerprints of asylum applicants 
and irregular immigrants in line with the Dublin Regulations.305  However, these 
policies required only little change in the UK’s domestic legislation.306 
 
The UK has been highly active concerning the development of the external dimension 
of EU’s asylum policy. The Regional Protection Programmes proposal of the European 
Commission was mainly affected by the UK initiative in 2003 concerning the 
processing of asylum applications outside of the EU borders. Due to the pressures faced 
at the domestic level, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair wanted to tackle the asylum 
problem at the EU level. Sending a letter to the Greek Presidency ahead of the European 
Council meeting of the Heads of States, Tony Blair presented an initiative on the 
processing of asylum applications outside of the EU at special processing centres.307 
The actual initiative did not receive enough support from the Member States (except 
Denmark and the Netherlands) due to concerns in relation to the human rights records of 
third countries. However, it paved the way for the development of the European 
Commission’s proposal on increased cooperation with third countries in the area of 
asylum. The European Commission followed up with a communication proposing the 
‘Regional Protection Programmes’ as pilot systems in the EU’s neighbourhood.  
 
Conclusion  
Owing to the UK ‘opt-out’ from Title IV TEC on migration settled during the 
Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1997, the UK had the possibility to take part in 
measures in accordance with its national interest. Despite the flexibility it has gained, 
there is still an ‘EU dimension’ with respect to the UK’s migration policy. This is 
particularly relevant for irregular migration and asylum cooperation as the UK used its 
‘opt-in’ option with respect to these two policy areas to a great extent.308 EU level 
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engagement would be beneficial for the UK in terms of addressing the challenges faced 
in these two areas as the leverage of the EU is much higher.309  
 
Short-term visa policy and labour migration are considered strictly national domains in 
line with its opt-out from Title IV TEC measures and the Schengen agreement. On the 
other hand, the UK pushed for the development of a holistic approach with respect to 
the external dimension of migration in the course of the Global Approach to Migration 
negotiations in 2005. The increased incorporation of greater legal migration channels 
into the cooperation with third countries at the EU level is supported by the UK. 
However, its participation in EU level measures has been limited.  
 
4.3. France  
Since the early 1980s, immigration has become a salient topic in French politics.310 
France has gradually become one of the main immigration countries in Western Europe 
starting from the 1920s. It has attracted migrants particularly from its neighbours and 
former colonies.311 By the 1950s, an open labour migration policy was adopted in 
France similar to other Western European countries, lasting until the economic decline 
triggered by the oil crises in the 1970s. The weakening economy paved the way for 
restrictions on labour migration.312 Whilst economically-motivated immigration from 
other European countries decreased following the recession, the enduring non-European 
migratory pressures increased the salience of migration issue. Public concerns were 
predominantly related to the integration of migrants from former French colonies who 
became permanent residents. These concerns paved the way for increasing support for 
the anti-immigrant far-right party Front National.313 Both the Socialists and the right-
wing parties started to reflect on these concerns in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Whilst both groups adopted a restrictive approach towards immigration and asylum in 
France, the Socialists supported pro-diversity policies with respect to the integration of 
                                               
309 Geddes, “Getting the best of both words? Britain, the EU and migration policy,” 724. 
310 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Palgrave, 2003): 56. 
311 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, 53-54. 
312 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, 54. 
313 James F. Hollifield, “France: Republicanism and the Limits of Immigration Control,” in Controlling 
Immigration: a global perspective ed. Wayne A. Cornelius et al. 2nd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004): 193. 
92 
 
  
existing migrant groups.314 Since the 2002 elections, immigration has increasingly been 
considered a security issue threatening the public order in France.315 
  
In the course of France’s Council Presidency in 2007, immigration was one of its main 
priorities. In the course of the French Presidency, the French President Sarkozy put 
forward the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in September 2008.316 In 
addition to EU level cooperation in the areas of asylum, irregular and legal immigration, 
the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum underlined enhanced cooperation with 
third countries regarding migration. The geographical priority for France in the 
neighbourhood has traditionally been North Africa.317 However, the importance of 
cooperation with the eastern neighbours of the EU has increased due to the enlargement. 
Focusing on the four case study areas, this section presents the main policy positions of 
France with respect to the eastern neighbourhood.  
  
Irregular Immigration  
Irregular immigration has been the most politically salient dimension in the area of 
migration for France.318 Since the early 1990s, the number of irregular immigrants who 
were detained increased more than three times compared to the 1980s.319 The main 
groups of irregular immigrants are from the Magreb region and the Middle East in line 
with the historical links of France with these regions.320 The shared land border 
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between the EU and the eastern neighbours after the eastern enlargements of the EU 
increased the concerns related to migration.321 Yet, France is a transit zone rather than a 
destination for the irregular immigrants from Eastern Europe. The migrants from 
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova tend to use France as a transit point to reach the Iberian 
peninsula.322  
 
Similar to the other signatory countries to the Schengen agreement, the abolition of 
internal borders has significantly changed the management of border control in France. 
With the aim of fighting against irregular cross-border movements, the Member States 
adopted several policies in partnership with third countries. These include both 
conventional readmission agreements as well as ‘concerted management’ negotiations 
regarding migration flows, particularly to cooperate with the Southern 
neighbourhood.323  
 
France is a signatory to the community readmission agreements with Ukraine and 
Moldova. With Belarus, a ‘resolution specifically concerning the issue of consular 
travel documents’ has been agreed at the bilateral level and encompasses cooperation 
regarding movement of persons, border surveillance and solidarity development with a 
rather holistic approach to immigration cooperation.324 The focus has been on the 
irregular migration threat.  
 
Visa Cooperation  
Similar to Germany and the UK, France has shown reluctance towards easing cross-
border mobility for the citizens of the eastern neighbours due to irregular migration 
concerns from the region, despite the calls from the member states that have rather a 
liberal approach. At the EU-Ukraine Summit that took place in Paris during the French 
Presidency, there was a broad agreement on the ‘long term perspective’ towards visa 
liberalisations without any clear guidelines. This was particularly apparent concerning 
                                               
321 Interview with Member State official F, September 2010, Brussels. 
322 Ibid.  
323 The French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, “Africa-France: Emphasis on ‘concerted’ 
management of migratory flows,” accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/spip.php?page=article_imprim&id_article=8666. 
324 French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, 2009 
Anuual Report- European Migration Network, 2010.  
94 
 
  
the negotiations regarding the Eastern Partnership in 2009. France, along with 
Germany, refused to make commitments regarding the abolition of visa requirements 
for the eastern neighbours of the EU. 
 
In 2010, there was as a shift regarding the French position on the visa liberalisation 
negotiations with Russia. France prioritised and pushed for reaching an agreement at the 
EU level regarding giving clear guidelines and moving to an operational stage with 
Russia on the issue of short-term travel. Their position towards Russia paved the way 
for concessions regarding Ukraine and Moldova as well. Although France had been 
lukewarm regarding facilitation of mobility for the WNIS region, visa liberalisation for 
the Russian citizens is the main priority in the region.325 
 
Labour Immigration  
Between the 1950s and 1970s, there was a high demand for economic labour in France. 
As opposed to Germany that considered the initial labour immigrants temporary, France 
was open to the naturalisation of migrants in line with its jus soli (birth right citizenship) 
principle.326 Several bilateral agreements were signed with other countries in and 
outside of Europe for economic immigrant recruitment. Between the 1950s and 1960s, 
France adopted a highly flexible approach as immigrants who had illicitly come in to 
the French territory were able to get a legal status after their arrival if they could get an 
employment offer. This was linked to the fact that labour immigration was 
predominantly managed by the employers rather than the state.327 By the mid-1960s, 
the French government initiated its attempts to control and regulate immigration.328 The 
main policy change came with the economic downturn of 1974 which brought about 
strict restrictions to the recruitment of foreign labour as the need for low skilled 
immigration diminished.329 These restrictions were also triggered by the concerns 
related to increasing immigration from former French territories following the 
decolonization in North Africa, particularly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in the 
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aftermath of the 1960s. The restriction of labour immigration paved the way for an 
increase in other forms of immigration such as family unification, which has become 
rather difficult to curtail.330 
 
Similar to Germany and the United Kingdom, France has shown reluctance towards EU 
level management of economic immigration. Taking into account the intra-EU 
restrictions regarding labour mobility following the eastern enlargement of the EU, 
France has been unwilling concerning opening up economic immigration possibilities 
for the eastern neighbours. As detailed in the previous section on Germany, the Franco-
German coalition supported the circular immigration proposal in early 2006 in line with 
the need for providing legal immigration incentives for third countries to cooperate in 
the area of migration. In line with this initiative, France also showed its commitment to 
the Mobility Partnership that was concluded with Moldova which incorporated the 
Franco-German circular migration proposal (including irregular and legal migration 
dimensions and development aspects) in the framework of migration cooperation.331  
 
Asylum Cooperation 
France was highly involved in the EU level negotiations regarding the further 
integration among the Member States in the area of migration and asylum ahead of the 
Amsterdam Treaty.332 The EU level cooperation in the area of asylum has considerably 
strengthened the management of asylum demands in France.333 Since the 1990s, the 
evolution of ‘safe third country’ mechanisms in Europe has allowed France to send 
asylum seekers to third countries. Following the agreement on the Dublin Regulations 
in 2003 among the Member States, France has been able to control the asylum pressures 
through transferring asylum applications to other Member States.  
 
Parallel to the other Western European countries, France also faced increasing asylum 
applications in the second half of the 20th century. The numbers peaked in 1990 in the 
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aftermath of the Cold War reaching more than 60.000.334 Despite another peak which 
was experienced between 2003-04, the acceptance rates lowered in France particularly 
in line with the agreements with the other European countries on the issue of 
immigration. 335  Between 2000-09, only 18-27 percent of the applications were 
accepted.336 France also put forward a number of unfavourable policies for asylum 
seekers limiting their financial and social conditions with the aim of discouraging 
potential future asylum seekers.337  
 
Regarding asylum cooperation with third countries with the establishment of Regional 
Protection Programmes (RPPs), France was one of the Member States that opposed the 
initial proposal of the UK on the issue of processing asylum applications outside of the 
EU.338 After the publication of the European Commission proposal on the RPPs, France 
along with Spain showed its objection to the establishment of transit processing centres 
in North Africa. However, there were not strong objections regarding the development 
of the programmes in the eastern neighbourhood.  
 
Conclusion 
Among the countries with whom the EU cooperates within the ENP, the priority region 
for France is the southern neighbours. Since the initial debates at the EU level regarding 
the introduction of a new neighbourhood policy for the EU, France has pushed for 
enhanced cooperation between the EU and the Southern neighbourhood. In the area of 
migration, France has not been subject to high levels of immigration from the region as 
it is considered a transit rather than a destination for the irregular immigrants originating 
from the eastern neighbourhood. Yet, France did not support further liberalisation of 
EU’s migration policy. As discussed above, the main aim of the ‘circular migration 
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policy’ proposal of France and Germany was to increase irregular migration cooperation 
with third countries.   
 
However, one could argue that there has been a shift towards offering more mobility-
oriented policies in the east. The relations with the WNIS region have moved up on 
France’s agenda particularly due to its increased interest in EU-Russia relations. As 
France wanted to increase the EU commitments towards Russia in the area of mobility 
in 2010, this had implications particularly on the EU policy towards Ukraine and 
Moldova on the subject. 
 
4.4. Poland 
As a transit country rather than a traditional immigrant destination, immigration has not 
yet been a politically significant concept for Poland at the national level.339 The EU 
integration process has been a significant factor in relation to the formation of the post-
Soviet Polish immigration policy. 340  Poland had to abide by the requirements 
concerning accession to the EU (including the Schengen border zone) and transpose the 
relevant EU acquis to its national law. The EU financial assistance mainly targeted 
justice and home affairs issues including border management, visa and migration 
policies, bearing in mind the shift of the Schengen borders eastward with the eventual 
accession of Poland to the Schengen zone.341 Poland’s external border has become one 
of the longest external land borders of the EU. It was offered substantial EU financial 
assistance through the pre-accession funding programme of the EU. This section 
presents an analysis of the policy position of Poland regarding immigration cooperation 
with the eastern neighbours in four areas.  
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Irregular Immigration  
In line with its geographical position, the security of the border between Poland and its 
non-EU neighbours was of importance for the EU due to the threat of irregular 
immigration and cross-border crime. According to the multilateral readmission 
agreements signed between Poland and the Schengen countries in 1991, Poland was 
obliged to receive back irregular migrants entering the Schengen border via Poland.342 
These agreements also obliged Poland to conclude similar readmission agreements with 
its eastern neighbours by 1993.343  
 
As mentioned above, irregular immigration is not considered an important problem at 
the national level as Poland is a transit country. However, the EU efforts concerning the 
issue of border management have been intensified with the EU's eastward enlargement. 
With the EU accession process, several measures were put across to limit unwanted 
migration from the eastern neighbours via Poland. As a pre-requisite for its accession to 
the EU, Poland had to abide by the requirements of the EU acquis related to 
immigration and asylum cooperation. The Member States, particularly Germany, were 
concerned about potential East-West migration after the EU's eastern enlargement.344 In 
addition to the EU level aid that Poland received before its accession, Germany also 
offered substantial bilateral assistance to Poland to improve its border management 
capacity.345 Germany particularly put great emphasis on the advancement of border 
security and management ahead of the accession. 346  Through the European 
Commission’s External Borders Fund under the 'Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows' programme, Poland also received 78.000 EUR for the period between 
2007-2013 to contribute to the management of the border controls.347 
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As one of the longest external borders of the EU belongs to Poland, the pressure on 
Poland concerning combating irregular immigration from its eastern neighbours has 
increased with the shift of the Schengen borders eastward in 2008. Among the WNIS, 
the cooperation with Ukraine has been highly significant due to the long common 
border. At the EU level, Poland has strongly emphasized ‘border management’ 
cooperation with the Ukraine. 348  Poland has taken part in a number of Frontex 
operations to strengthen the eastern border of the EU.349 
 
Visa Cooperation  
The short term cross-border mobility between Poland and its eastern neighbours has 
been one of the main problems following the integration of Poland in the EU. The EU 
integration put the economic and social aspects of the connections between the border 
zones at risk.350 Irrespective of the legacy of visa-free travel between the post-Soviet 
countries, Poland was obliged to adjust the rules concerning the entry to the Polish 
territory to the EU regulations, including ceasing all former visa-free travel 
arrangements with its non-EU neighbours. During the preceding free-movement regime 
for the neighbouring countries, the economic undertakings (mainly undocumented) of 
the neighbouring countries’ citizens to a certain extent endured.351 In January 1998, 
Poland started to reflect the necessary changes in line with the requirements of EU 
accession.352 Poland was obliged to align its visa policy with the EU’s common visa 
policy. In October 2003, the previous visa-free border crossing regime terminated with 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.  
 
The introduction of the strict EU border regime had an impact both at the economic as 
well as at the societal level. Concerning the economic dimension, the cross-border trade 
                                                                                                                                         
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/108&format=HTML&aged=1&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
348 Interview with EU officials E, February 2011, Brussels. 
349 Cooperation among the member states regarding combatting illegal immigration threats from eastern 
neighbours has been one of the main focus of Frontex since 2005. See 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/go:flt/ 
350  Joerg Monar, “The area of freedom, security and justice after the 2004 enlargement,” The 
International Spectator 38 no.1 (2003): 33-50. 
351 Kicinger et al., “Advance yet uneven: The Europeanization of Polish Immigration Policy”, 181-200.  
352 Krystyna Iglicka, “Migration Movements from and into Poland in the light of East-West European 
Migration,” International Migration 39, 1 (2001): 7. 
100 
 
  
particularly in the case of Ukraine had been significant for both sides. 353  The 
restrictions concerning the cross-border mobility that were introduced between Poland 
and Ukraine in the late 1990s paved the way for a considerable decline (around 30 
percent) in the cross-border trade.354 Although the weight of the cross-border trade was 
relatively low at the national level, it was significant for the economically 
underdeveloped border regions.  
 
Poland aimed at continuing its historical and social bounds with the eastern neighbours 
ensuring that there are no dividing lines between the EU and its European neighbours as 
a result of the EU accession process. New dividing lines would give the eastern 
neighbours an undesirable signal from the EU. Imposition of high-priced visas was 
particularly an issue of concern for Poland. Initially, Poland introduced short-term visas 
for the citizens of the neighbouring countries who wanted to travel for tourism 
purposes.355 Although these visas were handed out free of charge, the process was still 
considered a disturbance in comparison to the former visa-free travel regime.  
 
Poland along with the other Visegrad countries negotiated the ‘Local Border Traffic’ 
agreement.356 The local border traffic was particularly significant concerning the cross-
border economic and social relations for the border regions. This has paved the way for 
a special authorization to keep the existing ‘local border traffic’ after the accession of 
the central European countries to the EU. In line with the Commission’s Local Border 
Traffic proposal357, the Member States are given permission to sign bilateral agreements 
with their non-EU neighbours.358 The Council’s decision stated that these permits were 
introduced in the EU ‘to ensure that the borders with its neighbours are not a barrier to 
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trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation’ which was very dynamic 
among the countries of the post-Soviet area.359  
 
Despite the limited flexibility offered to the border regions, the mobility aspects of 
migration cooperation with the neighbours have been one of the disputed issues 
concerning the EU policy towards eastern neighbours.360 Poland has been one of the 
main defenders of the abolition of visa requirement to enter the EU for the nationals of 
the immediate eastern neighbours. 361  The negotiations on readmission and visa 
facilitations were followed by a visa dialogue between the EU and Ukraine and 
Moldova without a clear prospect for how the visa liberalisations would be 
‘operationalised’. In line with its support to enhancing cross-border mobility, Poland 
(along with the other new Member States, particularly with Lithuania) has strongly 
pushed for the approval of the European Commission’s proposal regarding moving to 
an ‘operational’ stage and assist the neighbouring countries to establish a visa free 
regime between the EU and the eastern neighbours. 
  
 
Labour Immigration  
As opposed to the other Member States that are analysed, Poland is not a traditional 
destination country for labour immigration. Nevertheless, Poland attracted short-term 
economic immigrants from the region following the end of the Cold War. Ahead of the 
introduction of the Schengen border regime regulations that abolished the free-border 
policy between Poland and its eastern neighbours, the nature of the movement from 
Eastern Europe to Poland was mainly for short- term with the aim of trade or short-term 
labour.362 These cross-border movements were mainly of clandestine nature. Short-term 
seasonal labour migration from Ukraine to Poland or to other EU countries further west 
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was an important element of cross-border mobility. This was especially important for 
the communities living very close to the border on each side. The long-standing Polish 
liberal policy concerning immigration and mobility with respect to its eastern 
neighbours has not been significantly changed since its accession to the EU.  
 
Asylum Cooperation  
Since the early 1990s, Poland started to cooperate with the EU Member States regarding 
legislative and policy development in the area of asylum cooperation. Poland was 
declared as a ‘safe country’ for asylum seekers following its compliance with the 
Geneva Convention. Compared to the Western European member states analysed in this 
study, Poland was never subject to high levels of asylum applications. In 1993, it was 
agreed that the asylum seekers entering the German borders via Poland should be 
readmitted by Poland due to the increasing asylum pressures from the region.363  
 
One of the objectives of the ENP is to establish a similar relationship between the EU 
and its eastern neighbours with respect to legislative development in the neighbouring 
countries as stressed in the ENP country progress reports regarding immigration and 
asylum cooperation. Poland was one of the Member States that expressed their 
reluctance concerning the externalisation of asylum duties in the EU. In 2004, the Polish 
Minister of Interior stated that ‘We oppose to establishing such centres outside the EU 
borders. The European Union and Poland constitute the area of freedom, security and 
solidarity. The asylum seekers need their rights to be protected, therefore we cannot 
expel them’.364 Despite the divergent opinions on the regional settlement programmes, 
a consensus was reached at the EU level following the European Commission’s 
proposal on pilot regional protection programmes.  
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Conclusion 
The long-standing Polish liberal policy concerning migration and mobility with respect 
to its eastern neighbours has not been significantly changed since its accession to the 
EU. For Poland, as a member state located along the eastern border of the Schengen 
zone sharing the longest land borders of the EU with a third country, it is essential to 
ensure the security of the border and address this issue at the EU level. In line with this, 
Poland (along with the other new Member States in the region) argues that the EU 
should sufficiently assist the eastern neighbours to ensure that they develop the 
necessary mechanisms to control their own borders and meet the relevant criteria 
needed to have a more flexible cross-border arrangement with the EU.  
 
4.5. Sweden  
Immigration was not a politically salient issue in Sweden until the early 1990s. There 
was a tradition of consensus among the political parties both on the left and right 
regarding immigration policy.365 Migration became a political issue in Sweden from the 
early 1990s when a populist party (New Democracy) adopted a restrictive stance with 
respect to migration to Sweden.366 With the defeat of the traditionally strong Social 
Democrats, a centre-right coalition government was formed called the Alliance for 
Sweden after the 2006 elections.367 Following the process started by the Parliament in 
2006 under the Social Democrats, the legislation concerning labour immigration was 
amended in December 2008, which aimed at facilitating labour market access for 
foreigners. A Swedish representative pointed at the fact that there was a consensus 
among the seven parties that were in parliament regarding the need for more flexible 
rules in the area of labour migration policy.368 However, the 2010 elections paved the 
way for the end of the consensus regarding pro-immigration policies among the parties, 
                                               
365 Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Jesper Krogstup, “Immigration as a political issue in Denmark and 
Sweden,” European Journal of Political Research 47: (2008): 610–634. 
366 Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Jesper Krogstup, “Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the 
immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden”, in Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe: Why 
Politics – and the Centre-Right Matter ed. Tim Bale (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 58. 
367 The coalition was formed by four parties: the Conservative Party (Moderaterna), the Center Party, the 
Liberal Peoples Party and the Christian Democratic Party. 
368 Åsa Carlander, Legal counsellor, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 1 
February 2011, Brussels. 
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with the success of a far-right party, Sweden Democrats, who won 20 seats in the 
Swedish parliament.369 
 
Sweden put considerable emphasis on the development of the external dimension of the 
EU’s immigration policy through striking a sound balance between legal immigration 
opportunities, development cooperation with third countries and fight against irregular 
immigration. 370 The area of immigration and asylum has become an important 
dimension of the Swedish initiatives regarding the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. It is 
considered that ‘migration issues must be a distinct part of the ENP’ underlining the 
need for further international cooperation.371 
 
Sweden prioritized the development of cooperation regarding capacity-building 
mechanisms in the area of immigration management between the EU and its 
neighbours. One of the main multilateral frameworks on the issue of immigration and 
asylum, the Soderkoping Process (SP), was launched by Sweden in 2001. The aim was 
to enhance the dialogue and cooperation particularly between the new EU member 
states and the WNIS regarding the immigration and asylum policy areas.372 The 
cooperation included Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. 373  The areas identified as 
‘common security’ items between the stakeholders were ‘migration, asylum policy 
skills, border surveillance and the strengthening of outer border controls’. The SP has 
become one of the main multilateral frameworks that bring together the EU Member 
States and the partner countries in the eastern neighbourhood contributing to the 
                                               
369 Jonas Fredén, “Center–right wins Swedish election - but short of majority,” September 23, 2010, 
accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Society/Government-politics/Reading/Center-right-wins-Swedish-
election--but-short-of-majority/. 
370 Swedish Presidency of the EU, “Draft Multiannual programme for an area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice serving the citizen (The Stockholm Programme),” 14449/09, October 16, 2009, accessed January 
8, 2012 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14449.en09.pdf. 
371 Government Offices of Sweden, “Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on 
foreign affairs 15 February 2006,” accessed January 9, 2012 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10275/a/70230. 
372 See: The Soderkoping Process http://soderkoping.org.ua/page2864.html. 
373 There is also a Secretariat based in Kiev that is responsible with the cooperation and the coordination 
between the EU and the WNIS.  
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immigration cooperation and dialogue in the region.374 Although there is not a formal 
connection between the SP and the EU policy, there is an on-going discussion regarding 
integration of the SP into the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership. 
 
The following section maps the policy positions of Sweden with respect to the four case 
study areas.  
 
Irregular Immigration 
The Swedish government confirms the need for EU level cooperation to fight with 
irregular immigration. The readmission negotiations between the EU and third countries 
were particularly supported by Sweden given that the issue was ‘a matter of common 
interest’.375 Sweden’s involvement in the region regarding irregular immigration is 
particularly linked to combating cross-border crime such as trafficking. Its development 
cooperation concerning Belarus (2007-2010) underlines cooperation particularly to fight 
human trafficking.376 Similar to Belarus, high levels of irregular immigration from 
Moldova are also underlined in the development cooperation between Sweden and 
Moldova (2007-2010).377 However, Sweden diverges from other member states that 
traditionally receive high levels of immigration on the issue of combating irregular 
immigration. Due to its rather liberal approach towards immigration, Sweden exhibits a 
more balanced approached at the national and EU level with respect to different aspects 
of immigration cooperation. A national representative from Sweden pointed at the fact 
that the EU focus has been on irregular migration and security issues. She has 
underlined that Sweden would prefer to discuss legal migration opportunities and 
mobility with the neighbours.378 Sweden also put emphasis on the balance between 
                                               
374 “Recommendations from the Chisinau Conference - a step taken towards the integration of the 
Söderköping Process into the Eastern Partnership”, February 2, 2011, accessed January 8, 2012,  
http://soderkoping.org.ua/page28901.html. 
375 Kerstin I. Eriksson, “Removal-enforcement of return decisions,” Paper prepared for the European 
Commission hearing on a community return policy on illegal residents, July 16, 2002, accessed January 8, 
2012 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0019_en.htm. 
376 Government Offices of Sweden “Strategy for development cooperation with Belarus (2007-2010),” 
accessed January 8, 2012 http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/574/a/39761.      
377  Government Offices of Sweden, “Strategy for development cooperation with the Republic of 
Moldova (January 2007 – December 2010),” accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/574/a/93988. 
378 Åsa Carlander, Legal counsellor, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 1 
February 2011, Brussels. 
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irregular immigration and asylum. In the course of the debates regarding the ‘Future 
Common European Asylum System’, Sweden underlined that the measures that were in 
place to combat irregular migration must not undermine the access to asylum at the 
EU’s external borders.379 The concern in relation to asylum was also stressed in the 
2009 Work Programme of the Swedish Presidency.380 
 
Visa Cooperation  
As a Member State that has a liberal approach towards immigration and mobility issues, 
Sweden put emphasis on the need to increase legal migration opportunities for the 
eastern neighbours of the EU. In the aftermath of the Commission proposal on the 
Eastern Partnership in December 2009, one of the main issues that were debated among 
the Member States was the visa liberalisations commitments that would be put in the 
EU declaration.381 A number of Member States stressed the conditionality with respect 
to the abolition of visa requirements for the partner countries. Along with Poland, 
Sweden advocated a liberal and optimistic approach to convey the signal that an offer 
was made by the EU to the partner countries regarding the facilitation of mobility. In 
the course of the Council debates, Sweden gave its support to moving to an 
‘operational’ stage with the Action Plans adopted for Russia, Ukraine and Moldova in 
2010. Sweden (along with Belgium) was faced with increasing numbers of asylum 
applications from the Western Balkans in the aftermath of the visa liberalisations for the 
region. Although the Western Balkans example paved the way for certain reservations 
for some Member States such as Belgium regarding granting visa liberalisations to the 
eastern neighbours, it did not cause a policy change in the Swedish context.382  
 
 
 
 
                                               
379 Regeringskansliet, Points of view on the Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum 
System, October 1, 2007, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0010_en.htm. 
380 Government Offices of Sweden, “Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU 1 July-31 
December 2009,” June 23, 2009, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/11312/nocache/true/dictionary/true. 
381 Interview with EU official A, March 2009, Brussels. 
382 Interview with EU Member State representative H, February 2011, Brussels.  
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Labour Immigration  
Similar to the other immigrant receiving countries in Western Europe, Sweden adopted 
a liberal foreign labour policy from the aftermath of the Second World War until the 
early 1970s. Other Scandinavian countries in the region were the main source of foreign 
labour in Sweden. Besides its neighbours, Sweden also recruited foreign labour from 
the Mediterranean countries during this period. As opposed to Germany, the foreign 
workers were not recruited under a short-term macro level policy. The immigrant 
workers and their families were welcomed to reside in Sweden and were given secure 
legal status.383 In addition, the integration of immigrants to Sweden was a priority from 
the outset. By the end of the 1960s, efforts were made to ensure that immigrants were 
given rights similar to those of Swedish citizens. The foreign workers who were 
recruited in the course of this period also enjoyed considerably high salaries equivalent 
to or more than those of domestic workers. In the early 1970s, the oil crises reduced the 
need for foreign workers. The liberal policy of Sweden was mainly contested by the 
trade unions that had a considerable power over the management of the labour market 
policies as well.384 By the early 1970s, the Social Democrats who were in power 
introduced restrictions on further recruitment of foreign labour. After the 1970s, the 
political parties on the right by and large had a consensus regarding the liberalization of 
the labour migration policy. However, this was opposed by the Social Democrats. 
 
Sweden supports increasing legal immigration opportunities for the WNIS region. 
Increased legal channels are also seen as a tool to fight with irregular immigration from 
the region. Concerning the policy adopted in 2008 at the domestic level in Sweden on 
labour migration, the main policy change with respect to the external dimension of 
immigration was the emphasis that the new coalition government put on the facilitation 
of legal migration from outside of the EU.385  Despite the pull factors regarding 
immigration such as liberal policies and geographical proximity, it should be noted that 
                                               
383 Tomas Hammar, “Sweden” in European Immigration Policy-A Comparative Study ed. Hammar 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 30.  
384 Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Jesper Krogstup, “Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the 
immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden”, in Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe: Why 
Politics – and the Centre-Right Matter ed. Tim Bale (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 56. 
385 European Migration Network – Annual Report 2006 – Sweden, available at: 
http://emn.intrasoft-
intl.com/Downloads/prepareShowFiles.do;jsessionid=53ADAD772F69B55569C34C517C8FC2F4?entry
Title=05. Annual Policy Report 2006. 
108 
 
  
the level of immigration from the post-Soviet republics to Sweden has been limited 
compared to immigration from the region to other destinations in Europe such as 
Germany and the UK.386 
 
The Swedish Ministry of Justice, that is responsible with migration policy in Sweden, 
underlined in a recent report that Sweden prefers a more integrated EU policy regarding 
labour migration. The report stressed on support for the establishment of EU level 
common rules concerning a ‘needs-based system’ with respect to labour migration.387   
The facilitation of mobility through circular migration at the bilateral level with the 
eastern neighbours is aimed (in line with the commitments that were made with the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted in 2008).388 However, the Swedish 
approach to labour immigration diverges considerably from the circular immigration 
idea put forward by France and Germany in 2006 and later developed by the European 
Commission. After the Member States’ disapproval of the Commission’s ambitious 
policy in 2001 on a general policy, the Commission has come up with a proposal that 
has a narrower focus. In line with the Swedish national policy that offers a general 
framework, Sweden does not fully support the European Commission’s sectoral 
approach (such as the development of different frameworks for highly qualified or 
seasonal workers) to the labour migration policy area. 389  Instead, Sweden has 
negotiated a labour migration policy at the national level which is not sectoral. Different 
than the Commission’s approach, the Swedish policy aims to encourage labour 
immigration at all skill levels.  
 
Giving its support to increased legal migration opportunities for third countries, Sweden 
takes part in the pilot EU Mobility Partnership agreement reached between the EU and 
Moldova. The Swedish Strategy for Development in Moldova (2007-10) also underlines 
the priority of Sweden to assist Moldova with respect to high levels of migration. The 
                                               
386  Jenny Olofsson and Gunnar Malmberg, ‘‘When Will the Russians Come? On Post-Soviet 
Immigration and Integration in Sweden,’’ International Migration-IOM 49, no. 4 (2011): 93-117.  
387 Swedish Ministry of Justice (2010) Migration Policy- Fact Sheet, (Stockholm, 2010). 
388 European Migration Network – Annual Report (2009), available at:  
http://emn.intrasoft-
intl.com/Downloads/prepareShowFiles.do;jsessionid=53ADAD772F69B55569C34C517C8FC2F4?entry
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389 Åsa Carlander, Legal counsellor, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 1 
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main emphasis is on addressing root causes of migration. At the national level, a 
project, titled “Strengthening Moldova’s capacity to manage labour and return 
migration within the framework of the mobility partnership with the EU”, is run by 
Sweden. The aim is to encourage the voluntary return of the Moldavian nationals 
residing in the EU.390  
 
Asylum Cooperation 
Sweden has traditionally had one of the most ‘generous’ asylum policies among the EU 
member states. The approval rates for asylum applications were approximately 100 
percent until the mid-1980s.391 Since the 1980s, the political salience of the asylum 
topic has increased in Sweden due to the considerable rise in applications. The sudden 
increase in the number of applications in the aftermath of the Cold War paved the way 
for the reconsideration of the liberality of the Sweden’s asylum policy. The Social 
Democrat government introduced restrictions concerning granting the right to asylum to 
certain categories of asylum seekers in 1989. The increasing asylum applications broke 
the former consensus among the two party blocs, the Socialist and Conservative 
governments. 
  
In line with the increasing problems associated with the management of the asylum 
system, the main priorities for Sweden concerning the EU level policy on immigration 
have been burden sharing and harmonization particularly with respect to asylum and 
humanitarian dimension.392 The government’s statement on foreign policy in 2003 
highlighted the need for the minimum conditions that the EU member states would 
agree on were underlined particularly due to generous policy of Sweden with respect to 
refugee policy compared to other EU member states.393 In line with the existing 
balances between the member states, Sweden puts considerable emphasis on  ‘a 
                                               
390 European Migration Network – Annual Report (2009), available at:  
http://emn.intrasoft-
intl.com/Downloads/prepareShowFiles.do;jsessionid=53ADAD772F69B55569C34C517C8FC2F4?entry
Title=02. Annual Policy Report 2009  
391 Elisabeth Abiri, “The Changing Praxis of ‘Generosity’: Swedish Refugee Policy during the 1990s,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no.1 (2000): 13.   
392 Government offices of Sweden, “Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on 
foreign affairs,” (Unofficial Translation), February 9, 2000. 
393 Government offices of Sweden, “Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on 
foreign affairs,” (Unofficial Translation), February 12, 2003. 
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common EU refugee policy based on solidarity’ among the EU member states.394 The 
issue of equal offers from each member state within a common EU asylum system is 
prioritised in Sweden.395  
 
Cooperation with the eastern neighbours concerning refugee and asylum policies is also 
prioritised by Sweden. The compatibility of the partner countries in the eastern 
neighbourhood with the European standards concerning asylum is highly significant as 
underlined in the SP cooperation with the WNIS. The ENP Progress Reports for the 
eastern neighbours also underline both legal developments and problems in the partner 
countries with respect to the humanitarian dimension of immigration. Regarding the 
external dimension of asylum policy, Sweden did not support the suggestion of the UK 
regarding ‘off-shore processing’ of asylum applications ahead of the Thessaloniki 
Summit in 2003.396 Despite the initial concerns, the European Commission’s proposal 
regarding the Regional Protection Programmes in cooperation with the eastern 
neighbours is agreed at the EU level and integrated in the resettlement cooperation 
through finding a consensus on the issue.397  
 
Conclusion  
Similar to the policy priorities of Poland, Sweden also emphasizes the need for 
enhanced cross border mobility between the EU and eastern neighbours. In line with 
this, visa liberalisation is central to Swedish policy towards the region. In addition to 
short-term mobility, Sweden also prioritizes opening up further legal channels for the 
citizens of the WNIS region. It is argued that irregular migration could be combated 
through introducing further legal channels, both concerning visa facilitations and 
economic immigration, for the region.  
 
 
                                               
394 Government offices of Sweden, “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on 
Foreign Affairs,” (Unofficial Translation) February 9, 2005. 
395 Swedish Ministry of Justice (2010) Migration Policy- Fact Sheet 
396 Alexander Betts, “The International Relations of the ‘New’ Extraterritorial Approaches to Refugee 
Protection: Explaining the Policy Initiatives of the UK Government and UNHCR,” Refuge: Canada's 
Periodical on Refugees 22, no (1) (2004): 59. 
397 See: The Swedish Migration Board-the EU and Migration 
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111 
 
  
4.6. Chapter Conclusions 
 
The comparative analysis in this chapter presents the main policy positions of the 
Member States on the issue of immigration cooperation with the eastern neighbours 
(See Table 3). The assessment of their preferences on the four sub-areas of immigration 
cooperation shows that the main cleavage among the Member States could be identified 
as the degree to which security or mobility oriented policies are supported. Among the 
case study areas, irregular immigration and asylum have been related to security 
dimension of immigration management in the EU decision-making context. Based on 
this differentiation, it is argued that there is a high consensus among the Member States 
with respect to security-oriented policies. All the Member States that are analysed in the 
Chapter agree on the fact that irregular immigration is an important part of the EU 
cooperation with third countries. Historically, the early internal cooperation among the 
Member States focused on combatting irregular immigration as well. In line with, there 
is a relatively longer tradition of cooperation in the area of fight against irregular 
migration among the EU Member States. As the external extension of the intra-EU 
partnership, the cooperation with the neighbouring countries in the area of migration 
focuses on irregular migration dimension. It is considered that there is a need to 
cooperate with the neighbours due to economic or security related repercussions of 
irregular migration to the EU. Moreover, it is a sector that most likely involves cross-
border crimes and human (potentially asylum seekers) exploitations.  
 
On the other hand, visa cooperation and labour immigration are the policy areas that are 
linked to the liberalisation of cross-border mobility. The policies that are linked to 
further liberalisation of cross-border mobility bring about polarised preferences among 
the Member States. As shown above, the Member States considerably diverge regarding 
the degree to which they support visa liberalisations and opening up labour immigration 
channels for the third country citizens from the region.  
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Table 3. Member States’ Policy Preferences 
Policy areas Preferences of the Member States 
Irregular Migration High Consensus 
Visa Low Consensus 
Labour migration Low Consensus 
Asylum cooperation High Consensus 
 
As outlined above, France, Germany and the United Kingdom adopted security-oriented 
approaches emphasizing the concerns related to future migratory pressures from the 
region. As traditional migrant receiving countries, these countries consider themselves 
potential destinations for the migrants coming from the WNIS. As mentioned above, the 
UK opted in a substantial amount of EU legislation concerning the irregular migration 
as well. A security-oriented approach is shared by most of the EU member states which 
have been traditionally subject to high levels of immigration such as Austria, Belgium 
and Netherlands. In line with their approach, these actors are reluctant to adopt policies 
that would ease cross-border travel.  
 
The actors that give support to further liberalisation of movement for the citizens of the 
eastern neighbours, such as Poland and the rest of the new member states that entered 
the EU in 2004 and 2007, have historically been either source or transit countries of 
immigration. Similar to the new member states from the east, Sweden has been in 
favour of further liberalizing mobility for the citizens of eastern neighbours parallel to 
its long-standing liberal approach with respect to migration.  
 
The comparative picture depicts that there is a tendency for economically and politically 
strong member states (i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom) to prioritize 
cooperation against irregular migration and in relation to the asylum pressures to the EU 
in partnership with the neighbours.398 Despite the reluctance of the ‘strong’ member 
states to further enhance mobility for the eastern neighbours, there has been progress 
regarding security and liberty oriented policies towards the region since 2006.399 
                                               
398 See Appendix 1 for a comparative table on asylum levels. 
399 The policy outcomes are discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.  
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Although the policy preferences and concerns of the strong member states are 
compelling in an area like immigration (i.e. high politics), the policy outcomes rise 
above the lowest common denominator. 
 
As opposed to the state-centric approaches that put forward the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ argument, the institutionalist approaches argue that institutional actors 
and dynamics act as intervening variables. Their impact on the decision-making process 
could constrain intergovernmental bargaining among member states. The following 
Chapter analyses the ways in which the EU’s institutional framework constrains the 
intergovernmental bargaining among the EU Member States.  
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CHAPTER 5: The Influence of EU’s Institutional Framework  
 
Introduction  
This chapter first outlines the legal basis and procedures of decision-making in the EU. 
The aim is to analyse the extent to which legal and formal constraints reinforce or 
constrain intergovernmental decision-making processes. As opposed to the ‘bargaining 
approach’, the extension of the Community method to areas such as immigration and 
asylum policies constitutes constraints according to institutional approaches. On the 
other hand, the legal and constitutional rights of the member states are taken into 
account. Member states could limit each other or EU institutions based on the legal 
framework. Parallel to this, the decision-making procedures could enhance the role of 
EU institutions. The institutions could also constrain the behaviour of each other or 
national actors at different stages of EU decision-making process. A considerable 
amount of EU legislation in the area of justice and home affairs is on the intra-EU 
integration and harmonisation. This chapter deals mainly with the external dimension of 
the policy areas. The internal dimension is presented to the degree that it is relevant for 
the external aspects of cooperation. Secondly, the Chapter presents the main 
institutional actors in the area of the external dimension of migration. This section deals 
with the institutional dynamics of policy making. The analysis focuses on: the Council 
of the EU, the European Council, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament as the main decision-making institutions of the EU.  
 
5.1. The legal basis of the EU Action concerning the external dimension of 
migration 
 
5.1.1. The Maastricht Treaty: Intergovernmental cooperation under the third 
pillar 
In 1992, the member states signed the Maastricht Treaty which established a legal basis 
for EU-level cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs under Title VI TEU. 
The Maastricht Treaty defined the field of justice and home affairs as a ‘common 
interest’ and asserted the shared aim of the member states to develop ‘close cooperation 
115 
 
  
on JHA affairs’.400 Among the spheres of EU competence regarding migration under 
Title VI were asylum, borders, immigration and the policies regarding documented and 
undocumented third country nationals. 401  The legal basis was placed under the 
intergovernmental third pillar. As emphasised in Article K.3 (1) Title VI TEU, the 
member states agreed to enhance cooperation and coordination at the EU level without 
communitarisation during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations.402 
 
Under the Maastricht legal framework, the member states had a very strong hand in 
decision-making due to the unanimity requirement. As stated in Article K.4 (3) TEU, 
the intergovernmental legal basis allowed the Council to act unanimously to adopt 
common positions and actions, promote cooperation and draw conventions. The third 
pillar structure did not give substantial roles to the European Commission and the 
European Parliament in decision-making due to the reluctance of the member states in 
ceding sovereignty in the area of justice and home affairs. As indicated in Article K.3 
(2) TEU, the Commission shared the competence to initiate legislative proposals with 
the member states regarding asylum, borders, immigration and third country nationals. 
Under the restricted intergovernmental legal basis, the EP’s position was not binding on 
the member states in the course of decision-making process.403  
 
The legislative developments in the justice and home affairs were limited under the 
intergovernmental framework of the Maastricht Treaty. This was particularly due to the 
unanimity requirement and intricate decision-making for the adoption of measures 
which prolonged decision-making process and hence discouraged the member states 
                                               
400 See: The Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 191, July 29, 1992, accessed January 2, 2012. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html.  
401 Several issue areas concerning migration have been included under Article K.1 VI TEU including ‘(i) 
asylum policy; (ii) rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States 
and the exercise of controls thereon; (iii) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third 
countries: (a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member 
States; (b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, 
including family reunion and access to employment; (c)  combating unauthorized immigration, residence 
and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States.’ The Member States have 
committed to coordinate their policies and cooperate regarding migration in the view of the increasing 
interdependence.  
402 Article K.7 TEU also enabled cooperation among two or more member states.  
403 According to Article K.6 TEU, the Presidency and the Commission should inform and consult the 
European Parliament. 
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from cooperation within the narrow Treaty competence.404 The limitations of the Treaty 
paved the way for increased dialogue and interchange among the member states outside 
of the EU framework.405 The member states adopted joint positions predominantly to 
control migratory pressures to the EU. Among these measures were the harmonisation 
of the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU borders and the 
transfer of responsibility to third parties such as ‘carrier sanctions’ that make the airline 
companies liable if they take undocumented migrants on board.406 Despite its limited 
scope and the problems related to its effectiveness, the EU level cooperation in the area 
of justice and home affairs under the Maastricht Treaty’s intergovernmental further 
encouraged the Member States to cooperate in the area of justice and home affair.407 In 
Amsterdam, the member states reached a consensus to communitarise the policies that 
were related to migration.  
 
5.1.2. Amsterdam Treaty: Communitarisation in the policy area  
 
With the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the member states approved the 
transfer of the items related to immigration and asylum from the intergovernmental 
domain to the European Community. The Council adopted Articles 61-69 of Title IV of 
the TEC on ‘Visa, asylum, immigration and other policies relate to free movement of 
persons’.408 It should be noted that the EU level communitarisation of this area was not 
a result of a consensus regarding making further commitments in terms of cooperation 
in migration field. The integration at the EU level regarding migration policy area was 
related to the increasing interdependence among the member states in line with ‘free 
movement of persons’.409 
                                               
404 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy Making as Venue 
Shopping,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no.2 (2000): 256-257. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Sarah Collinson, “Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, ‘‘Safe Third Countries’ and ‘Readmission’: 
The Development of an Asylum ‘Buffer Zone’ in Europe,’’ Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, New Series 21, no. 1 (1996): 76-90. 
407 Joerg Monar, “Justice and home affairs after Amsterdam: the treaty reforms and the challenge of their 
implementation,” in The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, eds. Jörg Monar and Wolfgang 
Wessels (London: Continuum, 2000): 267-295. 
408 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and related acts, Official Journal C 340, 10 November 1997 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html. 
409 Monar, “Justice and home affairs after Amsterdam: the treaty reforms and the challenge of their 
implementation,” 267-295. 
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The Amsterdam Treaty moved a large amount of issues into the Community pillar with 
respect to the justice and home affairs field including ‘controls on the external borders, 
asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters’ to establish a more 
comprehensive management of these issues at the EU level.410 Due to the sensitivity of 
the policy area, the member states agreed on a transition period to fulfil the 
commitments that were made in Amsterdam. They committed to change the decision-
making procedures with respect to these areas moving from unanimity in the Council to 
QMV and also to grant co-decision powers to the European Parliament.  
 
After the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, a special Council meeting was organized 
dealing exclusively with the issues of justice and home affairs in Tampere in October 
1999.411  The Tampere European Council was one of the rare occasions when a 
European Council meeting was devoted to a single issue. The member states made a 
declaration to start working towards ‘a common EU migration policy’ with a multi-
annual scheme in Tampere. The European Council conclusions put forward firm targets 
and deadlines for the development of EU level legislations directed towards ‘the 
creation of an area of justice, liberty and security’.412 The pace of the legislative 
developments with respect to immigration and asylum were slow within the first one 
and a half years of the Tampere European Council.413 Despite a number of Commission 
proposals that were put through immediately after the Tampere Council meeting, the 
member states were reluctant to agree on the adoption of further legislative measures 
until 2001. Signed in February 2001, the Nice Treaty drew attention to the commitments 
that were made with the Amsterdam Treaty in relation to changing the decision-making 
procedures in the area of migration from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the 
Council and extending co-decision competences to the European Parliament by May 
                                               
410 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and related acts, Official Journal C 340, 10 November 1997 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html. 
411 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 
1999, accessed January 8, 2012 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. 
412 Ibid.  
413 Steve Peers, “Key Developments on Migration in the European Union,” European Journal of 
Migration and Law 3 (2001): 231-55. 
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2004.414 With the entry into force of the Nice Treaty in February 2003, the decision-
making procedures were changed from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the 
Council for a number of areas related to migration that were covered under Title IV 
TEC. This change did not affect some areas including ‘conditions of entry and 
residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long-term 
visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion’.  
 
In the first half of 2004, the EU Presidency which was held by the Netherlands launched 
a debate about the upcoming deadline for changing the decision-making procedures for 
the migration policy area. In June 2004, the European Commission presented its 
Communication on the evaluation of the Tampere Conclusions. The Communication 
pointed at the problems in the course of policy making process due to the continuing 
dominance of intergovernmental decision making.415 The Commission criticized the 
member states for prioritising the national issues rather than the common EU level 
objectives. This criticism was particularly relevant in the areas that the member states 
could also put forward proposals along with the Commission. It was clear from the 
Commission’s evaluation of the progress that was made in the course of the first multi-
annual programme that the member states were reluctant to give up on their 
competences including the veto power.   
 
In November 2004, the European Council approved the Hague Programme, the second 
multi-annual scheme regarding the course of action in the area of freedom, justice and 
security for the EU, replacing the Tampere Programme of 1999.416 In 2005, the 
Commission presented the Action for the Hague Programme putting forward the 
following primary targets in the field to be realized within five years (2005-2010): 
ensuring fundamental rights and citizenship; enhancing and complementing member 
states’ capabilities to fight against terrorism; developing an EU level migration policy 
                                               
414 Declaration number 5 on Article 67 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Treaty of 
Nice, OJ 2001 C 80, March 10, 2001, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/C_2001080EN.000101.html. 
415  European Commission, “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere 
programme and future orientations,” COM (2004) 401 final, June 2, 2004.  
416 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Presidency Conclusions, the Hague Programme: Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’’ Annex I, (14292/1/04 REV 1 11), November 4-5, 
2004. 
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and managing migration, integrating external border management and visa policies; 
establishment of a common asylum area; adopting measures on integration to maximise 
benefit from migration for the EU society and economy; management of privacy and 
security in sharing information; fight against organized crime; ensure an area of 
European area of justice; and enhancement of shared responsibility and solidarity 
among the EU member states with respect to meeting the objectives of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.417  
 
The Hague Programme reflected the increasing security-oriented approach in the EU 
regarding the issues related to the AFSJ.418 The emphasis that was put on the ‘shared 
commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of 
law’ with the Tampere Programme was lessened. The Hague Programme stated that it 
responded to ‘a central concern of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
Union’ diverging from the Tampere Programme. 419  Instead of furthering EU 
integration in the areas concerning justice and home affairs, the Hague Programme was 
subject to criticism with respect to impeding the creation of ‘an area of freedom, 
security and justice’.420 The third multi-annual programme (2009-2014), the Stockholm 
Programme, was approved by the European Council in 2009.421 The Programme has 
incorporated a detailed external dimension to the justice and home affairs policy area 
which has shown the increasing importance for the Member States.  
 
Before delving into the each case study area, it should be noted that most of the 
decisions and instruments related to migration cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova 
were adopted under the Amsterdam Treaty legal basis and procedures. In line with this, 
the following section mainly focuses on the Amsterdam Treaty. Entered into force in 
December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty has led to certain significant changes regarding the 
                                               
417  European Commission, “The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years: The 
Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice,” COM (2005) 184 final, 
June 10, 2005.  
418 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, “The Hague Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security 
and Justice,” in Security vs Freedom, eds. Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006): 5. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera, “The Hague Programme & the EU’s agenda on ‘Freedom, Security 
and Justice: Delivering results for Europe’s citizens?,” CEPS, July 2006. 
421 European Council, “The Stockholm Programme, an Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens” (2010/C 115/01), May 4, 2010.  
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legal basis and decision making procedures in the area of external dimension of 
migration. After presenting the legal basis and the procedures under the pre-Lisbon 
rules, the following section also explain the changes that are introduced after the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
5.1.2.1. Irregular Migration 
As shown in Chapter 4 on the member states’ policy preferences regarding the four case 
studies, the member states have found relatively easier to agree on a common position 
in the area of irregular migration due to their shared interest in reducing irregular 
migration to the EU. Among the policy tools that are available in the area of irregular 
migration, conclusion of ‘readmission agreements’422 has been one of the primary 
measures for the member states to cooperate with each other and with third countries.423 
These agreements have helped the member states smooth the progress of returning 
undocumented immigrants to either countries of origin or transit.424 
 
The cooperation among the member states regarding streamlining their efforts in order 
to return undocumented immigrants began under the intergovernmental legal basis 
which was created with Article VI of the Maastricht Treaty. Under the 
intergovernmental Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, the member states took certain 
steps to coordinate their actions regarding concluding readmission agreements with 
third countries. In 1994, they agreed on a template to be used at bilateral or multilateral 
readmission agreements with third countries.425 In March 1995, an agreement was 
reached in the Council regarding inserting repatriation clauses to the ‘mixed 
agreements’ with third countries which require the consent of both the member states 
                                               
422 EU Readmission Agreements are agreements between the EU and third countries with respect to 
undocumented migrants. The partner countries agree to receive their undocumented nationals residing in 
the EU, undocumented migrants who are not their nationals (including stateless persons) if it is proven 
that they entered the EU transiting through their territory. 
423 Annabelle Roig and Thomas Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the 
Political Impasse,” European Journal of Migration and Law 9 (2007): 373. 
424 Ibid. 
425 European Commission, “Council Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning a specimen 
bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State and a third country, OJ  C 274 , September  
19, 1996, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996Y0919(07):EN:HTML. 
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and the European Community.426 These agreements proved the increasing integration 
of the European Community into the management of readmission cooperation with third 
countries.  
 
With the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Community was granted 
with the competence to adopt measures in the area of irregular immigration and return 
of undocumented immigrants. Article 63(3) (b) under Title IV of the TEC introduced 
the call for the development of measures concerning ‘illegal immigration and illegal 
residence, including repatriation of illegal residents’ providing a legal basis for 
readmission agreements between the EC and third countries.427 With the legal basis, the 
European Community was given the competence to conclude readmission agreements 
with third countries on behalf of the EU.428 
 
Decision-making Procedures:  
After the end of the five-year transition period following the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission acquired exclusive competence to make proposals 
concerning the issues related to irregular migration identified under Article 63(3)(b) 
TEC. In line with the legal commitments that were made with the Amsterdam Treaty 
regarding the decision-making procedures, the Hague Programme (the second multi-
annual programme) gave the EU Institutions the political mandate to transfer the 
decision making procedures on the issue of irregular migration measures from 
unanimity requirement to QMV in the Council. The Hague Programme also 
                                               
426 See Readmission Agreements Council of the European Union (1995), doc. 12509/95, Council of the 
European Union (1996), doc 4272/96. Also see: Council of the European Union (1999) Council document 
6098/99, 17 February (1999), Summaries of EU Legislations, Europa, accessed January 8, 2012  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33105_en.htm. 
427 Article 63 TEC also states that the instruments that are approved in the Council under its third 
paragraph ‘shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas concerned 
national provisions which are compatible with the Treaty and with international agreements.’ In the case 
of 63(3)(b), the Member States could conclude readmission agreements with third countries at the 
national level as well. However, they cannot simultaneously negotiate with a third country that the EC is 
negotiating in line with Article 2(2) of the TFEU Bilateral readmission agreements concluded at the 
national level are usually less public compared to the EU level agreements. Despite the European 
Commission’s demands to increase transparency regarding bilateral readmission agreements of the 
member states, the member states traditionally do not reveal these agreements. 
428 Article 218 TEC (formerly Article 210 of Rome Treaty) has given the EC legal personality to 
conclude international agreements with third parties on behalf of the EU. With Article 46 A TFEU, the 
member states have approved the legal personality of the European Union which has replaced the 
European Community in the Treaties. 
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strengthened the competences of the EP granting it with co-decision powers regarding 
irregular migration.429 
 
Under the Amsterdam Treaty procedures, Community readmission agreements were 
concluded based on Article 300 (1) TEC which dealt with the conclusion of the 
international agreements that the EC acquired competences. According to Article 300 
(1) TEC, the Commission had the exclusive right to make recommendations regarding 
concluding international agreements between the EC and third countries. Commission 
proposals regarding readmission agreements had to be approved by the Council acting 
by a qualified majority. After the approval of a proposal by the Council, the European 
Commission was responsible with negotiation process with third countries. Although 
the Commission had a considerable role being in charge of negotiation process on 
behalf of the EU, it was supposed to be in close contact with relevant Council working 
groups.  
 
As discussed in the Chapter on the Member States’ policy preferences, it is relatively 
easier for the Member States to reach a common position in the area of irregular 
migration. Readmission agreements predominantly facilitate the removal of 
undocumented migrants residing in the EU. The Council had the competence to reach a 
final decision regarding concluding a readmission agreement with a third country, 
following Commission led negotiations, based on qualified majority after consulting the 
European Parliament. Given that its policy position is not legally binding under the 
consultation procedure, the EP did not have strong influence in the course of 
readmission agreement negotiations with third countries under the pre-Lisbon 
procedures.  
 
Post-Lisbon 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the competences of 
the EU to conclude international agreements with third countries on managing returning 
irregular migrants to their countries of origin or transit have become explicit. Although 
                                               
429 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the EU,” 2005/C/01. (OJ C53/1) March 3, 2005. 
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the EU has concluded several readmission agreements based on the Amsterdam Treaty 
basis, there was not a direct reference to readmission agreements with third countries. 
Due to the lack of a clear mention, signing EC readmission agreements with third 
countries was identified as ‘implied’ competence of the Community.430 Article 79 (3) 
TFEU (replacing Article 63(3) TEC with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) has 
explicitly referred to signing EU level readmission agreements stating that the EU could 
‘conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of 
origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the 
conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member 
States.’.  
 
In terms of the changes regarding decision-making process, the EP’s competences have 
been amended with respect to readmission agreements. Although the European 
Parliament lacked strong influence under the pre-Lisbon set-up in relation to EU level 
readmission agreements, its influence has been substantially strengthened with the 
Lisbon Treaty. In line with Articles 79 (which incorporated the TEC 63(3)) and 218 
(6)(a) (former Article 300 (3) TEC) of the TFEU, the consent of the EP has become 
required for the conclusion of readmission agreements. Under the consent procedure, 
the Council has a legal obligation to take into account the position of the EP in relation 
to concluding readmission agreements with third countries. As the negotiations for 
Ukraine and Moldova were concluded based on the Amsterdam Treaty procedures, the 
position of the EP was not binding for the Council. 
 
5.1.2.2. Visa policy 
In 1985, the Schengen Convention paved the way for the abolition of the internal 
borders among the EU member states. Although the main purpose behind the Schengen 
agreement was to strengthen the functioning of the Single European Act by eliminating 
the internal borders, one of the outcomes was the need for a common visa regime 
among the participating states. Among the case study areas of this thesis, visa policy is 
the most harmonised policy area. Within the Schengen system (which was initially 
                                               
430  The Tampere European Council Conclusions, adopted in October 1999, confirms this implied 
competence and states that the Community is granted with powers regarding readmission with the 
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.   
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negotiated outside of the EU Treaty framework in an intergovernmental setting), the 
participating states agreed to harmonise short-stay visas to cross the borders of the 
Schengen zone. Due to the salience of the policy area for the member states, the EU 
harmonization in the area of visa policy was restricted to short-stay visas.431 The 
member states were reluctant to transfer their competences over long-term visas and 
residence permits to the EU level.432 Article 100c gave the European Community the 
competence regarding visas with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.  
 
With the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the Schengen Acquis was 
integrated into the EU's legal framework.433 Referring to the adoption of measures in 
relation to ‘rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three months’, Article 62 
(2)(b) of the TEC created an EU level legal basis with respect to short-stay visas. The 
member states retained their competence regarding negotiating or concluding 
agreements with third countries. The legal basis of the EU measures regarding visa 
domain was only applicable to short-term Schengen visas. The member states that were 
opted out of the Schengen acquis (i.e. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) were 
excluded in line with the Schengen procedures. 
 
Decision-Making Procedure 
Based on Article 100c (1) EC introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, the Council had 
the competence to determine the list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the 
Schengen border voting unanimously on a Commission proposal. As put in Article 100c 
(3), the voting requirement was changed from unanimity to qualified majority voting by 
January 1996. The Council had to consult the EP before reaching a decision but the 
EP’s position was not legally binding.  
 
                                               
431 Article 62 (2) (b) TEC has given the EC the competence to adopt measures in relation to ‘visas for 
intended stays of no more than three months’.  
432 The long-term visas and residence permits are dealt under Article 63(3) TEC. Article 63 underlines 
that the five-year transition period does not apply to this item.  
433 See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, Summaries of EU Legislations, Europa, accessed January 8, 
2012  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_im
migration/l33020_en.htm. 
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In 2001, the Member States adopted the Regulation on the list of countries that are 
exempted or required to obtain a visa.434 The determination of visa requirements for the 
nationals of a third country has a strong technical dimension in line with the calculation 
of the irregular migration threat and border security. However, there is an indisputable 
external relations dimension both at the national and EU level. As indicated in the 2001 
Regulation on visa requirements, the external relations of the EU with a third country 
and the repercussions of the decision on the regional coherence are also important. In 
line with this, varied regional preferences of the EU Member States are highly 
important. The Member States that have close relations with the eastern neighbours, 
such as Poland, advocate visa-free travel for the eastern neighbours as Poland had to 
drop its visa-free national policy in line with the EU accession requirements. On the 
other hand, Spain could have particular preferences regarding the EU visa policy 
towards Latin American countries. Despite the likelihood of disagreements among the 
Member States and the hardship of reaching a common list of third countries, the EU 
has harmonised the visa lists since 1996.435 In line with this, the move from unanimity 
principle to qualified majority rule in the Council abolished the veto power of an 
individual member state with respect to the decisions on the visa requirements for the 
third countries. Although the QMV procedure in the Council restricted the impact of the 
Member States’ individual policy preferences, the Council was the sole legislator and 
was not required to take into account the position of the EP regarding the determination 
of visa lists.  
 
In relation to changing the 2001 Regulation on the list of the nationalities that are 
subject to visa requirement, the following procedure was relevant under the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 436  Article 67 TEC stated that the proposals on the measures related to 
determining visa requirements or exemptions for third country nationals should be made 
solely by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The decisions 
                                               
434 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement” OJ L 81/1, March 21, 2001, accessed January 8, 2012  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:081:0001:0007:EN:PDF. 
435 Steve Peers, “Vetoes, Opt-outs and EU Immigration and Asylum law,” Statewatch Briefing, 23 
December 2004. 
436 The 2001 Council Regulation No 539/2001 concerns the list of the third countries whose nationals 
should be in possession of visas to cross external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement. The list of countries has been amended several times since adoption.  
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on the proposals were taken in the Council by qualified majority. The EP’s position was 
not very influential due to the consultation procedure. Despite the extension of co-
decision procedures in a number of areas related to the justice and home affairs field 
following the adoption of the Hague Programme in 2004-2005, the determination of 
negative and positive visa lists was subject to the consultation procedure.  
 
Under the Amsterdam Treaty procedures (as described in Article 300 (1) TEC), the 
process to sign a visa facilitation agreement with a third country should be initiated by 
the European Commission with a proposal. After the approval of the Council to start the 
negotiations, the Commission had the main responsibility for negotiating with the third 
country. However, the Commission was expected to maintain a close contact with the 
relevant committees formed of member state representatives. The mandate that was 
given by the Council along with the authorisation could also limit the scope of the 
Commission action in the course of the negotiations.437  
 
Post-Lisbon:  
After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, Article 77 (2) TFEU has replaced the 
62 (2)(b) TEC on short-stay permits. Ordinary legislative procedure is extended to 
measures for determining the list of nationalities that are required to obtain a short-stay 
visa and could travel to the EU without a visa for short-stays. The introduction of the 
co-decision with the ordinary procedure has given a substantial role to the EP as the co-
legislator with the Council with respect to the visa policy.  
 
As in the case of readmission agreements, Article 218 TFEU (former Article 300 TEC) 
has increased the influence of the EP in relation to visa facilitation agreements. After 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, EP’s approval has become a legal requirement for 
a visa facilitation agreement to be signed. The EP exercised its competence for the first 
time with respect to the visa facilitation agreement with Georgia. If the negotiations 
with Belarus continue without problems, the visa facilitation agreement with Belarus 
has to be approved by the EP as well. Given that the decisions regarding the agreements 
                                               
437 Tom Delreux, “The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective 
on the internal decision-making process,” International Environmental Agreements 6 no. 3 (2006): 239. 
 
127 
 
  
that were signed with Ukraine and Moldova were taken under the Amsterdam Treaty 
procedures, the EP’s approval was not required. 
 
5.1.2.3. Labour Migration  
Labour migration has been the least harmonised migration policy area in the EU. The 
EU member states have traditionally been reluctant to transfer their competences to the 
EU level in relation to labour migration policy area. Although there has been a treaty 
basis for the EU action in the field of legal migration since the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the EU level cooperation has been very limited in line with 
the domestic concerns of the member states as outlined in the previous chapter. Despite 
the longstanding reservations of certain EU member states that have become traditional 
migrant receiving countries in the post-war period (particularly France, Germany and 
the UK), there has been an increasing EU level debate on expanding different legal 
migration opportunities including labour migration for a better management of 
migration to the EU. Offering legal migration opportunities is considered to be 
instrumental in encouraging third countries to cooperate with the member states 
particularly in fighting against irregular migratory pressures to the EU.438  
 
With Article 63(3) (a) TEC, the European Community acquired the competence to 
adopt measures regarding ‘conditions of entry and residence, and standards on 
procedures for the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, 
including those for the purpose of family reunion’. 439  However, the exclusive 
competence of the member states in determining the volume of economic migrants that 
could enter their labour markets was secured.440 Although the Amsterdam Treaty gave 
the European Commission the right to develop policy proposals, the legislative 
development process has been very slow in this policy field. In 2001, the Commission 
proposed the Council to adopt a comprehensive Council directive on the employment of 
                                               
438 Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003- Presidency Conclusions, 11638/03 October 1, 
2003. 
439 In addition to Article 63(3) (a), Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers claim that Article 137 TEC could also 
arguably provide a legal basis regarding the access of third country nationals to the EU labour market. 
See: Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006): 677-78.  
440 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the EU, 2005/C/01. (OJ C53/1), March 3, 2005. 79 (5) TFEU also explicitly stated that the 
volumes of economic migrants (both self-employed or employed) is determined by the Member States.  
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third country nationals defining EU level shared rules and conditions.441 However, the 
member states could not reach an agreement on the proposal. Given that the Council 
was supposed to act by unanimity in relation to labour migration policy area, it was very 
difficult to reach an agreement due to strong objections from certain member states such 
as Germany. The proposal was eventually withdrawn by the Commission.442  
 
In 2004, the multi-annual Hague Programme on justice and home affairs cooperation 
put an emphasis on the need for an EU level debate on economic migration to the EU 
and requested the Commission to develop a policy framework.443 Building on the 
Hague Programme, the European Commission released a green paper to re-launch a 
debate on developing an EU level policy on labour migration in 2004. The Commission 
proposal on the legal migration policy was presented following the public consultation 
process on its green paper in 2005. Compared to the 2001 Directive proposal which 
adopted a ‘horizontal framework’ involving the entry of economic migrants of all skill 
levels, the 2005 policy plan of the European Commission was less ambitious due to the 
lack of interest among the member states in an all-encompassing framework.444 Due to 
the reluctance on the part of the member states to give up their veto power, the 2005 
policy plan adopted a sectoral approach focusing on certain categories of economic 
migration for which there was a consensus among the member states. These categories 
included highly skilled migrants, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transfers and paid 
trainees. Due to its limited scope, the policy plan did not satisfy certain member states 
that have a liberal approach towards labour immigration such as Sweden.445 Moreover, 
the European Parliament was not satisfied with the lack of a general directive.446 
 
 
                                               
441 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities,” 
COM (2001) 386, July 11, 2001.  
442 European Commission, “Outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the  
Legislator,” COM (2005) 462 final, September 27, 2005. 
443 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice 
in the EU, 2005/C/01. (OJ C53/1) March 3, 2005. 
444 European Commission, “Policy Plan on Legal Migration,” COM (2005) 669 final, December 21, 2005.  
445 Åsa Carlander, Legal counsellor, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 1 
February 2011, Brussels. 
446 European Parliament LIBE Committee, “European Parliament resolution on the Policy Plan on legal 
migration,” A6-0322/2007 / P6-TA-PROV(2007)0414, 26 September 26, 2007.  
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Decision-Making Procedure:  
Among the four case study areas, the constraints that were imposed by the EU’s legal 
framework on the member states were the lowest in the area of labour migration under 
the Amsterdam Treaty procedures. According to the decision-making procedures 
indicated in Article 67 TEC, decisions related to the policy areas that were covered 
under Article 63 TEC should be taken by unanimity. Although Article 67 TEC stated 
that the unanimity requirement would be abolished after the end of the five-year 
transition period, legal migration area was exempt from this requirement as pointed out 
in Article 63 TEC due to the reluctance on the part of the member states to give up their 
veto power. In line with this exception, the Hague Programme did not give a political 
mandate for the transfer of legal migration domain to QMV. Due to their veto power, 
the member states had a strong control over the decision-making process.447 Their 
responses to the European Commission’s Green Paper on Legal Migration (despite its 
limited scope compared to the former 2001 Directive) also have shown the lukewarm 
position of the member states with respect to harmonisation in this policy area.  
Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the EP had a limited level of involvement in the course of 
decision-making on legal migration due to the consultation procedure. Although the 
Council had to consult the EP before reaching a decision, the position of the EP was not 
legally binding on the Council in the area of labour migration. Although a number of 
policy areas that were covered under Title IV of the TEC on migration were transferred 
from consultation to co-decision procedure after the end of the five-year transition 
period, labour migration continued to be decided under the consultation procedure. 
 
Post-Lisbon  
With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the member states have 
lost their veto power with respect to labour migration policy area. Article 79(2) (a) 
TFEU has replaced Article 63(3) (a) regarding the long-term visas and residence. Under 
the ordinary legislative procedure, the decision-making procedure in the Council with 
respect to for labour migration was changed from unanimity to QMV in the Council. 
                                               
447 During the 5-year transitional period after the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission 
shared its competences to initiate a proposal with the Member States. Although the Commission becomes 
the sole initiator following the end of the transition period, the Treaty affirms that the Commission should 
look into the requests from the Member States.  
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Despite further ‘communitarisation’ of the policy area, Article 79(5) TFEU has clearly 
protected ‘the right of the Member States to determine volumes of admission of third-
country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, 
whether employed or self-employed.  
 
Despite the general reluctance on the part of some member states to share their decision-
making powers in the area of labour migration, the EP has become a co-legislator along 
with the Council in relation to labour migration area with the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
5.1.2.4. Asylum Policy 
The EU policy on asylum has evolved interconnected with migration policy. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, the member states were highly concerned about mounting 
asylum applications due particularly to the political instabilities in the broader 
neighbourhood of the EU. 448  The decrease in other forms of legal migration 
opportunities to the EU member states since mid-1970s has been considered a 
contributing factor as well.449 As presented in Chapter 4, the member states started to 
revise their liberal asylum policies following the rise in asylum applications. After the 
signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the signatory Member States were urged to 
cooperate among themselves regarding asylum. A number of measures were adopted 
among the Member States at the intergovernmental level. The border free zone made it 
easy for asylum seekers to move from one member state to another and issue several 
applications. In 1990, the Dublin Convention was signed among the Schengen members 
to determine which member state is responsible for assessing an asylum application and 
control asylum applications through prohibiting the issuing of several coinciding 
applications.450 
 
                                               
448 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the right of asylum, Discussion Paper on the Right to Asylum,” SEC (91) 1857, October 
11, 1991. 
449 Ingrid Boccardi, Europe and refugees: towards an EU asylum policy (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002): 27. 
450 Council of the European Union, “Convention determining the State responsible for examining 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin 
Convention,” OJ C 254, August 19, 1997, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01):EN:HTML. 
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In addition to the internal mechanisms such as the Dublin framework that regulate the 
burden sharing among the Member States, the Member States adopted policy tools that 
transfer certain responsibilities outside of the EU. In 1992, the ministers who were 
responsible with immigration agreed to transfer certain responsibilities outside of the 
EU and introduced the safe third country principle.451 Based on this principle, an 
asylum seeker could be expelled to a ‘safe’ third country that he or she had transited 
from prior to entering the EU territory to apply for an asylum.452 The agreement was 
reached at the intergovernmental level among the Member States outside of the existing 
EU framework. At the following European Council meeting, the heads of states 
reaffirmed their support to the agreement.453 
 
The integration of the Schengen Convention into the Amsterdam Treaty created an EU 
level legal basis. Article 63 (1) and (2) TEC have provided the legal basis for the 
adoption of measures related to asylum, refugees and displaced persons. These items 
mainly dealt with internal measures in relation to determining minimum standards (such 
as on reception conditions for asylum seekers and procedures for giving or taking away 
refugee status) and allocation of responsibility among the Member States.  
 
Although the EU Member States had already integrated third countries in their 
management of asylum, the external dimension of asylum policy is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Amsterdam Treaty. In line with the Amsterdam Treaty commitments 
that were related to the internal aspects, the Tampere programme referred to the 
development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) focusing on the 
internal aspects as well. The extent to which the EU Member States could cooperate 
with third countries regarding asylum has been a salient topic. Some Member States 
argued that the transfer of responsibilities to manage asylum demands to third countries 
                                               
451 Council of the European Union, “Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a Harmonized 
Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third Countries (‘‘London Resolution’’),” November 30, 1992, 
accessed January 08, 2012 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,COUNCIL,,,3f86c3094,0.html.  
452 According to the London Resolution (1992), a host country could be considered safe to return asylum 
seekers if their life and freedom are not endangered and it is guaranteed that they will not face with 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The EU does not have a common safe third country list.  
453  Council of the European Union, “Edinburgh European Council 11-12 December Presidency 
Conclusions-(Part A, Point 22), accessed January 2, 2012 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/default_en.htm.  
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against the commitments that were made as signatories to the Geneva Convention. 
Moreover, the ability of certain third countries in terms of managing asylum 
applications and processing was questioned by several actors as the UNHCR and the 
ECRE.454 Reflecting on the debates, the Hague Programme, the second multi-annual 
programme on the development of JHA cooperation, gave a political mandate to the 
development of external measures including the Regional Protection Programmes.  
 
Although the Hague Programme is not a legislative instrument, the Heads of States gave 
the EU institutions a political mandate to further develop cooperation with third 
countries in the area of immigration. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
agreed in 2008 also reinforced cooperation with third countries under the Regional 
Protection Programmes and capacity development in the partner countries. The external 
part was also stressed by the Stockholm Programme underlining cooperation and 
solidarity with third countries for them to increase their capacity with respect to 
handling asylum applications through the Regional Protection Programmes.  
 
Decision-Making Procedure:  
According to the Amsterdam Treaty procedures, asylum policy was adopted mostly by 
QMV in the Council. Article 63(1) that identified the main competences of the EC was 
decided based on QMV since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. These articles 
were mainly concerned about the adoption of the internal measures in relation to 
determining minimum standards and allocation of responsibility among the Member 
States. The exception was Article 63(2) (b) TEC on ‘promoting a balance of effort 
between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving 
refugees and displaced persons’ in line with the procedures identified Article 67(5) 
TEC. The EP acquired co-decision competences for the areas that are covered under 
63(a) and 63(2)(a).  
 
 
 
                                               
454 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Protection in third countries”, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/introduction/41-protection-in-third-countries.html. 
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Post-Lisbon 
 
The political mandate of the Hague Programme with respect to EU action in the area of 
external dimension of asylum policy is further strengthened by the legal basis provided 
by the Lisbon Treaty regarding cooperation with third countries on the issue of asylum. 
In line with the Hague, Article 78(2) (g) TFEU has created a legal basis with respect to 
the adoption of measures regarding ‘partnership and cooperation with third countries for 
the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum and subsidiary 
protection’. This has given the EU a legal competence to further expand its cooperation 
with third countries regarding asylum policy.  
 
5.1.3. Conclusions 
The analysis above demonstrated that the legal framework of the EU has increasingly 
permitting more constraints with respect to an intergovernmental bargaining. However, 
it should be stated that the level of constraint is different with respect to each case study. 
Among the areas that are analysed, visa policy has been the most harmonized case. On 
the other hand, labour migration policy still is highly restricted at the EU level due to 
the reluctance of the Member States in developing an EU level policy. Moreover, the 
unanimity requirement under the Amsterdam Treaty has restricted the European 
Commission to put forward ambitious proposals. However, it is also shown that the 
Lisbon Treaty has increased the competences of the supranational institutions in these 
areas.  
 
5.2. The EU’s institutional structure in the area of external dimension of migration  
 
After mapping out the legal framework in the area of the external dimension of 
migration in the first part of this Chapter, this section deals with the EU’s institutional 
structure. It aims to portray how the institutional structure has developed in this policy 
area in view of the legal framework presented above. The analysis focuses on the four 
main decision-making institutions: the Council of the EU, the European Council, the 
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European Commission, and the European Parliament.455 The EU’s cooperation with 
third countries in the area of migration has traditionally been under the strict control of 
the officials who have thematic responsibility with respect to migration. With the ENP, 
this picture has been changing. The external relations policy actors have gained 
horizontal competence with respect to the policies that are integrated within the ENP 
including migration. In line with this, the section presents the following: (i) the justice 
and home affairs actors, and (ii) external relations actors.  
 
5.2.1. The Council of the European Union: Hard bargaining vs. Compromise  
 
The Council of the European Union456 is considered the main ‘intergovernmental’ 
decision-making body in the EU. According to the state-centric theoretical approaches 
to the EU, Member States’ governments engage in decision-making and negotiate at 
various levels within the Council structure with their exogenous national preferences 
and based on their relative bargaining power. They are involved in and support policies 
based on their pre-determined interests. According to Moravcsik, joint decision-making 
in the Council does not lead to the development of a collective interest among Member 
States at the EU level.457 However, the decision-making mechanism in the Council is 
not entirely intergovernmental. It could be observed that the intergovernmental and 
supranational areas of EU’s institutional structure increasingly overlap in the EU. 
Westlake and Galloway point at the fact that the negotiations in the Council incorporate 
both supranational and intergovernmental elements.458 From a state-centric point of 
view, national representatives bargain at the EU level based on the instructions that 
come from national capitals. Despite the high importance of the pre-determined policy 
positions of Member States, the negotiations in the Council are not unidirectional or 
solely based on ministerial instructions. There is room for compromise. Member states 
                                               
455 Hierarchically, the European Council comes before the Council of the EU. However, the thesis first 
focuses on the Council of the EU due to the relevance of the latter for the thesis.  
456 The Council of the European Union term is used to define the Council Meetings, the Presidency and 
the Council Secretariat. 
457 Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal intergovernmentalism and integration: a rejoinder,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 33 (1995): 611-28. 
458 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “What is the Council?” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 7-9. 
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move from their national pre-determined positions due to the impact of the complex EU 
decision making mechanism.  
 
Member states form ‘a complex web of long term interest groupings’459 based on their 
policy preferences concerning different issue areas. These groupings could be based on 
geographical proximity, size, political orientation or economic condition of member 
states. As stated by a Council Secretariat official, ad-hoc interest groups based on 
common interest of Member States in an issue area is highly common as well.460 In this 
framework, national delegations in Brussels feed the debates in Brussels to policy-
makers based in capitals. National representatives have the leverage to build networks 
and provide the setting to their capitals which feed compromise-building. They consider 
the positions of other Member States through formal or informal contacts in Brussels. 
They feel the tone concerning which policies could be accepted or not and the actors 
who could be on their side to make sure that they guide their colleagues based in 
capitals accordingly. Informal meetings among member state officials are important to 
get to know the position of other member states. These meetings could take place 
among certain Member States that have common interest or could be organized by the 
Presidency to talk to the Member States that have a concern or interest with respect to 
an issue. 
 
Despite the official QMV voting requirements, the actual act of voting is not a regular 
practice in the course of Council negotiations. Rather than strict calculation of the votes, 
the decision making is rather an ‘inclusive’ process where the Presidency (as the chair 
of the Council sessions) is inclined to seek agreements that convince all actors including 
the ones that express initial discontent with the matter. There is an effort to work 
towards a final decision that would satisfy all member states to a certain degree and 
                                               
459 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper),” in 
The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper 
Publishing, 2006): 266. 
460 Interview with EU Official B, May 2009, Brussels. 
136 
 
  
address their reservations. 461  Consensus-building is essential to boost 
implementation/compliance at the national level in the member states.462 
 
Within the Council negotiations, the member states are encouraged commonly by the 
Presidency or the Council Secretariat to take part in negotiations and be open to 
compromises to avoid marginalization. Lewis argues that ‘culture of compromise’ is a 
significant tool of the negotiations among the permanent representatives which they are 
‘socialised’ to within the Council negotiations.463 The permanent representatives are 
encouraged to have ‘self-restraint’ in safeguarding their national interest. The member 
states are motivated to move from their initial position to avoid isolation in the areas 
where they do not have veto power. The ‘culture of compromise’ is mainly present 
among member states’ permanent representatives to the EU who meet regularly in the 
framework of the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER). It is a 
horizontally functioning committee that has responsibility across all policy fields that 
are discussed in the EU. 464  Within the COREPER meetings, member states’ 
representatives negotiate a diverse set of issues and there is prospect for linking 
different subject matters at hand to reach a deal.465  Diplomatic experiences and 
negotiation skills of permanent representatives are considered an asset to reach a 
collective decision at the EU level.466 It is highly common for member states to reach 
compromises on policy debates at the COREPER level ahead of sectoral Council 
meetings.467 Quid pro quo agreements and concessions across different issue areas are 
commonly made in the course of negotiations. There is a constant information flow 
                                               
461 Ibid. 
462 Fioana Hayes-Renshaw, Wim van Aken and Helen Wallace, “When and Why Council of Ministers of 
the EU Votes Explicitly?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no.1 (2006): 161-94.  
463 Jeffry Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in the 
Council’s infrastructure,” Journal of Public Policy 7, no.2 (2000): 261-89. 
464 The deputy national representatives meet as COREPER I. The member state ambassadors to the EU 
form COREPER II where political, institutional and economic matters are covered including migration. 
There is a division of labour between COREPER I and II. 
465 Jeffry Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in the 
Council’s infrastructure,” Journal of Public Policy 7, no.2 (2000): 261-89. 
466 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, 2nd (Houndmills, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006): 72. 
467 Interview with EU Official B, May 2009, Brussels. 
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between the COREPER and their national counterparts in member states’ capitals.468 
Being based in Brussels, permanent representatives have an information advantage over 
their colleagues who are based in national capitals. They are able to closely follow the 
development of EU level policies and the policy positions of other actors due to their 
frequent contacts with the EU institutions and officials from other member states. 
 
The level of compromise also depends on whether an issue is a priority area for a policy 
actor. If it is an issue highly central to national interests, it is hard for a member state to 
move from its initial policy position. As expressed by a national representative, national 
delegations in Brussels are bound by the instructions that they receive from their 
capitals. This makes compromises in the course of Council negotiations very 
challenging and time consuming.469 The national instructions that are sent to permanent 
representations from their capitals are commonly a compromise document involving 
details from various ministries. The priorities and concerns are negotiated at the national 
level and then presented to the national representatives in Brussels by the main ministry 
in charge of the issue. In the course of Council negotiations, national representatives are 
bound by their capitals if they are asked to make compromises. The dynamics between 
different ministries also influence the policy making process. 
 
Considering a migration related issue, the probable ministries that could be involved are 
Ministry of Interior/Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Ministry 
of Economy and Ministry of Business/Industry.470 Various other ministries could be 
added depending on the issue area, such as Ministry of Health or Education. The main 
ministry in charge (or a national coordination body as in the case of France) coordinates 
the priorities that are reflected by these ministries. Moreover, there could be different 
viewpoints within a ministry as well. Taking the Foreign Ministry as an example, the 
units that are responsible for general bilateral relations with a country (i.e. country 
                                               
468 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper),” in 
The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper 
Publishing, 2006): 209. 
469 Interview with Member State official A, May 2009, Brussels. 
470 The issue of migration is mostly the responsibility of ministries of interior or home affairs in the EU 
Member States. In some Member States (such as Sweden), the Ministry of Justice is responsible. In some 
cases, migration related duties are split up between different ministries. Some Member States (such as 
France) establish specialized ministries that are in charge of migration issues.  
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desks) and for visa negotiations (i.e. visa desks) could have different policy positions 
with respect to a matter on migration. 
 
During EU level negotiations, national representatives might also move away from their 
national instructions and have to negotiate with their capitals more than in Brussels with 
other member states. The ‘internal coordination’ mechanisms in the Member States 
moderate related national actors that are taking part in decision making. Interests and 
concerns of relevant ministries are taken into account while the national position and 
instructions are developed. However, the process of negotiations in the Council should 
be taken into account as well. With their experience and contacts in Brussels, national 
representatives provide their capitals with feedback concerning EU level negotiations.471 
For the negotiations taking place at lower levels than permanent representatives such as 
officials at working group level, the ranking of the expert in the ministry he or she 
belongs to is significant for the negotiator to take the initiative.472  
 
Member States are encouraged to compromise with respect to the matters that are 
relatively less significant for them. Presenting a balanced attitude could increase the 
credibility of a member state and help achieve its actual policy priorities. With respect 
to the negotiations that pave the way for legal changes (which is very common in the 
area of migration policy), member states are relatively more reluctant to compromise.473 
This makes national representatives less willing to move from their initial position and 
compromise at the EU level. However, it is worth noting that the members are 
committed to the European integration process and aim that it nevertheless works.474 
 
 
 
                                               
471 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “The national negotiator in Council Preparatory Groups,” in 
The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper 
Publishing,2006): 228. 
472 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “The national negotiator in Council Preparatory Groups,” in 
The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper 
Publishing,2006): 221. 
473 Interview with Member State Official A, May 2009, Brussels.  
474 David Spence, “Negotiations, coalitions and the resolution of inter-state conflicts,” Westlake & 
Galloway, in The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd 
(London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 259. 
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Main organisational structure  
Although the Council of the EU is formally a single institution, it is essentially formed 
of Councils responsible for sectoral policy areas with different levels of decision-
making structures and dynamics. 475  The EU migration policy falls under the 
responsibility of the JHA Council that consists of interior, justice or special migration 
ministers.476 Due to the increasing integration of a migration dimension to EU’s 
external policies and relations with third countries, as in the case of the ENP and the 
Eastern Partnership, the involvement of actors who have geographical competence with 
respect to those regions has increased. Formed of the foreign ministers of member 
states, the Foreign Affairs Council has a geographical horizontal competence with 
respect to the ENP and the Eastern Partnership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                               
475 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace (2006) The Council of Ministers, St Martin’s, 14 (Article 
203 of the TEU) The frequency of the meetings depends on the importance of the issue area. 
476 For the purposes of simplicity, this thesis refers them as ministers of interiors. 
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Figure 1. Council of the EU Institutional Structure concerning Migration Policy  
(Title IV TEC-First Pillar)477  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
The JHA Council  
Formal decision-making process in the JHA Council concerning EU migration policy 
starts with a proposal adopted by the European Commission that has acquired exclusive 
initiative power concerning migration since 2004 as explained in the first section of this 
Chapter. Within the JHA Council, negotiations continue at several levels (See Figure 
1).478 As in other sectoral Councils, the responsibility for decision-making in JHA 
                                               
477 It should be noted that the table provided by Nilsson regarding JHA Council decision-making is used 
as guidance. Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European 
Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 133. 
478 Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 135.  
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Council rests with the relevant ministers or national representatives who have 
administrative authority representing member state governments in Council meetings. 
Below the JHA Council, there are several preparatory bodies that are responsible for the 
planning of Council meetings and by and large pursue the negotiation process in the 
Council. In view of diverging national regulations in member states, the EU level 
decision-making involves dealing with technical details of policy proposals in the 
course of adoption of legal acts. Bearing this in mind, the role of the preparatory bodies 
is particularly significant for decision-making in the JHA Council.479  
 
The first level is the specialised working group level that national experts (appointed by 
ministries of interior, justice or migration) meet depending on their area of expertise. 
When the Council receives a proposal from the European Commission, negotiations 
normally start at the working group level. Discussions predominantly evolve around the 
technical details of proposals at the working group level. The debates that take place at 
this level are particularly significant for legislative proposals due to the expertise of 
policy officers in technical issues. Non-legislative and politically sensitive proposals 
that require concessions are normally dealt with at a higher level.480 The interviews that 
were conducted with EU and national officials have shown that the issues that are 
related to the external dimension of migration tend to move upwards due to their 
political salience.  
 
Above the working group level, there are two senior committees responsible for 
migration issues attended by high level bureaucrats that come from member states. The 
first committee is the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
(SCIFA) 481  that is attended by senior officials representing interior or justice 
                                               
479 Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 131.  
480 David Spence, “Negotiations, coalitions and the resolution of inter-state conflicts,” Westlake & 
Galloway, in The Council of the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd 
(London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 265. 
481 The SCIFA does not have a treaty basis and was formed with the COREPER decision in the aftermath 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of 
the European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 
2004): 135. 
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ministries.482 After being discussed at technical working group level, migration issues 
are normally transferred to the SCIFA committee. The SCIFA is predominantly 
responsible for the issues related to the internal dimension of EU migration policy. The 
second senior level preparatory group, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and 
Immigration (HLWG) is of particular interest to the thesis due to its specific 
responsibility with respect to the external dimension of EU’s migration policy. Founded 
in December 1998, the HLWG is responsible for the external aspects of migration and 
tackling the development needs (political, human rights, development concerns) of third 
countries in line with the increasing comprehensive approach to migration.483 As the 
external dimension of migration falls under the domain of several ministries, the 
member states are commonly represented by a set of ministries in the HLWG. For 
instance, in the UK, Foreign Office and the Department for International Development 
(DFID) and the Home Office attend the HLWG with a common position.484  In 
Germany, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior are responsible with attending 
the HLWG with the Foreign Office in the lead.485 
 
When the HLWG was founded, its initial tasks included determining main 
countries/regions that were either source of or transit for migratory pressures to the EU 
and drawing up Action Plans to tackle the roots of these pressures. The HLWG Action 
Plans were EU's early cooperation tools with third countries.486 In line with the 
increasing importance given to the external dimension of migration policy, the HLWG 
acquired further responsibilities in 2002. According to the new mandate, the HLWG 
became responsible for producing a consistent strategy in a cross-pillar framework 
concerning the main source and transit countries of migration to the EU (both asylum 
                                               
482 In addition to meetings among the member state representatives, SCIFA also comes together with 
‘heads of frontiers guards’ in relation to issues concerning EU borders under the framework of ‘SCIFA+’ 
Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union eds. 
Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2004): 132. 
483 Joanna Van Selm “Immigration and Asylum or Foreign Policy: The EU’s Approach to Migrants and 
Their Countries of Origin,” in Externalities of Integration: The Wider Impact of The Developing 
European Asylum and Immigration Policy, eds. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer, (Philadelphia: 
Lexington Books, 2003): 148-9. 
484 Interview with a Member State official, September 2009, London.  
485 Interview with National Expert, September 2009, Berlin.  
486 Steven Sterkx, “The External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expending Fortress 
Europe,” in EU's global role: external policies of the European Union, ed. Jan Orbie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008): 119.  
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seekers and immigration) focusing more on the link between migration and 
development as well as having a broader geographic coverage.487 These early Action 
Plans broadly focused on restrictive measures to deal with the migratory pressures to the 
EU. The proposals that were drawn up in the Action Plans primarily proposed 
concluding readmission agreements with the countries concerned and adopting 
restrictive measures. The development or conflict resolution needs in the root or transit 
countries of migration were not soundly addressed in the Action Plans. The approach of 
the HLWG was not welcomed by the European Parliament and the UNHCR due to its 
stress on transferring burden to third countries through externalising the control rather 
than addressing ‘root causes’ of these pressures.488 There were also concerns in the 
Commission in relation to the approach adopted by the HLWG towards third countries 
as well as in relation to budgetary issues. 
 
In addition to these specialised committees, member state representatives based at 
permanent representations in Brussels form ‘JHA Councillors’ working group take part 
in the decision-making process. Although they are based in Brussels, they keep very 
close relations with their home ministries. JHA Counsellors are considered as effective 
on issues that are both politically sensitive and require high technical knowledge.489  
Being based in Brussels, a sense of rapport is developed among the JHA counsellors of 
different member states. 490  Informal dialogue among the officials from different 
member states could help identify coalition partners or different views ahead of formal 
discussions. They have information advantage over the officers based in ministries. 
Although negotiation instructions formally come from the national ministries of 
member states to Brussels, informal dialogues among policy officers in Brussels feed 
into negotiations. JHA Counsellors negotiate more with their ministries than with their 
counterparts from other member states in Brussels.491 
 
                                               
487 Council of the European Union, “Modification of the terms of reference of the High Level Working 
Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG),” 9433/02 limite, May 30, 2002. 
488 Christina Boswell, “The External Dimension of EU immigration and asylum’ policy,” International 
Affairs 79, no.3 (2003): 630. 
489 Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 134.  
490 Ibid.  
491 Ibid.  
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The final preparatory level before ministerial Council meetings is the COREPER. The 
COREPER is formed of diplomats who have general knowledge about policy areas. 
They are supported by working groups that are formed of officers who have specialised 
expertise. Being composed of senior staff and junior experts from relevant ministries, 
Council working groups deal with the issues that mostly require knowledge about 
technical legislative details. Negotiations among the member states are normally 
initiated at working group level responsible for a specific policy area before they are 
transferred to the COREPER level that has a horizontal competence.492 In the area of 
migration, the SCIFA and HLWG as high level committees feed into Council meetings 
as well. The involvement of senior officers in decision-making with special experience 
through these committees could decrease the influence of the COREPER.493 The 
practice of forming specialized committees is common for the area of JHA given the 
sensitivity of policy area for the member states. However, policies still go through 
COREPER. 
 
Due to their horizontal responsibility over policy areas, COREPER meetings could 
allow for addressing ‘common priorities’ rather than individual concerns of sectoral 
ministries. This is particularly important for the policy areas that fall under the remit of 
several Council groups such as the external dimension of migration. As the external 
dimension of migration policy is relevant for both the Justice and Home Affairs and the 
Foreign Affairs Councils, it is vital to reach a consensus among different actors who 
have different policy directions. Regional policy priorities tend to be more important for 
foreign ministries, whereas security issues are prioritized by the officers from ministries 
of interior. The debates at COREPER level could lead to reconciliation of incompatible 
priorities that are being upheld by different actors.  
 
 
 
                                               
492 The Presidency could decide whether they would like to start it at the Working Group level or take an 
issue straightaway to the Ministers. For instance, the Global Approach to Migration and the Stockholm 
Programmes are not discussed at the Working Group level.  
493 Martin Westlake and David Galloway, “Other Council Preparatory Groups,” in The Council of the 
European Union eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006):  
217. 
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Increasing involvement of the Foreign Affairs Council 
Although the EU decision-making concerning migration policy falls under the sphere of 
the JHA Council, the increasing external dimension has increased the involvement of 
the Foreign Affairs Council. After being a part of General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) since, the Foreign Affairs Council has been constituted as 
a separate Council with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The involvement is not 
only at the level of ministers but also at the working party level. The Working Party on 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) has a horizontal mandate with respect to the 
management of the relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The scope of the 
mandate also encompasses the migration dimension of cooperation.  
 
The early policy documents regarding EU cooperation about the external dimension of 
justice and home affairs have over the years addressed the issue of coherence between 
the geographical and thematic dimensions. In the area of migration, the coordination of 
the geographical and thematic groups has become more important due to the increased 
importance that the Member States put on migration in their relations with third 
countries. The High Level Working Group on Migration focuses on the external 
dimension of migration that brings together officials from ministries of foreign affairs, 
home affairs or development. 
 
With the introduction of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, this issue has been very 
crucial for the JHA dimension and the regional coordination. With the aim of enhancing 
the consistency between the JHA and the external dimension of the policies tackled 
under the JHA, an Ad Hoc support group was established in October 2008.494 The 
JAIEX horizontal working group is formed to better coordinate the issues that fall under 
JHA as well as external relations as a ‘coordination and information mechanism’. The 
JAIEX working group is aimed at facilitating ‘a regular information flow’ among the 
working groups dealing with JHA issues such as High Level Working Group or SCIFA 
and geographical/thematic RELEX working group, for instance COEST concerning the 
immediate Eastern neighbours. It is targeted that the JAIEX support group will enhance 
                                               
494 Council of the European Union, “On the Creating of an Ad Hoc Support Committee concerning the 
external dimension of JHA questions,” 14431/01/08, October 28, 2008. 
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the coordination on issues that incorporate several working groups under the JHA and 
RELEX.  
 
An area where the JAIEX group would be effective is the issues on specific 
geographical areas. During the negotiations of the Eastern Partnership, the JAIEX 
committee took place in the negotiations in the Council to manage the horizontal 
coordination between different preparatory bodies.495 The monthly meetings of the 
JAIEX working group also provide a venue for the member states to present a more 
consistent approach. However, the JAIEX framework has its limitations with respect to 
increasing coherence between regional and thematic policy actors. Although the 
Directorate-General responsible with home affairs issues from the European 
Commission attends the meetings, the regional units from the European Commission 
are not represented in the JAIEX.496 
 
Role of the Council Secretariat  
The Secretariat of the Council of Ministers holds responsibilities for supporting the 
running of the Council meetings as well as working with the preparatory bodies in the 
Council. Officially holding organizational duties in terms of running the Council 
meetings, the Secretariat gradually gained further roles in the policy making process 
assisting the negotiating actors. The Council Secretariat staff contributes to the 
consensus and compromise building among member states assisting the Presidency with 
their expertise on the rules of procedures and historical context with their ‘practical 
procedural background’.497 Their role in terms of proving technical and legal advice is 
particularly important. As the Presidencies change every six months and the longer 
rotation periods with 27 member states, the Council Secretariat staff provides expertise 
to the Member States concerning EU decision-making.  
 
The role of the Council Secretariat has always been significant for the JHA Council. 
The ministers from theministries of interior or justice traditionally did not have 
experience with the EU framework and initially expected the Council Secretariat to be 
                                               
495 Interview with EU official B, May 2009, Brussels. 
496 Interview with EU official D, July 2010, Brussels. 
497 Interview with EU official B, May 2009, Brussels. 
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actively involved. Secondly, the preceding absence of the Commission in this area made 
the Secretariat have a more active role.498 Hence, the Secretariat has gone above and 
beyond its regular designated roles which were note taking, reporting, advising on 
procedures and providing institutional memory. The Council Secretariat acquired roles 
as the ‘motor, legal drafter, initiative taker’ as well over the years.499 However, this has 
changed with the increasing involvement and expertise of the Commission in the field. 
Member states have become more used to communicate with the Commission 
concerning justice and home affairs issues. In terms of division of labour between the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission concerning migration, the competences of the 
Commission have gradually been enhanced.500 The Council Secretariat is primarily an 
institution with a ‘support function’ whereas the Commission is rather perceived as an 
institution that has its agenda and is inclined to defend its interests acquiring a ‘policy 
role’.501 As commented by a Council Secretariat official, ‘it has its strategy, policy and 
guidelines which does not necessarily coincide with the Presidency. It is an institution 
with funds and objectives to meet.’502 
 
On the other hand, the scope of the involvement and assistance of the Council 
Secretariat in the policy making process might increase depending on the experience 
and size of the member state holding the presidency. The personal initiative and 
expertise of the Secretariat staff in a subject matter are also important in terms of giving 
legal advice and being involved as expressed by a Council Secretariat staff.503  
 
5.2.2. The European Council  
The European Council, being attended by the heads of states or government, the 
European Commission's president and the President of the European Council504 , 
                                               
498 Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 137-09. 
499 Hans G. Nilsson, “The Justice and Home Affairs Council,” in The Council of the European Union 
eds. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, 3rd (London: John Harper Publishing, 2006): 137. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Interview with an EU official B, May 2009, Brussels.  
502 Ibid.  
503 Ibid.  
504 In line with Article 15 (1) of the TFEU, the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also takes part 
in the European Council's activities. Article 4 of the TEU has stated that the Foreign Ministers should 
support the European Council. This has changed with the Lisbon Treaty. Article 15 (3) TFEU has 
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‘provide[s] the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and (…) define[s] 
the general political guidelines’ in line with Article 15 TFEU. With the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become one of the EU Institutions.505 The 
Lisbon Treaty underlines that the exclusive role of the European Council is ‘political 
leadership’ across all policy areas.506 On the other hand, it cannot ‘exercise legislative 
functions’ according to Article 15 (1) TFEU. Although European Council decisions 
cannot be legally enforced, the EU institutions abide by the conclusions of the European 
Council due to its political authority.507 The conclusions of European Council meetings 
have an overriding authority in relation to political decisions that shape and influence 
the EU decision-making. European Council meetings give guidance and political 
mandate to the EU Institutions with respect to taking a certain policy direction.  
 
The issues that are related to justice and home affairs domain have been of high 
importance for the European Council. The European Council has acted as ‘agenda 
setter’ through the introduction of multi-annual programmes. 508  Since the 
communitarisation of the policy areas related to migration with the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the European Council has held three thematic meetings, in 
Tampere (1999), Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2009), to provide the Union with multi-
annual programmes for the development of the EU policy.509 The road maps that are 
provided with these multi-annual programmes have served to guide the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament in their decision-making process. The European 
Council conclusions have been highly significant for the direction that the external 
dimension of immigration has taken as well. The evolution of an external dimension to 
EU's immigration policy has been supported since the Tampere European Council. With 
                                                                                                                                         
affirmed that ‘the European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister’. The President of the 
Commission could be assisted by a Commission member as well. 
505 The role and election procedures of the President of the European Council are provided in Article 
15(6) TFEU.  
506 Jean Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010): 208. 
507 Phillippe de Schoutheete, “The European Council” in The Institutions of the European Union, ed. 
John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, 2nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 45-46. 
508 Hans G. Nilsson and Julian Siegl,‘‘The Council in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in The 
Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, ed. J. Monar 
(Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010): 69-72. 
509 The first section of this Chapter evaluates the three programme and their impact on the legislative 
development in the area of EU's migration policy.  
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the Feira European Council, the Member States have provided guidance on the 
strengthening of the coherence between the internal and external dimensions of the EU 
policy in the area of the JHA. 
 
The strong involvement of the European Council in the formulation of the external 
dimension of EU’s migration policy signals the dominance of the Member States’ 
policy preferences in the course of the policy development process. According to the 
state-centric theoretical approaches to the EU, the European Council meetings pave the 
way for an intergovernmental bargaining to the advantage of politically and 
economically powerful Member States. On the other hand, the policy outcomes that are 
set by the European Council could further increase the role of the EU Institutions in the 
long run. In line with the historical institutionalist approach, decision-makers cannot 
acknowledge or take into account ‘the long term institutional consequences’ of their 
decisions.510 For instance, the commitments that have been made at the Tampere 
European Council with respect to the gradual communitarisation of the EU’s migration 
policy became politically binding towards the end of the transition period. The Member 
States have eventually agreed to give up on the unanimity requirement in the Council 
and grant the European Parliament co-decision powers in 2004.  
  
5.2.3. The European Commission  
As presented in the previous section of this Chapter on the EU’s legal framework, the 
role of the European Commission in justice and home affairs policies was initially 
limited due to the intergovernmental structure of the cooperation among the Member 
States based on Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty. Due to the narrow role of the 
Commission in the third pillar, a task force based at its Secretariat General was initially 
in charge of justice and home affairs issues including migration. Following the 
introduction of Title IV of the TEC in 1999 with the ratification of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the executive competences of the European Commission have gradually been 
extended to migration policy area. In line with the decision taken during the Amsterdam 
Treaty negotiations to transfer migration policies to the first pillar, the Commission first 
became the co-initiator with the member states for the areas covered under Title IV. 
                                               
510 Phillippe de Schoutheete, “The European Council” in The Institutions of the European Union, ed. 
John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, 2nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 47. 
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After the completion of the 5-year transition period, the Commission gained an 
exclusive right to make legislative initiatives on issues related to migration. Following 
the Tampere European Council meeting in 1999, a specialized directorate-general, the 
DG Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS) was established. The 
European Commission’s organizational structure has recently been subject to a number 
of changes. In 2010, the former DG JLS was divided into two separate units. DG Home 
Affairs511 has taken over the responsibilities of the former DG Justice, Freedom and 
Security (now called DG Justice) related to home affairs.  
 
Main organisational structure 
The Commission is considered a ‘multi-organisation’ with different actors who have 
different policy cultures, organizations and interests.512  The internal coordination 
among different units in the Commission is highly significant for the coherence of 
policy making process. For a document to be published with the name of the 
Commission on the text, all interested DGs have to show consent on the document. Yet 
the European Commission is not a unitary entity. Different DGs could have different 
priorities and policy perspectives on an issue area. This is particularly important for the 
issues that cut across multiple policy domains and involve several actors such as the 
external dimension of the EU’s migration policy. The main unit in the Commission that 
is in charge of migration related cooperation at the EU level is the DG Home Affairs. 
Over the years, the involvement of the Commission units that have responsibility 
concerning relations with third countries has increased in line with the emphasis that has 
been put by the EU to integrate migration cooperation in their relations with third 
countries. The involvement of the DG responsible for External Relations of the EU (DG 
RELEX)’s role increased due to its role in EU’s relations with third countries including 
the EU’s eastern neighbours. Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 2009, Article 27 TFEU introduced the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) to function under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  The organizational division of labour between 
                                               
511 See The organigram of the new DG Home Affairs, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/chart/chart_intro_en.htm 
512 Michelle Cini, “Administrative Culture in the European Commission: the case of competition and 
environment,” (paper presented at the fourth biennial International Conference of the European 
Community Studies Association (ECSA), Charleston, South Carolina, USA. May 11-14, 1995).  
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the Commission and the EEAS was clarified in March 2010. 513  Following its 
establishment in 2010, the newly founded EEAS incorporated the duties of the former 
DG RELEX.514Despite the transfer of the DG RELEX to the EEAS, there is still a 
Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
the European Commission. Moreover, there is still an ambiguity regarding the 
functioning of cooperation between the EU and the partner countries in thematic fields, 
such as migration cooperation.515  For clarification purposes, the thesis refers to the 
DG RELEX to explain the role of the officials responsible with the regional dimension 
of the ENP cooperation with the partner countries rather than the EEAS. 
 
It also has to be mentioned that the former DG Development516 became an important 
actor due to the increased cooperation with third countries in the area of migration. 
However, there was a so-called geographical division of labour between the DG 
RELEX and DG Development. The relations with immediate eastern neighbours of the 
EU fell into the responsibility of the DG RELEX. Accordingly, the following section 
mainly focuses on the relation between the DG JHA and DG RELEX. 
 
The Directorate-General for Home Affairs   
Due to the nature of the justice and home affairs domain in the EU, the DG JHA started 
to operate in an area that was mainly dominated by intergovernmental circles.517 The 
DG JHA had to compete with the Council and national governments who were hesitant 
to transfer full control of the policy area to the Commission. In addition, the new DG 
had to ensure the scope of its mandate in the area of migration in view of other possibly 
relevant actors within the Commission, particularly the DG responsible for Employment 
                                               
513 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Explanatory Memorandum Council Decision – Establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service,’’ 8029/10, March 25, 2010 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st08/st08029.en10.pdf. 
514 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and 
functioning of the External Action Service,” (2010/ 407/EU), OJ L 201/30, August 3, 2010.  
515 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “EU Law Expert to the Eastern Neighbourhood,” in EU 
External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Area ed. Paul James Cardwell (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2012): 235. 
516 It should be noted that the DG Development and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office are merged in 
2011 following the organizational restructuring in the European Commission. Information regarding the 
new DG is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/index_en.htm.  
517 Christina Boswell, “Evasion, Reinterpretation and Decoupling: European Commission Responses to 
the ‘External Dimension’ of Immigration and Asylum,” West European Politics 31, no.3 (2008): 500. 
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and Social Affairs, to be able to expand its competence and budget.518 Despite the short 
time that has passed since its foundation, the DG JHA has become one of the fastest 
growing units in the Commission. 
 
Putting an emphasis on the external dimension of migration, the conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council called on the European Commission to work closely with 
the Council to develop the external dimension of EU’s justice and home affairs policy 
including migration.519 Although the DG JHA has become the leading unit within the 
Commission responsible for migration policy, the involvement of the DG External 
Relations and the DG Development have gradually increased parallel to the increasing 
emphasis put on the integration of a migration dimension into the EU’s external policies 
by the member states.  
 
The Directorate-General for External Relations 
With the introduction of the ENP, the External Relations DG gained horizontal 
competence with respect to EU’s regional policies. DG RELEX was the leading unit 
responsible for the coordination of ENP. The ENP has integrated thematic policies 
including migration under a single regional policy framework. Although the DG 
RELEX was responsible for the relations of the EU with third countries, it was involved 
in policies that are related to the external aspects of the EU migration policy to the 
extent that migration issues concern relations with third countries. Due to its horizontal 
competence, the DG RELEX increased its coordination with the DG JHA with respect 
to the migration dimension.  
 
The involvement of the DG RELEX with respect to the external relations issues built on 
the increasing external dimension of the EU’s migration policy. The Tampere Council 
Conclusions underlined the importance of the developing cooperation with third 
countries within the framework of migration policy. The policy preference for the DG 
RELEX is to develop constructive and long term positive relations with third countries. 
The general priority for the DG RELEX concerning migration issue was the coherence 
                                               
518 Ibid.  
519  European Council, Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, 
accessed January 8, 2012 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. 
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between the EU migration policy and the general approach to a third country partner. 
The main aim is to put the issue of migration parallel to the existing frameworks of 
relations with that third country.  
 
In the aftermath of the changes with the introduction of the EEAS as discussed above, 
the full implications of the new setting have to be assessed in a while.  
 
The dynamics of decision-making regarding the external dimension of migration 
The emphasis put on the migration cooperation with third countries in the EU paved the 
way for an increased involvement of the external relations actors in the area of 
migration. However, the DG RELEX was not content with being enforced by the DG 
JHA concerning migration issues to the extent that the relations with third countries 
damaged or redirected.520 Traditionally, the DG RELEX prioritises a ‘coherent external 
action’ towards a country or a region and aims at incorporating migration cooperation 
into the general framework of relations.521 The input of the DG JHA nevertheless has 
been significant for the policies that are introduced by the RELEX. However, given the 
importance of the issue, migration was included as a subject matter under each regional 
units under the DG RELEX. The issues under migration policy that are under the 
responsibilities of the DG RELEX include to the extent that they are related to third 
countries and third country nationals. The role of the DG RELEX is significant for the 
management of the ENP which includes goals concerning migration cooperation with 
neighbouring countries as well.  
 
We could differentiate policy preferences between the DG RELEX and DG JHA with 
respect to how they regard cooperation with the EU’s partner countries on the issue of 
immigration. The DG RELEX puts emphasis on the need to increase mobility 
dimension of the cooperation.522 Given that the EU's partner countries towards east 
consider mobility and visa liberalisation dimensions as one of their top priorities with 
                                               
520 Christina Boswell, “Evasion, Reinterpretation and Decoupling: European Commission Responses to 
the ‘External Dimension’ of Immigration and Asylum,” West European Politics 31, no.3 (2008): 501. 
521 Steven Sterkx, “The External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expending Fortress 
Europe,” in EU's global role: external policies of the European Union, ed. Jan Orbie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008): 126-7. 
522 Interview with EU official A, March 2009, Brussels. 
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respect to the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, there was rather more pressure on the 
DG RELEX concerning the enhancement of the mobility dimension.523 Moreover, it 
was also important to make the ENP ‘marketable’ for the partner countries. The eastern 
partner countries such as Ukraine were particularly dissatisfied with the ENP due to 
their aspirations for full accession to the EU. As the ‘owner’ of the policy, the RELEX 
would be more concerned about how the overall policy is perceived by the partner 
countries.  
 
The DG JHA has had a rather technical approach towards the issue in terms of the level 
of preparedness of infrastructure in the partner countries as a condition to offer further 
liberalisation of cross-border movement. The DG JHA has a more instrumental 
approach towards cooperation in terms of realizing its goals concerning irregular 
migration cooperation or asylum (which is closer to the consensus in the Council).524 
 
The DG JHA and DG DEV have different priorities and there is more political debate 
taking into account the differences in terms of priorities (compare to RELEX). For 
instance, the DG DEV gives high importance to the issue of ‘brain drain’ and its causes 
on the development of third countries. The DG JHA and DG DEV have a quite 
diverging opinion concerning how they regard ‘brain drain’ issue and legal 
migration/skilled labour migration.525 
  
Moreover, the DGs that are involved in migration issues work with different external 
constituencies in the Council or in the member states. The DG JHA mainly cooperates 
with officials from ministries of justice/home affairs who traditionally have strong 
intergovernmental focus due to the sensitivity of the policy area. Compared to foreign 
office officials who have diplomatic experience, officials responsible for migration are 
relatively less exposed to international debates and negotiations.  
                                               
523 Interview with Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, ‘Minister: Ukraine is next for EU visa-free travel.’ 
Euractiv, 21 May 2010 
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The external dimension of migration policy, the Global Approach, could have several 
contradictions with respect to its development goals and migration goals.526 Bearing in 
mind their diverging perspectives, disagreements could occur in the course of policy-
making between different DGs. These negotiations between diverging opinions should 
also take into account that the outcome should be considered as ‘agreeable’ by the 
Member States in the Council of Ministers (or by the European Parliament in case of 
co-decision).  
 
5.2.4. The European Parliament  
As outlined in the first part of this Chapter, the communitarisation in the area of EU 
migration policy has gradually increased the competences of the EP. Under the 
intergovernmental framework of Title VI of the TEU, introduced with the Maastricht 
Treaty, the European Parliament was not very effective. As defined under Article K(6), 
the involvement was limited to exchange of information. Following the Maastricht 
Treaty, the EP has established a committee to be responsible with its involvement in the 
area of the JHA. As presented in the first section, the ratification of the Amsterdam 
Treaty has gradually increased the legal competences of the EP.   
 
The EP has acquired significant co-decision powers with the Council on migration and 
asylum policies from January 2005 onwards.527 As a result of its increasing powers in 
the decision making process, the EP has become a significant actor for member states to 
lobby with the aim of getting its support on issues that fall under co-decision 
procedures.528 Although the EP has become a significant actor with respect to the 
internal negotiations, the EP had limited influence with respect to the external 
dimension of immigration. The competences of the EP did not extent to the external 
                                               
526 Christina Boswell, “Evasion, Reinterpretation and Decoupling: European Commission Responses to 
the ‘External Dimension’ of Immigration and Asylum,” West European Politics 31, no.3 (2008): 507. 
527 The co-decision power of the EP is acquired for Title IV of Part Three of the EC with the Council 
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_396/l_39620041231en00450046.pdf. 
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dimension of migration until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which has made 
the approval of the EP obligatory to conclude international treaties. The introduction of 
the financial instrument of the ENP (the ENPI) has increased the involvement of the EP 
in the course of the decision-making process.529  
 
With respect to the internal decision-making of the EP, the role of the special 
committees is highly prominent.530 The responsibility with respect to the external 
dimension of migration includes two European Parliament parliamentary committees: 
(i) Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and (ii) Foreign Affairs. The Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee is mainly responsible with the 
internal dimension of the JHA issues due to its competences as outlined in the first 
section of the Chapter.531 Although its role has been limited in the area of external 
dimension of migration in the course of the negotiations with respect to the eastern 
neighbours, the Lisbon Treaty has increased its role concerning the approval of 
international treaties. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the 
involvement of the committee with respect to the EU decision-making concerning the 
visa dialogues with the eastern neighbours has increased.532  The contacts of the 
European Commission with the LIBE committee have increased due to the increased 
competences of the EP. Due to its traditional liberal and pro-mobility approach of the 
EP, the committee has favoured the intensification of the mobility with respect to the 
citizens of the eastern neighbours. In addition to the LIBE committee, the Foreign 
Affairs committee that has a responsibility with respect to the relations with the eastern 
neighbours in the framework of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. Due to its regional 
competence, the Foreign Affairs committee has become involved in the area of 
migration (particularly visa negotiations).533 
 
 
                                               
529 Interview with AFET Committee member, May 2009, Brussels.  
530  David Judge and David Earnshaw, (2008) The European Parliament Houndmills: Palgrave 
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531 Emilio De Capitani, “The evolving role of the European Parliament in the AFSJ,” In The Institutional 
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533 Ibid.  
157 
 
  
5.3. Chapter Conclusions  
 
This chapter outlines the ways in which the impact of the EU institutions on decision-
making process is assessed in the thesis. It focuses on two levels: (1) legal dimension 
and (2) institutional dimension. As shown the first section of the Chapter, the Member 
States have been increasingly constrained due to the legal framework in the area of 
migration. Since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, the competences of the EU 
institutions have increased. As shown with the analysis on the Lisbon Treaty, the 
unanimity requirement is abolished with respect to all four case study areas. Among the 
four case study areas, the visa cooperation has been highly communitarised due to the 
Schengen cooperation. The constitutional constraints on the Member States with respect 
to decision-making process have been high in the area of visa policy due to the QMV 
requirement. Moreover, the institutions have strong competences in the area of visa 
policy. Although the role of the EP has been limited with respect to the external 
dimension of migration, the Lisbon Treaty has increased the legal competences of the 
EP with the introduction of the ‘consent requirement’. As shown in the Chapter, labour 
migration has traditionally been the least communitarised policy area in the area of 
migration. The Member States kept their veto power with respect to labour migration 
due to the salience of the topic at the domestic level. The Lisbon Treaty has abolished 
the unanimity requirement in the area of legal migration. However, the Member States 
still have full competence with respect to the determination of the volumes of migration.  
 
After conducting a legal framework analysis, the Chapter also looked at the institutional 
dynamics within the four decision-making institutions. The analysis conducted in the 
second part of the Chapter demonstrated that the institutional dynamics create their own 
constraints in addition to the legal framework. Although the Council of the EU has been 
known as the ‘intergovernmental’ institution of the EU, the analysis showed that there is 
a pressure on the Member States to ‘compromise’ rather than ‘hard bargaining’ in the 
Council. The compromised decision-making has been mainly a characteristic of low-
politics issues. The area of migration has been largely considered a high-politics area. 
The intergovernmental circles of the justice and home affairs officials have traditionally 
been highly significant in the course of decision-making. However, the analysis 
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displayed that the ENP structure challenged the dominance of the JHA officials in the 
course of the decision-making. The ENP has given the external relations policy actors 
increased coordination competences. 
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CHAPTER 6: The Migration Policy Instruments towards the Eastern Neighbours  
 
Introduction  
After providing the legal and institutional framework of the external dimension of the 
EU’s migration policy in the previous Chapter, this Chapter deals with the actual policy 
instruments that have been in place with respect to the eastern neighbours. The Chapter 
looks at the extent to which the EU institutions are able to influence the EU decision-
making focusing on the four sub-areas of immigration policy by tracing the progress 
regarding their development. First, it deals with the readmission agreement negotiations 
as part of the irregular migration cooperation with the eastern neighbours. Second, the 
Chapter looks into the cooperation with the eastern neighbours in the area of visa 
facilitation and visa liberalisation. Third, the labour migration dimension that is put 
forward within the Mobility Partnerships is discussed. Lastly, the Chapter analyses the 
decision-making process concerning the evolution of the external dimension of EU's 
asylum policy focusing on the Regional Protection Programmes. Mapping out the 
development and decision-making processes with respect to the four case study areas, 
the chapter aims to analyse the degree to which they have been subject to institutional 
influence.  
 
6.1. Irregular Migration: Readmission Agreements  
Over recent decades, there has been a growing consensus regarding integrating 
migration cooperation into the broader external relations of the EU.534 Cooperation 
with the eastern neighbouring states, particularly with respect to the return of irregular 
migrants, has become a priority for the EU after the EU enlargement. Within the 
framework of the ENP cooperation, Ukraine and Moldova signed EC readmission 
agreements as part of the package deal with a short-term travel visa facilitation 
agreement in 2007.535 Both agreements were concluded under the Amsterdam Treaty 
                                               
534 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions. Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002,” 13463/02, 
2002, accessed January 1, 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/european-
council.aspx?target=2002&bid=76&lang=en&id=.   
535 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council Decision of 29 November 2007 concerning the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on readmission of persons’’ OJ L 
332/46, December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012. 
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legal basis and decision-making procedures. Due to the EU decision to suspend bilateral 
relations with Belarus as a result of the undemocratic regime in place, the start of the 
readmission agreement negotiations was delayed until the end of 2010. In November 
2010, the Commission asked the Council for a mandate to negotiate an EC readmission 
agreement with Belarus. The negotiation mandate was approved by the Council in 
February 2011.536 As in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the readmission negotiations 
between the EC and Belarus are coupled with visa facilitation negotiations to enhance 
mobility channels for the citizens of Belarus.537 Due to the incomplete negotiations and 
uncertainties regarding the process in relation to Belarus, this section evaluates the EU 
decision-making process in the area of readmission of undocumented migrants mainly 
focusing on Ukraine and Moldova. 
 
Since the late 1990s, the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries has 
become a traditional policy instrument for the EU. Initial agreements were concluded 
among the Member States and with the candidate countries for EU accession as a 
requirement for membership. At the Tampere (1999) and Laeken European Councils 
(2001), the Member States highlighted the need for the enhancement of an external 
dimension to the EU’s migration policy. The Council conclusions particularly pointed at 
the then upcoming borders of the EU in the aftermath of the eastern enlargement and the 
conclusion of readmission agreements. Building on the outcome of the Laeken 
European Council, at the European Council meeting that took place in Seville in 2002 
the Member States agreed that ‘(A)ny future cooperation, association or equivalent 
agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any 
country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.’538 Particularly the old 
Member States that have been subject to high levels of irregular migration have been 
                                                                                                                                         
Council of the European Union, ‘‘2007/826, Council Decision of 22 November 2007 on the conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation,’’ OJL 334/148, December 19, 2012, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:334:0148:0148:EN:PDF. 
536 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations 
for the conclusion of a readmission agreement between the European Union and Belarus’’ 6623/11, 5 
May 2011. 
537 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council Conclusions on Belarus,’’ 11860/11, 20 June 2011. 
538 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions. Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002,” 13463/02, 
2002, accessed http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/european-
council.aspx?target=2002&bid=76&lang=en&id=.  
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highly concerned about the eastern neighbourhood of the EU as a source of and transit 
for irregular migration.539 
 
In line with the growing importance attached to cooperation with the countries of origin 
or transit for irregular migration, the ENP Action Plans for Moldova and Ukraine 
identified the prompt conclusion of readmission agreements as one of the ‘priorities for 
action’.540 Due to its size and the long shared border with the enlarged EU, Ukraine has 
been the main priority for the Member States among the WNIS to cooperate against 
irregular cross-border movements.  
 
The EU and Ukraine cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs has started with 
the Common Strategies cooperation.541 The European Council Common Strategy on 
Ukraine, adopted in December 1999 under the CFSP cooperation, underlined the 
importance of the cooperation with Ukraine in the area of irregular migration. The 
European Council has proposed Ukraine to improve ‘cooperation regarding the 
readmission of own nationals, persons without nationality and third county nationals, 
including the conclusion of a readmission agreement’ as a part of the JHA 
cooperation.542 After an evaluation following the adoption of the Common Strategies in 
December 2001, an exclusive Action Plan on the justice and home affairs area was 
adopted between the EU and Ukraine under the terms of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement.543 Ukraine was the only ENP country that the EU had a 
specific JHA Action Plan. The 2001 Justice and Home Affairs Action Plan identified 
irregular migration cooperation as the main priority area of cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
539 European Commission, ‘‘Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours,’’ COM (2003) 104, 11 March 2003. 
540  European Commission, ‘‘EU/Ukraine ENP Action Plan 2004’’; (adopted 21 February 2005); 
European Commission, ‘‘EU/Moldova ENP Action Plan 2004’’. (adopted 22 February 2005). 
541 Council of the European Union, European Council Common Strategy  of 11 December 1999 on 
Ukraine  (1999/877/CFSP) OJL  331/1, 23 December 1999.  
542 Ibid.  
543 Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs in Ukraine (Text 
approved by the Council on 10 December 2001) OJ C 77/01, 29 March 2003. Ukraine was the only ENP 
country that the EU had a specific JHA Action Plan.  
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In the framework of the justice and home affairs cooperation, the Commission asked the 
Council to have a mandate to start readmission agreement negotiations with Ukraine in 
2001. The mandate was given by the JHA Council in June 2002 authorizing the 
Commission to start negotiations.544 Despite the negotiation mandate, the European 
Commission could not manage to conclude a prompt agreement with Ukraine due to 
lack of incentives for the Ukrainian side. It is evident that readmission agreements 
predominantly serve the interests of the EU member states due to the migratory 
pressures to the EU rather than the partner countries. The lengthy negotiation processes 
have shown that it is highly challenging to convince partner countries to sign a 
readmission agreement without offering substantial incentives in return. It was 
particularly challenging for the European Commission as the main negotiator for the 
EU. The main policy preference of the European Commission was to deliver a 
successful agreement regarding EU level readmission agreements with partner 
countries. This was mainly related to the fact the Member States were losing their 
confidence in EU level agreements due to lengthy processes.545 Among the Member 
States that are analysed, Germany in particular has been subject to high levels of 
irregular migrants from Ukraine. Moreover, the other Member States were also 
concerned as Ukraine was identified as a major transit for irregular migrants to the 
Schengen zone and also the UK due to the limited border management capacity. As 
shown in Chapter 4 on the policy preferences of the Member States, there is a high 
consensus among the Member States with respect to the need for increased cooperation 
on the issue of readmission agreements.  
 
The Commission convinced the Member States to develop incentives for the partner 
countries by proposing a package deal that combined readmission and visa facilitation 
agreements for the eastern neighbours. The Commission’s task was much harder in the 
Mediterranean as the partner countries were not inclined to cooperate with the EU as 
much as the eastern neighbours like Ukraine or Moldova. The limited room for 
                                               
544 The Decision is agreed at the COREPER level. Council of the European Union, “2436th meeting of 
Council of the European Union (Justice and Home Affairs and Civil Protection) - Addendum 1 to List A 
Items,” 982/02 ADD 1, June 12, 2002 (13.06), accessed January 8, 2012  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st09/st09825-ad01.en02.pdf. 
545 Annabelle Roig and Thomas Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the 
Political Impasse,” European Journal of Migration and Law 9 (2007): 373. 
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cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean paved the way for readmission agreements 
that are concluded informally at the national level among some member states and their 
partners in the southern neighbourhood.546 These developments side-lined the European 
Commission regarding the negotiations with the southern neighbours.  
  
The visa facilitation offer was a substantial incentive both for Ukraine and Moldova. 
The governments of the partner countries wanted to justify their pro-EU attitude at the 
domestic scene by getting a better deal regarding short-stay visas in exchange of 
readmission obligations. Prepared by the European Commission, the ENP Country 
Report (2004) on Ukraine also confirmed the offer of a package deal that incorporated 
readmission agreement and visa facilitations negotiations. 547  The package deal 
unquestionably accelerated the conclusion of the readmission negotiations. An 
agreement was signed with Ukraine in June 2007 and it entered into force in January 
2008.548 The combined readmission and visa facilitation negotiation was also offered to 
Moldova and a mandate for the EC-Moldova readmission agreement negotiations was 
approved by the Council in December 2006. An agreement was rapidly reached between 
the EU and Moldova in October 2007 taking effect in January 2008.549 
 
As detailed in the Action Plans550 with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU considers 
readmission agreements between the EU and the neighbouring partners as a vital step 
towards further cooperation to fight against irregular migration. Given the limited 
resources at the disposal of the EU’s partnering countries in the east, readmission 
agreements were met with opposition due to the technical as well as material investment 
                                               
546  Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Beyond Asymmetries: Cooperation on Readmission in the EU 
neighbourhood” (paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, 
Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011): 8-9. accessed January 1, 2011 
http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/3b_cassarino.pdf. 
547 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy-Country Report- Ukraine,” COM (2004) 
373 final, May 12, 2004.  
548 Council of the European Union, ''Council Decision of 29 November 2007 concerning the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on readmission of persons’ OJ L 
332/46, December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:332:0046:0047:EN:PDF. 
549 Council of the European Union, ''2007/826, Council Decision of 22 November 2007 on the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation,'’ OJL 334/148, December 19, 2012, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:334:0148:0148:EN:PDF.  
550 European Commission, “EU/Ukraine ENP Action Plan, 2004 (adopted 21 February 2005);  
European Commission, “EU/Moldova ENP Action Plan, 2004 (adopted on 22 February 2005). 
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that they necessitate. The partnering countries do not have the required resources to 
comply with the needs of effective border control to limit irregular cross border 
activities and the demands of the agreements put additional pressure on the already 
limited financial resources and infrastructure. Keeping in mind these limitations, the EU 
committed itself to provide the necessary technical and financial assistance to its 
partners to comply with the requirements detailed in the readmission agreements and 
Action Plans. With the aim of reducing irregular migration pressure and enhancing 
Ukraine's capacity to deal with undocumented migrants, the EU assistance included 
border management capacity improvement.551 The EU paid particular attention to the 
Ukraine-Moldova border to bring down cross-border illicit activities. In 2005, a special 
EU border assistance mission was initiated to provide technical assistance to Ukraine 
and Moldova.552 
 
The readmission agreements signed by Ukraine and Moldova have formed the basis for 
cooperation in other bilateral agreements between EU and ENP partner countries. In the 
Council, there was a broad consensus regarding putting readmission agreements as a 
priority. The focus of the EU cooperation has traditionally been on limiting ‘unwanted’ 
immigration. This is particularly supported by the older member states in which 
migration is domestically a significant and politicised issue. It is considered that the 
leverage of the EU as a whole is higher compared to negotiating the agreements 
concerning readmission agreements at the bilateral level.553  
 
 
 
 
                                               
551 Following the readmission agreement and the signing of the Action Plan, the EU has offered EUR 35 
million aid for ‘Readmission-related assistance (Improving infrastructure and capacity to deal with 
irregular migrants and to reduce irregular migration flows through Ukraine) and EUBAM-flanking 
measures (Support to the implementation of EUBAM recommendations)’. The aim of the assistance was 
infrastructure and capacity development for temporary retention and custody facilities in Ukraine and 
enhancing the control capacity of the border between Ukraine and Moldova.  
European Commission, “Commission Decision on the ENPI Annual Action Programme 2007 in favour of 
Ukraine to be financed under Article 19 08 01 03 of the general budget of the European Communities 
(Annex II)”, Action Fische for Readmission Related Assistance and EUBAM-flanking Measures, 
accessed January 8, 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2007/ec_aap-2007_ua_en.pdf. 
552 See EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine  http://www.eubam.org/. 
553 Interview with Member State official A, May 2009, Brussels  
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6.2. Visas: Visa Facilitation and Liberalisation  
In the framework of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, the EU has established 
intense cooperation and regular bilateral dialogue with the WNIS partners in the area of 
visa policy. This case study addresses two subsequent developments in the course of the 
negotiations. Firstly, the visa facilitation agreements are evaluated given that the 
negotiations evolved around the adoption of certain concessions to ease the procedures 
and reduce the costs of obtaining a Schengen visa for the nationals of the WNIS. The 
cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova regarding the facilitation of the conditions for 
obtaining a Schengen visa has evolved tightly conditioned to the irregular migration 
cooperation.554 Although the primary emphasis of the EU was on fighting against 
irregular migration in cooperation with its eastern neighbours, the lengthy readmission 
agreement negotiations between the EU and the partners proved that it was challenging 
to convince them to take responsibility regarding irregular migration management.  
The EU visa facilitation agreements could be considered as ‘foreign policy tools’ to be 
offered accompanying readmission agreements, to create incentives for third countries 
to agree to a readmission agreement.  
 
Secondly, the section is concerned with the abolition of the visa requirement for the 
citizens of Ukraine and Moldova.555 Although visa facilitation and visa liberalisation 
have been interlinked, the policy motivations and negotiations have been very different. 
Visa facilitation are instruments of compromise to sign readmission agreements with 
modest mobility facilitation concessions offered to third countries in return. On the 
other hand, visa liberalisation concerns the broad EU policy towards the region. Yet, the 
negotiations that started with visa facilitation have paved the way for further dialogue 
on abolishing the visa requirement for Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
554 Sandra Lavenex, “EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’,” Journal of European Public Policy 11 
no. 4 (2004): 680-700. 
555 As the process towards the conclusion of readmission and visa facilitation negotiations with Belarus 
has started in early 2011, the visa liberalisation section does not concern the policy towards Belarus.  
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Visa Facilitation as an incentive for readmission agreements: the case of Ukraine 
and Moldova 
The visa requirement for short-term travel has become a particularly topical issue for 
the WNIS following the eastern enlargement. The CEE countries, which had a long 
legacy of visa free regime towards the WNIS since the end of the Cold War, had to align 
their visa policies with the EU to comply with the EU acquis.556 The importance of 
improving the procedures and reducing the costs for obtaining Schengen visas has 
increased for the governments of the partner countries.557 In view of the extended 
negotiations regarding the conclusion of the readmission agreements, the EU has 
offered its immediate eastern neighbours visa facilitation agreements as a concession in 
return for their cooperation in the readmission of undocumented migrants.  
 
The agreements on readmission and visa facilitation were signed with Ukraine and 
Moldova in 2007.558 The visa facilitation agreements have brought about a number of 
measures to ease the process and cost of acquiring short-term visas. The EU has 
maintained its practice of pairing of the readmission and visa facilitation negotiations in 
the case of Belarus as well. Despite the facilitated travel, the ultimate target for Ukraine 
and Moldova has remained the abolition of visa requirement for their nationals. In line 
with the importance attached to enhancing cross-border mobility between the EU and its 
neighbours by the governments of the partner countries and some of the EU member 
states, further dialogue and cooperation for further liberalisation of the EU visa regime 
                                               
556 Heather Grabbe, “The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards,” International Affairs 
76, no.3 (2000): 528; Jan Zielonka, European Unbound: Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the 
European Union, (Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2003): 10. 
557 Euractiv Interview with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister: “Foreign Minister: Bridges symbolise change 
for Ukrainians” (15 December 2010) (updated 12 September 2011), Euractiv, accessed January 9, 2012 
http://www.euractiv.com/east-mediterranean/foreign-minister-bridges-symbolise-change-ukrainians-
interview-500613. It should also be noted that the Ukraine-EU Association Agenda puts forward visa 
cooperation as a priority. The Moldavian government has identified visa liberalisation as a priority for 
their European Integration Programme (2011-2014). Government of Moldova, Activity Program- 
European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare 2011-2014, accessed January 8, 2012 
http://www.mfa.gov.md/work-program-en/. 
558 Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas - Protocol - Declaration - Joint Declarations,” Official Journal L 
332/68, December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1218%2802%29:EN:HTML; 
Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of 
Moldova on the facilitation of the issuance of visas,” OJ L 334/169, December 19, 2007, accessed 
January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1219%2811%29:EN:HTML. 
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vis-a-vis its eastern neighbours started.  
 
The European Commission is the negotiator on behalf of the EU for the EC readmission 
agreements since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. In view of the slow 
negotiations, as discussed in the previous section on the readmission agreements, the 
Commission pushed the Member States with the aim of creating incentives for partner 
countries to take responsibility regarding the return of undocumented migrants. In line 
with the increasing importance of cooperation with third countries regarding irregular 
migration in the EU, the Conclusions of the June 2003 European Council meeting in 
Thessaloniki stated that cooperation with third countries on migration should be 
considered as ‘a two-way process’ which includes both fighting against irregular 
migration and consideration of opening up legal migration routes.559 Since 2004, there 
has been a broad agreement at the EU level regarding combining readmission 
agreements with short-term visa facilitation agreements. In November 2004, the 
European Council approved the Hague Programme providing further ‘political mandate’ 
to the facilitation of short-term visas to third-country nationals as part of the 
readmission agreement negotiations. The Hague Programme underlined the possibility 
of coupling the EU readmission agreement with the facilitation of ‘the issuance of short-
stay visas to third country nationals, where possible and on basis of reciprocity, as part 
of a real partnership in external relations including migration-related issues.’560 These 
agreements were particularly considered instruments to accelerate the readmission 
agreement negotiations.  
 
For a number of eastern neighbours including Ukraine and Moldova, the readmission 
agreements were coupled with facilitation of short-term travel. Due to the reluctance of 
the member states to make any binding commitments concerning adopting a visa-free 
regime, an exploratory dialogue phase regarding further cooperation on mobility was 
the second step in the aftermath of the conclusion of visa facilitation agreements. The 
visa dialogue process paved the way for the adoption of visa liberalisation Action Plans 
                                               
559 Council of the European Union, “Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency 
Conclusions,” 11638/03, October 1, 2003, accessed January 1, 2012  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf.  
560 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice 
in the European Union,” 0JC 531 March 3, 2005. 
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for Ukraine and Moldova. The negotiations concerning the facilitation of short-stay 
visas started in line with the readmission agreement negotiations for both Ukraine and 
Moldova.561 The negotiations with Belarus have been following the same pattern as 
Ukraine and Moldova. With the facilitation agreement, a reduction in the short-stay visa 
costs from 60 EUR to 35 EUR was introduced for applicants from Ukraine and 
Moldova.562 Other measures include granting visa fee-free travel to certain groups of 
Ukrainian citizens (close relatives, students, disabled people, journalists and pensioners) 
and issuing multiple-entry visas (lorry drivers, people on business, students, journalists 
and members of official delegations). Moreover, procedures (such as lessening the 
documents needed for visa application) are alleviated and the duration for a visa 
application to be processed is reduced. With respect to work permits, commitments are 
made for highly skilled migrants, seasonal workers from partnering countries as well as 
permits for training purposes. 
 
The readmission agreements are geared towards shifting the burden of combating 
irregular migration to the partner countries and towards the end goal of strengthening 
immigration management. However, these approaches failed to be productive given the 
unwillingness of the third countries to commit themselves to readmission agreements.563 
Among the 18 negotiation mandates that the Council has given to the Commission, only 
13 of them are concluded and entered into force.564 In its 2011 Communication on the 
                                               
561 Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas - Protocol - Declaration - Joint Declarations,'' Official Journal  L 
332/68, December 18, 2007, accessed January 1, 2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1218%2802%29:EN:HTML; 
Council of the European Union, “Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of 
Moldova on the facilitation of the issuance of visas,” OJ L 334/169, December 19, 2007, accessed 
January 1, 2012  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1219%2811%29:EN:HTML. 
562 Ibid.  
563 A recent evaluation of the EU Readmission Agreements is available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-003323&language=EN. 
564 The readmission agreement that are in force are Hong Kong and Macao (2004), Sri Lanka (2005), 
Albania (2006), Russia (2007), Ukraine (2008), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2008), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), Montenegro (2008), Serbia (2008) and Moldova (2008), Pakistan (2010) 
and Georgia (2011). With Morocco, Turkey and Cape Verde, the readmission agreement negotiations 
have started and not concluded despite several rounds of meetings. For example, the Council has given 
the European Commission the mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement with Morocco in 2000. The 
Commission was only able to start the formal negotiations in 2003 and the negotiations are still 
continuing. With China and Algeria, the negotiations have not formally started yet despite the Council 
mandate.  
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Evaluation of the Readmission Agreements565, the Commission has pointed at the fact 
that the negotiation process has been very lengthy for the majority of readmission 
agreements.566 As noted in its Communication, the Commission has underlined that the 
processes for Ukraine and Russia readmission agreements have gathered speed when 
the EU offered visa facilitation negotiations in return. With respect to Moldova, the 
process of readmission and visa facilitation negotiations simultaneously started leading 
to relatively fast negotiations. Visa facilitation has encouraged Moldova to agree to a 
readmission agreement.  
 
The Commission has put pressure on the Member States to offer ‘compensatory 
measures’ to partner countries to make them agree to readmission agreements. 
Examples of the measures are defined in a Commission Communication following the 
Thessaloniki European Council: ‘more generous visa policy with respect to the co-
operating countries or increased quotas for migrant workers, closer economic co-
operation, trade expansion, additional development assistance, better market access or 
WTO compatible tariff preferences are demands often mentioned as areas where greater 
generosity is expected from the EU and its Member States in order to lead to more 
progress in the negotiations.’567  Seeing the delays in relation to the readmission 
negotiations, the member states responded to the calls from the Commission. The 
Presidency Conclusions of the November 2004 referred to the possibility to offer visa 
facilitation as one of the external relations instruments of the EU while negotiating with 
third countries. As it was underlined in the ENP ‘Wider Europe’ Communication of the 
Commission, the neighbourhood of the EU is very significant for the EU to conclude 
readmission agreements.568 Although the visa facilitation was not clearly put in the 
ENP documents, the ENP also underlined the need for enhancing mobility between the 
neighbouring countries.  
                                               
565  European Commission, “Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements,” COM (2011) 76 final, 
February 23, 2011.   
566 As also noted by the European Commission, relatively fast negotiations were only concluded with the 
Western Balkan states, Moldova and Georgia. 
567 European Commission, “Communication in view of the European Council of Thessaloniki on the  
Development of a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, Smuggling and Trafficking of Human Beings,  
External Borders and the Return of Illegal Residents,” COM (2003) 323, June 3, 2003.  
568 European Commission, “Wider Europe–neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our 
eastern and southern neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 final, 2003, accessed 01/01/12, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
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As in the case of readmission agreements, the negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova 
were conducted under the pre-Lisbon procedures regarding the conclusion of 
international agreements. The agreements were adopted after consulting the European 
Parliament. In line with its support to enhancing mobility between the EU and eastern 
neighbours, the European Parliament has welcomed the coupling of readmission 
negotiations and concessions regarding short-term visas and approved the visa 
liberalisation agreements with Ukraine and Moldova.569  
 
The visa liberalisation concessions were considered as necessary for the EU to be able 
to conclude readmission agreements with third countries, as the conclusion of 
readmission negotiations with the neighbours has been highly important for the EU to 
fight against irregular migration. However, the negotiations concerning the 
liberalisation of the short-stay visas have become more challenging. 
 
Negotiations regarding the ‘long-term goal’ of visa liberalisations 
Visa liberalisation has become an important dimension of the ENP – and later the 
Eastern Partnership – negotiations. The EU policy on visa liberalisation for Ukraine and 
Moldova has developed in two stages. The first stage is a ‘visa dialogue’ stage between 
the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. The visa dialogue broadly entails the investigation of 
the ‘state of play’ in the neighbouring countries and the steps that should be taken to 
reach the ‘long term goal’ of visa liberalizations.570 The European Commission was 
responsible for closely observing the situation in the partner countries. The ‘visa 
dialogue’ stage was followed by the main ‘operational phase’ after a consensus was 
reached within the EU. This operational stage has brought about the adoption of the 
Action Plans for Ukraine and Moldova giving guidance to the partner countries through 
setting specific benchmarks. 
 
                                               
569 European Parliament, “Legislative resolution of 13 November 2007 on the proposal for a Council 
decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the 
facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas (COM(2007)0190 - C6-0187/2007 -2007/0069(CNS)),”  
P6_TA(2007)0493; European Parliament, “Legislative resolution of 13 November 2007 on the proposal 
for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and 
Republic of Moldova on the facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas (COM(2007)0488 - C6-0339/2007 
2007/0175(CNS)),” P6_TA(2007)0495. Interview with a member state representative, September 2010, 
Brussels. 
570 Interview with a member state representative, September 2010, Brussels. 
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The issue of visa-free travel was one of the difficult issues during the Eastern 
Partnership negotiations. In view of the declining interest of the eastern neighbours in 
the ENP (Ukraine in particular), it was acknowledged in the EU that the new policy 
proposal on the Eastern Partnership should be appealing for the partner countries. In its 
draft proposals, the European Commission has offered migration related policy tools 
that are in line with the EU's external immigration policy (i.e. the Global Approach to 
Migration framework). 571  During the drafting period of the Eastern Partnership 
proposal, the old member states in particular (such as Germany and France) have found 
the European Commission’s draft proposals too ambitious with respect to migration 
issues. Despite the importance of visa related concessions for the governments of the 
neighbouring countries, they were reluctant to grant visa free travel to the Schengen 
zone without attaching strong conditions.572  
 
Although the Eastern Partnership did not significantly alter the existing ENP framework 
with respect to bilateral relations of the EU with its eastern neighbours on the issue of 
migration cooperation, it has further underlined the need for enhanced cooperation 
concerning immigration and cross-border mobility. Due to the lack of a consensus 
among the Member States concerning how the EU should facilitate mobility with 
respect to its eastern neighbourhood, the commitments that were made during the 
Eastern Partnership agreement could be considered as limited. The Joint Declaration of 
the Prague Summit on the Eastern Partnership used an open-ended language. It was 
asserted that ‘gradual steps towards full visa liberalisation as a long term goal for 
individual partner countries on a case-by-case basis provided that conditions for well-
managed and secure mobility are in place’ will be taken, without giving a clear prospect 
to its partners about visa liberalisations. 
 
The ENP and the Eastern Partnership stress the broader reconciliation of the security 
and external relations objectives of the EU with respect to its immediate eastern 
neighbourhood. The EU level debates have been centred around the security concerns 
that are perceived with respect to further liberalisation of mobility as well as the 
geopolitical implications of the EU level agreement regarding the way the visa 
                                               
571 Interview with EU official A, March 2009, Brussels. 
572 Interviews with EU officials and member state representatives, March-May 2009, Brussels. 
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facilitations steps should be taken. It is important to stress that the EU’s visa 
requirements with respect to third countries is determined not only based on 
considerations related to the threat of irregular migration and security risks but also by 
‘‘the European Union’s external relations with third countries’’, taking into account “the 
implications of regional coherence and reciprocity”.573  
 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the policy preferences of the Member States diverge 
considerably on the issue of visa policy with respect to the WNIS region. Although the 
visa dimension has gained considerable attention in the course of the ENP and the 
Eastern Partnership dialogues due to its importance for the partner countries, the old 
Member States have been highly cautious regarding their commitments with respect to 
the issue of visas. With respect to security concerns, the Member States that have had 
concerns related to irregular immigration from the region, Germany in particular, have 
been reluctant to make binding commitments with respect to visa free travel. The 
divisions regarding policy preferences could be observed at the domestic level as well. 
The Ministry of Interior (who traditionally has a stronger hand on the policy) has 
adopted a rather technical approach with respect to the level of border and document 
security in the neighbouring countries. The Ministry of Interior officials have been less 
in favour of the removal of restrictions with respect to travel given the irregular 
migration and other illicit cross-border risks emanating from the region. On the other 
hand, the German Federal Foreign Office has a rather liberal approach with respect to 
taking steps towards granting visa free travel to the nationals of the eastern neighbours 
in line with the further development of relations with the region. Although France has 
not been subject to high levels of irregular migration from the region, it has been 
lukewarm towards further liberalisation of mobility for the WNIS region.  
 
As the UK does not take part in the Schengen agreement, the visa facilitation agreement 
does not have a direct effect on the entry conditions to the UK territory. However, 
Poland and Sweden have adopted a liberal approach towards visa negotiations. The 
enhancement of cross-border mobility particularly has become an important issue in line 
                                               
573 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001,” OJ L 81, 
March 21, 2001, accessed January 8, 2012  
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with the accession of the CEE countries to the EU. The visa requirements have been 
criticized due to ‘creating dividing lines’ in the continent following the eastern 
enlargement. As the owners of the Eastern Partnership proposal, Poland and Sweden 
aimed for putting concrete proposals on the visa liberalisation front to show the EU’s 
commitment to the further development of the relations with the region without 
attaching several conditions.  
 
Although the Eastern Partnership is a non-binding political document, it has intensified 
the debate regarding liberalisation and has paved the way for further discussions on 
whether the EU should move Ukraine and Moldova to the Schengen positive list. The 
process has started with a visa dialogue administrated by the European Commission. 
The role of the European Commission was significant at the visa dialogue stage as it 
was the main actor that had the responsibility and resources to closely monitor the 
situation in the neighbouring countries. The role of the Commission was also significant 
taking into account its role to prompt member states for reaching a political agreement 
with respect to proceeding to an ‘operational phase’ and settling the details of how the 
EU should develop and progress its policy towards the countries in the eastern 
neighbourhood following the visa dialogues. The Commission was also prompted by 
the Member States, Poland and Lithuania in particular, that have been in favour of 
moving to the operational stage.574 
 
The EU policy on short-term visas has been communitarised to a great extent. In the 
Council, the EU decisions concerning the list of countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of Schengen visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement are taken by qualified majority voting 
(Article 77(2)(a) TFEU). As the Member States do not have a veto power, they had to 
develop a common decision. Broader geopolitical priorities of the member states with 
respect to the region were central during the debate particularly for member states that 
have varying foreign policy priorities in the region. Although Russia is not a part of the 
ENP and the Eastern Partnership, the discussion also involved Russia given that there 
has been a parallel process with respect to EU negotiations concerning the visa debates 
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with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. Member States diverge with respect to the countries 
that the EU should launch negotiations concerning visa liberalisations. The negotiations 
among the EU member states with respect to visa liberalisations reflected their 
diverging foreign policy priorities. It was understood that their diverging regional 
preferences (i.e. Russia vs. WNIS) should be balanced. During the Council negotiations 
in the first half of 2010, France was particularly interested in starting the visa 
liberalizations negotiations with Russia as opposed to others, such as new Member 
States that traditionally prioritize relations with Ukraine and Moldova. France 
particularly prioritized the broader geopolitical interest vis-a-vis Russia over the 
security-focused concerns of JHA officials with respect to migratory pressures to the 
EU.575 The change concerning the viewpoint of France on the issue could be observed 
if compared with the reluctant support given concerning visa liberalisations during the 
EU-Ukraine Summit in the course of French Presidency in 2008.576 
 
On the other hand, the consensus-building has been highly important despite the 
decision-making rules. As indicated by an interviewee, the decision in the Council 
regarding moving to the operational stage was taken without actual voting. 577 
Considering the political weight of the negotiations, the role of the COREPER who has 
a horizontal competence with respect to Council negotiations (regarding reaching a deal 
during the negotiations) was highly significant.578 The EU negotiations concerning 
starting ‘the operational phase’ of the visa liberalisation process with the eastern 
neighbours has paved the way for a political agreement that balances particularly the 
foreign policy priorities of different actors in the EU in the eastern neighbourhood. In 
the EU-Russia Summit that was held in Rostov-on-Don in June 2010, it is declared that 
the EU and Russia will move towards visa liberalisation ‘based on a step-by-step 
approach’.579 A parallel approach is adopted with respect to Ukraine as indicated in the 
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting in June 2010 in Luxembourg.580 According 
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to the conclusions of the JHA Ministerial meeting, the process will be based on a two-
level Action Plan for Ukraine to realize the necessary steps. Negotiations with other 
neighbouring countries in the region (such as Moldova and Georgia) are also expected 
to follow the similar gradual model that is agreed with respect to Russia and Ukraine.   
 
In line with its liberal approach towards increased mobility, the European Parliament 
has been supportive of visa liberalisations toward Ukraine and Moldova. The European 
Parliament supported further development of the tools of the Global Approach to 
Migration in relation to the Eastern Partnership.581 As an official put it ‘the EP 
normally plays the role of political facilitator and tries to accelerate the process giving it 
a political dimension’.582 The EP resolutions have continuously called for the Council 
to start the process for visa liberation and also abolish the visa costs for national visas as 
an interim stage.   
 
6.3. Labour Migration: Mobility Partnerships 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the EU has acquired the competence to adopt 
measures in relation to labour migration with the introduction of Title IV of the TEC 
(on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons) 
in 1999. Not being subject to the five-year transition period commitment (regarding 
unanimity and co-decision) as opposed to the other case study policy areas that are dealt 
with in this thesis, labour migration has been the least harmonized area within the EU’s 
migration policy. Dismissing the Commission’s ambitious proposal on the adoption of a 
comprehensive EU level labour migration policy in 2001, the Member States since then 
have shown reluctance with respect to developing an ambitious labour migration policy 
at the EU level.583  In 2005, the European Commission has adopted a sectoral approach 
and pushed for a modest policy proposal focusing on certain categories of economic 
migrants.584 
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In December 2006, the European Council has put forward the concept of ‘circular 
migration’ in its conclusions as a policy tool to ‘strengthen and deepen international 
cooperation and dialogue with third countries of origin and transit, in a comprehensive 
and balanced manner’.585 The concept, which was developed by France and Germany, 
mainly refers to ‘time-lined’ temporary labour migration opportunity for partner 
countries in return for their cooperation primarily related to irregular migration.586 In 
2007, the Commission has put forward the Mobility Partnerships proposal which has 
integrated the concept of temporary labour migration into the broader EU cooperation 
with partner countries in the area of migration management. The proposal has specified 
that it aims to improve ‘the management of legal movements of people between the EU 
and third countries ready to make significant efforts to fight illegal migration’. A pilot 
mobility partnership is signed between the EU member states and Moldova within this 
scheme.587  
 
Circular migration is increasingly considered as a new approach to legal migration at 
the EU level. The discussions on the use of circular immigration as a policy tool to 
manage migration have been mainly initiated by international organisations such as the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations in 2005.588 
Circular migration has also been brought up by the European Commission in its 
publications on Migration and Development589 and further detailed concerning the 
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ways in which it could be developed in the Commission's communication590 on its legal 
migration plan as a concept to manage migration in the EU in cooperation with the 
countries of origin.  
 
In 2006, the Circular Migration initiative was supported by Germany and France 
ministers of interior, Wolfgang Schauble and Nicolas Sarkozy, as a framework to 
manage migration to the EU and cooperation with third countries.591 The initiative was 
first proposed at the informal meeting of the ministers in the framework of the G6 
attended by the interior ministers of six EU Member States.592 Afterwards, the proposal 
was presented to the Finnish Presidency taking place in the second half 2006.593 The 
initiative has found support among the EU Member States. It was argued that offering 
circular and temporary migration to third country nationals would be an instrument to 
fight with irregular immigration in cooperation with third countries. In December 2006, 
the European Council has integrated the concept of ‘circular and temporary migration’ 
into its conclusions as a policy tool to enhance cooperation with third countries in the 
area of labour migration.594 In the course of the German EU Presidency in the first half 
of 2007, Germany has further emphasized cooperation and partnership with third 
countries in the framework of circular and temporary labour migration. These schemes 
incorporate temporary work or educational opportunities for third country nationals 
(with interested Member States given that it falls into their competence) in exchange for 
readmission of undocumented migrants or encouraging ‘return migration’ of third 
country nationals residing in the EU in partnership with the source countries.  
 
The EU Mobility Partnerships are developed to create a cooperation platform between 
the interested Member States and volunteering third countries concerning different 
dimensions of migration based on their respective needs. The mobility partnerships are 
built into the EU’s existing framework regarding the external dimension immigration 
policy (i.e. Global Approach to Migration). The EU’s ‘Global Approach to Migration’ 
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policy has underlined the need for a more ‘comprehensive approach’ to migration issues 
including legal migration. In its communication ‘Global Approach to Migration: one 
year on’, the European Commission emphasises the importance of responding to the 
needs of the labour market through allowing for the admission of specific groups of 
migrants such as high skilled migrations or seasonal workers to the labour market.595  
The ideas regarding circular migration opportunities were already incorporated into the 
Commission’s review of the Global Approach to Migration. The Communication on 
‘Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European 
migration policy’ has stated that cooperation with third countries could include legal 
migration opportunities (under the then called ‘Migration Packages’) given that the 
partner countries effectively cooperate in the area of irregular migration and 
readmission.  
 
As in the case of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration, the Mobility Partnerships aim 
to incorporate cooperation with third countries regarding legal migration, irregular 
migration and to address the linkage between migration and development aspects in the 
source countries (such as brain drain or remittances). In view of the long-standing 
unwillingness of certain member states (such as Germany and France) regarding 
creating extensive EU level labour migration policy instruments, the Mobility 
Partnerships provide a flexible framework for the EU member states. One could observe 
the weak institutional involvement as the European Commission refrained from listing 
possible policy instruments in its Communication. The Communication provides a very 
flexible cooperation framework as interested Member States and partner countries could 
choose to cooperate based on their individual needs and preferences.  
 
Given that the Mobility Partnerships aim to cover a range of policy areas, the legal basis 
is complicated.596 Regarding the legal migration dimension, the competences are shared 
between the Community and the EU member states. The Member States have the 
competence to determine the volume of economic migrants that could enter their labour 
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markets.597 Based on Article 63(3) (a) TEC, the Community has acquired competence 
regarding ‘conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue 
by Member States of long-term residence permits’. 598  However, the European 
Commission has not been able to effectively exercise its competence in this area. In 
2001, the Commission proposed to the Council to adopt a comprehensive Council 
directive in relation to the employment of third country nationals defining EU level 
shared rules and conditions. 599  However, the member states could not reach an 
agreement on the proposal and it was eventually withdrawn by the European 
Commission.600 In view of the conclusions of the Hague Programme regarding the need 
for a debate on economic migration to the EU601, the European Commission has drawn 
up a ‘legal migration policy plan’ in 2005. The policy plan focused on a number of 
sectors rather than adopted a general directive regarding labour migration. This 
approach was particularly a result of the lack of an EU level consensus among the 
member states. On the other hand, the policy plan did not satisfy certain member states 
that have a liberal approach towards labour immigration such as Sweden.602 Moreover, 
the European Parliament supported a general directive rather than a sectoral one. A 
resolution was adopted which reflected the dissatisfaction of the EP regarding the new 
legal migration policy proposal.603  
 
The EU Mobility Partnerships are defined as negotiations ‘with third countries that have 
committed themselves to cooperating actively with the EU on management of migration 
flows, including by fighting against irregular migration, and that are interested in 
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securing better access to EU territory for their citizens.’604 The emphasis on managing 
migration is quite strong in the Mobility Partnerships. From the EU side, the partnering 
countries are expected to cooperate with respect to the fight against irregular migration 
and human trafficking, border controls and document security as well as measures with 
respect to returns and readmissions.605 In view of the difficulty of effective migration 
management without strong incentives for the partner countries, the Mobility 
Partnerships could be seen as a package offering cooperation concerning legal and 
irregular migration with the aim of convincing third countries to take more 
responsibility in terms of irregular migration.  
 
The objective of the Mobility Partnerships is to improve migration management as well 
as intensify legal migration opportunities and mobility between neighbouring countries 
and the EU. The partnership aims at cooperation for circular migration and returns of 
the migrants to tackle with the negative impacts of migration for source countries due to 
high skilled migration from the country of origin as well.606 The Commission's position 
(which was highly influenced by the German and French proposal) was objected by 
some member states such as Sweden. The EU level policy regarding time-lined 
temporary migration has clashed with Sweden’s rather liberal domestic policy which 
offers a more flexible condition to labour migrants.  
 
The Mobility Partnerships are also integrated into the ENP framework in line with the 
objective to increase cooperation between the EU and its partners. The first European 
Commission communication on the ENP put forward labour migration as a ‘long term 
objective’. In its Communication, the Commission stated that ‘The impact of ageing and 
demographic decline, globalisation and specialisation means the EU and its neighbours 
can profit from putting in place mechanisms that allow workers to move from one 
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territory to another where skills are needed most.’607 However, it was underlined that 
‘the free movement of people and labour remains the long-term objective’. 608 
Significant additional opportunities for cultural and technical interchange could be 
facilitated by a long-stay visa policy on the part of the EU member state’. The 
Migration Partnership with Moldova is a policy integrated in the framework of the ENP. 
 
Although the Mobility Partnerships are presented as policy tools that aim to increase the 
channels of legal migration for the neighbouring countries, the policy development is 
highly conditioned by irregular migration cooperation of the partners with the EU 
member states. It shows that the traditional focus of the Member States on the security 
dimension within the external dimension of the EU migration policy is still strong. The 
‘mobility partnerships’ have been negotiated with Moldova and Cape Verde as pilot 
programmes and followed with the partnership with Georgia. These policy instruments 
combine fight against irregular migration, legal migration opportunities and address the 
repercussions of migration regarding development in the partner countries cooperation.  
legal migration is one of the legs of the Mobility Partnerships, it is highlighted that the 
competences of the Member States concerning controlling the access of third country 
nationals to their labour market should be respected.609   
 
In its resolution on the EU legal migration policy plan, the EP stated that it broadly 
gives its support to mobility partnership and circular migration policy instruments.610 
The resolution inquired about the “link between integration and ‘circularity’and the 
effect that temporary migration schemes can have on legal and potentially stable labour 
relations’’.611 In addition, the EP underlined the need to ‘fully respect human rights’ in 
relations with migrants’ countries of origin.   
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6.4. Asylum Dimension: Regional Protection Programmes  
 
Due to the legal obligations of the Member States under the Geneva Convention with 
respect to the protection of refugees, the ‘externalization’ of Member States’ 
responsibilities through the development of an external dimension has been highly 
contentious. The EU Member States has developed policy tools to control mounting 
asylum demands and some member states have pushed for ways that they could extend 
their responsibilities on the issue of refuge protection. The EU developed the ‘safe third 
country’ principle through which the Member States return asylum seekers to third 
countries which they pass across before reaching the EU territory.612  
 
The debate on the external dimension of asylum was triggered by the then British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s letter to the Presidency on ‘New International Approaches to 
Asylum Processing and Protection’ ahead of the Brussels European Council in March 
2003.613 The UK letter proposed two concepts: ‘regional management of migration 
flows’ and ‘transit processing centres’ outside of the EU to better manage the processing 
of asylum applications at the international level. The views of the member states 
differed considerably on the issue of transferring certain responsibilities to third 
countries concerning asylum. However, a broad agreement at the EU level has been 
reached regarding the establishment of Regional Protection Programmes with the aim of 
integrating an asylum dimension into the EU’s external relations with third countries. In 
2004, the Hague Programme created a further political mandate regarding the 
establishment of the Regional Protection Programmes to enhance cooperation with 
‘regions of origin’ regarding protection of refugees.  
 
Following the debate on the UK letter in March 2003, the European Council asked the 
Commission to prepare a report on the issue in close contact with the UNHCR for the 
Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The European Commission has submitted 
its first proposal titled ‘Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum 
                                               
612 Sandra Lavenex, Safe third countries: extending the EU asylum and immigration policies to Central 
and Eastern Europe (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1999): 76. 
613 British prime minister Tony Blair’s letter to Greek prime minister Costas Simitis (March 2003), 
available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simitis-asile.pdf. 
183 
 
  
systems’ ahead of the Thessaloniki European Council. The Communication states that 
two measures could be supported: (i) Protected Entry Procedures in regions of origin 
and (ii) Resettlement Schemes. With the Protected Entry Procedure, claims for asylum 
are made in a host country to alleviate orderly arrival to the EU member states. The 
Resettlement Schemes refer to the EU’s commitment to the transfer of refugees from a 
host country to a more developed country that offers protection guarantees. Article 63 
(1) and (2) TEC justified the involvement of the Community in relation to the adoption 
of measures on asylum, refugees and displaced persons. 
 
The Thessaloniki European Council asked the Commission to report on the ‘orderly and 
managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international protection, and to examine 
ways and means to enhance the protection capacity of regions of origin with a view to 
presenting to the Council’. 614  Although the establishment of Protected Entry 
Procedures were controversial, there was an EU level consensus regarding Resettlement 
Schemes.615  
 
In 2004, the European Commission published a more detailed Communication on the 
external dimension of asylum focusing on enhancing ‘protection capacities’ of partner 
countries and EU-wide Resettlement Schemes.616  In view of the lack of consensus 
among the Member States, the European Commission also omitted its proposal 
regarding setting up Protected Entry Procedures.  
 
In its 2004 communication, the Commission introduced the ‘Regional Protection 
Programmes’ (RPPs) as a scheme to cooperate with third countries regarding asylum, 
legal migration opportunities, migration management and the return of irregular 
migrants. In its follow-up communication in 2005, the Commission proposed to develop 
RPPs in the WNIS region stating that there was a clear interest among the Member 
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States regarding cooperation with the eastern neighbours regarding asylum.617 As one 
of the main transits to the EU, it is not unexpected that the Member States prioritise 
cooperation with the eastern neighbours in area of migration management. The 
compatibility of the neighbouring states with the European standards concerning the 
asylum and refugee issues is highly significant for the EU side as well. The RPPs have 
been built on the existing cooperation in the area of migration with the region in line 
with the ENP Action Plans. The Progress Reports underline both the legal developments 
and problems in the partner countries. According to the ENP Progress Report of 
Ukraine published in 2010, the countries that are considered are Ukraine, Moldova and 
Belarus with respect to eastern neighbourhood.  
 
The Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) in the neighbourhood have been a very 
controversial issue since their introduction.618 There is a strong JHA focus concerning 
the development of the policy tool. As the Member State that has put for the agenda, the 
UK has been proactive towards the development of regional protection programmes.619 
Germany has supported the idea that it is better for the asylum seekers to stay in the 
region of origin rather than being relocated to a Member State given that the 
international obligations regarding refugee protection are respected in the partner 
countries.620 France has been supportive of the enhancement of the refugee protection in 
the countries or regions concerned.  
 
According to the conclusions of the specialized Council preparatory working group on 
Migration and Asylum (High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum) meeting 
(2005), Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands Poland, Slovakia and the 
UK were particularly interested in the development of a pilot Regional Protection 
Programme in the eastern neighbourhood. 621  
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The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the 2004 Communication of the 
Commission that gave support to cooperation with third countries in the area of asylum 
policy in the framework of the ENP and specific country Action Plans. The plan to 
establish EU-wide Resettlement Schemes to ensure a better managed entry to the EU is 
supported by the EU as well.622 However, the EP resolution underlined that it refuses 
(LIBE committee in particular) “ ‘outsourcing’ of the application process by sending 
applicants for refugee status to a third country, not least  because it makes it more 
difficult for applicants to be properly represented and removes the process from 
democratic oversight”.623  One could also argue that the factor that has empowered the 
EP is its budgetary powers in this policy area.  
 
6.5. Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter presented the EU decision-making process concerning the migration policy 
tools that are incorporated within the EU’s broader external relations with the Eastern 
neighbours focusing on irregular migration, visa cooperation, labour migration and 
asylum cooperation. The Chapter questioned to what extent the external dimension of 
immigration has been subject to institutional constraints. The analysis of the four case 
studies has shown that the policy outcomes in these four policy areas are subject to 
variable degree of institutional constraints and influence. It lends only limited supports, 
with respect to intergovernmental decision-making.  
 
Building on the first part of the previous Chapter, the first level of analysis was related 
to the legal basis and the decision-making procedures with respect to the four case 
studies. As the analysis on the legal basis has shown, the EU has simultaneously 
acquired competence to act on these four policy areas with the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The second level was about the way in which the EU Institutions 
have acquired institutional roles and resources that create certain dynamics over the 
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years which constrain inter-state bargaining. The increasing communitarisation in the 
policy area after the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty has paved the way for 
increased institutional roles over the years. However, the effect of the EU’s institutional 
framework varies among different policy areas.  
 
The policy making-process concerning the Ukrainian and the Moldavian readmission 
and visa liberalisation agreements has shown that the policy outcomes are subject to 
institutional influence. The European Commission as the negotiator on behalf of the EU 
in the course of these negotiations has been effective in terms of creating a package 
deal. Despite the emphasis of the Member States on the irregular migration dimension, 
the coupling of readmission and visa negotiations has created incentives for the 
neighbouring countries to cooperate with the EU on the issue of the return of irregular 
migrants.   
 
The EU has a relatively long history of integration with respect to irregular migration 
and short-stay visas. The qualified majority voting in the Council has highly constrained 
the Member States’ actions particularly in relation to the negative and positive lists to 
cross the Schengen border. Despite the salience of the policy area, the negotiations 
regarding short-stay visas have shown that the Member States’ actions are highly 
restricted on the issues where QMV is in place. On the other hand, consensus-building 
has been highly important despite the decision-making rules. As mentioned above, in 
the course of the negotiations concerning the visa liberalisation Action Plans for 
Ukraine and Moldova, the Member States did not calculate the votes. The decision was 
taken following the negotiations in the Council.   
 
However, the EP had limited competences during the negotiations on the Ukrainian and 
Moldavian agreements due to the consultation procedure regarding the ratification of 
the agreements based on the pre-Lisbon set-up. Since the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty and its entry into force in December 2009, the EP competences have increased as 
it has to ratify readmission and visa facilitation agreements. 
 
The issue of competences regarding the labour immigration dimension is relatively 
more salient compared to other policy areas. Although the EU has acquired 
187 
 
  
competences to act in the domain of legal migration, the unanimity requirement has 
restricted policy development and the Commission’s involvement. The Member States 
have been reluctant in terms of discussing the issues related to labour migration at the 
EU level. In line with this, the external dimension of the EU’s immigration policy does 
not have a substantial labour migration component. Rather than adopting an ambitious 
agenda, the European Commission has been cautious regarding the labour immigration 
policy tools that are incorporated into the broader EU cooperation with third countries 
in the area of migration. The Mobility Partnerships have been developed as flexible 
schemes that incorporate a number of dimensions including labour migration. In 
addition, the scope of the labour migration dimension of Mobility Partnerships is 
limited. The policy tools are mainly built on the ‘circular and return migration’ concept 
developed by the European Commission building on a proposal which had come from 
Germany and France. The Lisbon Treaty also further clarified the competences of the 
Member States regarding the admission volumes of economic immigrants.  
 
Regarding the external dimension of EU’s asylum policy, the debate regarding 
cooperation with the regions of origin has started at the intergovernmental level within 
the European Council framework. However, the role of the European Commission has 
been important to reach a consensus in view of the Member States’ varied views on the 
issue. The European Commission proposals on the issue in 2003 and 2004 have 
diverged from the initial UK proposal and brought about a consensus among the 
member states and the European Parliament. 
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CHAPTER 7: Reflections on the Theoretical Framework, Analysis of the Case 
Studies and Conclusions 
 
In focusing on the eastern neighbourhood, the thesis has provided an analysis of the 
decision-making process in the EU with respect to the external dimension of migration. 
The research assessed the explanatory power of two different sets of theories: 
intergovernmentalist/state-centric and non state-centric/institutionalist approaches to 
EU decision-making so as to analyse the ways in which the EU institutions influence or 
constrain the Member States in the four specific policy areas. Although the external 
dimension of migration has traditionally been subject to strong intergovernmental 
influence, the thesis examined the influence of the EU’s institutional framework on the 
decision-making process.  
 
7.1. Reflection on the Analytical Framework  
 
Based on the intergovernmental and the institutionalist approaches, the thesis identified 
two main hypotheses regarding EU decision-making:  
 
H1 The EU decision-making process in the area of external dimension of immigration is 
a result of inter-state bargaining among the Member States with aggregated exogenous 
policy preferences. 
 
H2 The EU’s institutional framework acts as an intervening factor with respect to EU 
decision-making process in the area of external dimension of immigration by 
constraining certain actions at the EU level.  
 
To put these hypotheses to an empirical test, the research conducted a comparative 
analysis of four policy areas within the area of external dimension of migration: (i) 
irregular migration; (ii) visas; (iii) labour migration; (iv) asylum. The empirical analysis 
of the case studies displayed that the intergovernmentalist theoretical explanations that 
solely take into account the official EU level policy positions of the Member States 
failed to provide a full picture of the decision-making process. The analysis showed that 
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the EU's institutional structure feeds into the decision-making process. The comparative 
analysis of the four sub-policy areas that have different legal basis and decision-making 
procedures enabled the testing of the two hypotheses presented above based on different 
levels of constitutional development. As presented in Chapters 5 and 6, the legal 
framework as well as the influence of the EU Institutions are highly different for each 
case study. The following section addresses the main research question reflecting on the 
two hypotheses based on the four case studies of the thesis.   
 
7.2. Divergence among the Case Studies  
 
This section evaluates the impact of the EU’s institutional framework on the decision-
making process reflecting on (H1) the dominance of the inter-state negotiations and 
(H2) the impact of the EU’s institutional framework. On the basis of the systematic 
application of process tracing method, the research concluded that a pure inter-state 
bargaining viewpoint fails to fully explain the EU decision-making process with respect 
to the external dimension of migration. As opposed to the H1, the H2 indicated a 
relation between the institutional framework and how policies were agreed at the EU 
level. Although the degree to which the case studies supported H2 differ, it was shown 
that the EU’s institutional framework has an impact. The relationship was evaluated 
based on the four policy areas that were identified.  
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Policy areas  Policy 
Instruments 
Member State’ Policy Positions EU level Decision-Making Process Overall 
Institutional  
Influence 
assessment 
Irregular 
Migration 
Readmission 
Agreements 
with UA & ML 
-High Consensus to sign readmission 
agreements with UA & ML. 
-All five MS consider irregular migration 
cooperation with UA & ML to be essential. 
-DE, FR & UK put higher priority on 
irregular migration cooperation in 
comparison to PL & SE. 
-All five MS supported the use of 
readmission agreements to fight against 
irregular migration. 
-QMV procedure in the Council 
-Policy positions of the MS in the Council 
converged. Limited policy flexibility due to 
strong intergovernmental pressure in the area 
of irregular migration. 
-Commission managed to convince the 
Council to combine readmission and visa 
facilitations for UA & ML to speed up the 
readmission agreement negotiations 
-EP exercised limited influence due to the 
consultation procedure. (a) 
Moderate  
Visa Conditions for 
short-term travel to 
Schengen  
countries for the 
citizens of UA & 
ML 
i) Visa facilitation 
ii) Visa 
liberalisation (b) 
-Low Consensus among the MS regarding 
the liberalisation of visa regime for UA & 
ML 
-Broad consensus on the visa facilitation 
agreements among the five MS 
-Divergences regarding visa liberalisation:  
.DE, FR & UK were lukewarm towards the 
abolition of visa requirement for UA & 
ML. Their concerns were shared by other 
old MS.  
.PL & SE were pro-visa liberalisation. 
Other new MS supported visa 
liberalisations. 
 
i) Visa Facilitation Agreements: 
-QMV in the Council 
-MS positions in the Council converged.  
-Limited EP influence due to the consultation 
procedure. (c)  
ii) Visa Liberalisation Process: 
-QMV paved the way for compromise despite 
the divergent policy positions. Coalitions 
polarised between actors who were in favour 
of visa liberalisation for UA, ML & RU and 
those against. 
-Commission was pro-liberalisation. The 
agreement on the visa liberalisation action 
plans was reached following various 
Commission proposal drafts.  
-EP’s standpoint was considerably influential 
due to its increased competences after the 
Lisbon Treaty. (d) 
High  
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Table 4: Divergences among the Case Studies 
a) Given that the readmission agreements with Ukraine and Moldova were concluded under the Amsterdam Treaty procedures, the EP’s opinion was not binding. The 
consent of the EP has become required for the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
b) The definitions of these two policy instruments are provided on page 10.  
c) Similar to the readmission agreements, the position of the EP was not binding until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. 
d) The EP gained co-decision powers in the area of short-term visas after Lisbon. 
e) The unanimity requirement in relation to labour migration policy area has been abolished after Lisbon. However, the Member States determines the volumes of 
admissions to their territory. 
f) The EP has become co-legislator in this area along with the Council after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Policy Areas Policy 
Instruments  
Member States’ Policy Positions EU Level Decision-Making Process Overall 
Institutional  
Influence 
assessment 
Labour 
Migration 
Mobility 
Partnerships with 
ML 
-Low Consensus among the MS regarding 
adopting EU level labour migration 
instruments for the eastern neighbours 
-DE, FR & UK were against an active EU 
labour migration policy.  
-SE and PL were in favour of flexible 
labour migration policies.  
-Commission Proposal grew out of 
bilateral DE & FR initiative 
-Unanimity required in the Council (e) 
-Limited Commission policy entrepreneurship 
due to the salience of the policy area and the 
unanimity requirement. 
-Agreement was only achieved on a flexible 
and voluntary labour migration scheme under 
the Mobility Partnerships 
-EP exercised limited influence due to the 
consultation procedure. (f) 
Low 
Asylum Regional Protection 
Programmes in UA, 
ML & BY 
-Moderate Consensus among the MS 
regarding integrating an external 
dimension to their asylum policies and 
cooperation with the eastern neighbours. 
-Commission proposal triggered by UK 
initiative on the international dimension of 
asylum  
-MS took polarised positions due to the 
sensitivity of the issue 
-QMV in the Council 
-Commission eventually formulated a 
proposal supported by the Council.  
-During the negotiation process, the EP 
enhanced its position due to its budgetary 
competences 
Moderate 
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Table 4 above summarises the qualitative analysis of the main findings of the thesis 
based on the four sub-fields of the external dimension of migration. It combines two 
analyses (1) the analysis presented in Chapter 4 in relation to the policy positions of the 
Member States and (2) the final outcome of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 4 identified a high level of consensus among the Member States with respect to 
irregular migration cooperation. High consensus among the Member States’ policy 
preferences is considered a factor that limits the impact of the EU’s institutional 
framework. On the other hand, in the area of visa policy, there was a lack of consensus 
due to the disagreements with respect to the liberalisation of mobility regime (both for 
short-term visas and labour migration) for the citizens of the eastern neighbours. As 
shown in Chapter 6 on the negotiations at the EU level, the lack of consensus increased 
the impact of the institutional constraints such as the QMV particularly in the case of 
visas. Lastly, in the area of asylum, Chapter 4 found moderate convergence among the 
policy positions of the Member States.  
 
Reflecting upon the Member States’ policy preferences (Chapter 4) and the EU level 
negotiations (Chapter 5 and 6) with respect to each case study, the thesis presents an 
analysis on the decision-making in the area of external dimension of migration in Table 
1. In Table 4, Low influence indicates that institutional constraints are limited to 
procedural roles in the course of negotiations without tangible policy influence. This is 
mainly relevant for the cases that unanimous decision-making is applied. Moderate 
influence refers to some influence which changes policy negotiations without leading to 
strong concessions. This is particularly relevant for the policy areas in which, despite 
communitarisation, intergovernmental pressure is strong. High influence refers to the 
cases that institutional constraints on Member States are diagnosable and policy 
negotiations are observably influenced by the institutional framework. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the case study that strongly supported hypothesis 2 is the decision-
making process with respect to the short-term visa policy of the EU. On the other hand, 
labour migration was the least supportive case study with respect to the second 
hypothesis. Below, a detailed examination with respect to each case study is presented.  
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Irregular Migration  
Despite strong intergovernmental pressures in the area of irregular migration, the 
empirical analysis of the case study on irregular migration, which focused on the 
readmission agreement negotiations, showed that a strict intergovernmental analysis 
fails to explain the decision-making process. The irregular migration case study 
moderately supported the second hypothesis. The Member States have traditionally put 
an emphasis on cooperation concerning irregular migration in their relations with the 
eastern neighbourhood. In the initial documents concerning the ENP, the security risks 
emanating from the region including irregular migration were particularly underlined 
with the eastward shift of the Schengen borders. The European Commission has 
strongly reflected the concerns of the Member States regarding irregular migration and 
put readmission agreements as a high priority in its communications and proposals on 
the ENP since the beginning. The ENP documents (i.e. Country Reports, Action Plans 
for the eastern neighbours that were released at the beginning and the annual reports on 
the progress of the partner countries) systematically evaluated the problems concerning 
border management and irregular migration problems experienced in the neighbouring 
countries underlining the need for further cooperation. Despite strong intergovernmental 
pressures in the policy area, the empirical analysis of the readmission agreement 
negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova shows that a strict intergovernmental analysis 
fails to explain the decision-making process. The strong involvement of the European 
Commission, in particular in the course of EU level readmission agreement 
negotiations, should be taken into account.  
 
In the JHA Council and the European Council, there was a consensus with respect to the 
need to cooperate with the eastern neighbours concerning returning undocumented 
migrants. This could be seen as the continuation of EU’s externalisation process of 
migration management since the end of the Cold War. The new eastern Member States 
were faced with similar demands regarding irregular migration cooperation ahead of 
their accession to the EU.624 As stated in the conclusions of Chapter 4, the official 
policy positions of the Member States regarding the fight against irregular migration 
considerably converge. All the five Member States that the study focused on (France, 
                                               
624 The externalisation literature draws attention to the EU’s transfer of its responsibilities outside in 
relation to migration management.  
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Germany, Poland, Sweden, the UK) agree on the fact that irregular immigration is an 
important part of EU cooperation with third countries and they strongly supported the 
negotiations with the partner countries. This has made it harder to judge the impact of 
the qualified majority voting in the Council as an institutional constraint on the 
decision-making process. Considering high levels of irregular migration from the 
eastern neighbours to the EU due to the long land border and its unfavourable economic 
or security related repercussions, the Member States highly supported the readmission 
agreements. The Member States that were faced with a greater threat of irregular 
migration (such as Germany or the UK) from the region clearly have a stronger voice 
regarding the purported security risks and conjoined economic and political instability 
associated with the eastern neighbourhood. Even the Member States that are in favour 
of a balance between security oriented and mobility oriented migration management 
approach towards the eastern neighbours (such as Poland and Sweden) favour the 
conclusion of the readmission agreements. These agreements are by and large 
considered as practical and they facilitate the process of returning irregular migrants to 
the countries of origin or transit.  
 
The external dimension of immigration policy has been systematically discussed at the 
European Council meetings due to its salience for the Member States. The agenda of the 
JHA Council and its preparatory working groups and the DG Home Affairs in the 
Commission have been subject to strong political pressure by the heads of states and 
governments in the area of irregular migration cooperation with third countries. Since 
the Feira European Council in 2000, the heads of states and governments have put high 
emphasis on the conclusion of readmission agreements. At the Seville European 
Council in 2002, the heads of states agreed that cooperation in the area of irregular 
migration should be a precondition for closer cooperation with the EU.   
 
 
The Member States also put pressure on the EU decision-making process through 
intergovernmental/transgovernmental networks outside of the EU framework. As shown 
in Chapter 6, the informal G6 meetings that take place outside of the EU framework 
formed of interior ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK has 
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put strong pressure on the formal decision-making process. Since its first meeting in 
2003 in Spain, irregular migration has been an important item on the agenda of the 
interior ministers. The biannual meetings of the largest six Member States of the EU 
have been criticized due to the fact that they have systematically allowed the largest 
members of the EU to privately discuss their positions prior to the EU level meetings 
and possibly impose their own policy preferences on the rest of the Member States and 
the EU Institutions. In addition to informal meetings, the Member States also cooperate 
in transgovernmental networks such as the General Directors of Immigration Services 
(GDISC) and Soderkoping Process to discuss the EU policy towards the region.  
 
However, an inter-state bargaining process fails to explain the role of the European 
institutions, particularly the European Commission in relation to the readmission 
agreements that were concluded with Ukraine and Moldova. The mandates to negotiate 
readmission agreements with the eastern neighbours that were given to the European 
Commission to negotiate EU level readmission agreements aimed at further fostering 
the Member States' interests in this area in addition to their national bilateral agreements 
with the neighbours. Although the European Commission was given the negotiation 
mandate for the readmission agreement between the EU and Ukraine in 2002, the 
Commission failed to conclude a prompt agreement. This is particularly related to the 
fact that readmission agreements mainly serve the interests of the EU rather than the 
partner countries. Although the EU was able to conclude such agreements with 
accession countries, the negotiations were difficult with the neighbours.  
 
The lengthy readmission agreement negotiations were discouraging for the Member 
States to pursue Community level measures in the area of readmissions. On the other 
hand, the European Commission has been trying to encourage the Member States to 
cooperate within the treaty framework since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. It 
was important for the European Commission to successfully complete the negotiations 
to promote EU level readmission negotiations. As such, the Commission managed to 
negotiate with the Council a compromise. With the aim of creating incentives for the 
partner countries, the European Commission pushed for a package deal that combined 
readmission and visa facilitation agreements for the eastern neighbours. The Member 
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States modified the negotiation mandate which was given to the European Commission 
and added a mandate in relation to visa facilitation to be negotiated with Ukraine. These 
package deals were for the first time negotiated with Russia and Ukraine and later 
followed by Moldova. This was particularly important for the European Commission 
given that the successful conclusion of the negotiations increased the confidence of the 
Member States in relation to EU level readmission agreements negotiated by the 
European Commission on behalf of the EU. The coupling of readmission and visa 
facilitation has become a regular policy tool of the external dimension of migration 
cooperation with the ENP partner countries in the east.  
 
Visa Cooperation  
The case study on EU visa policy towards Ukraine and Moldova highly supports the 
second hypothesis. In line with the ENP goals in relation to mobility, the cooperation in 
the area of short-stay visas has been an issue of high importance to facilitate the 
mobility between the EU and partner countries.  However, the policy preferences of the 
Member States strongly differed with respect to the facilitation of mobility for the 
nationals of partner countries. The empirical analysis focused on the visa facilitation 
negotiations and the adoption of the Action Plans for the visa liberalisation for Ukraine 
and Moldova. The analysis shows that the EU’s institutional framework had a strong 
influence on the policy-making process. Firstly, the QMV in the Council forced the 
Member States to agree on a common position despite their diverging official policy 
positions on the issue. Secondly, the Commission was very active in the negotiation 
process and maintained its policy position.  Rather than an inter-state bargaining among 
the capitals, the EU's institutional framework has shaped and enforced certain policy 
outcomes during the negotiations with respect to the EU visa policy towards the eastern 
neighbours.  
 
Due to their limited scope, the EU level agreement on offering visa facilitation to the 
eastern neighbours was reached without difficult debates in the EU. The concept of visa 
facilitation was mainly pushed by the European Commission as a ‘compensatory 
measure’ to be offered to the partner third countries to make them agree to readmission 
agreements. The European Commission managed to convince the Member States to 
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offer visa facilitation agreements to the neighbours to encourage them to sign 
readmission agreements. Visa facilitations were seen as rewards for signing readmission 
agreements and they did not severely change the visa requirement for the neighbours.  
However, the negotiations concerning the visa liberalisation towards the eastern 
neighbours have been highly difficult due to the diverging preferences of the Member 
States.  
 
As shown in Chapter 4 on Member States’ policy positions, the preferences of the 
Member States strongly differed on the issue. Among the countries that the thesis 
focuses, France and Germany were reluctant with respect to offering visa liberalisation 
to Ukraine and Moldova due to the risk of migratory pressures from the region. 
Germany in particular supported a very restrictive language regarding the visa 
dimension in the course of the Eastern Partnership negotiations. Although the agreement 
regarding starting a dialogue on visa cooperation with Ukraine was agreed during the 
French Presidency, France was reluctant to support the prompt liberalisation of the EU’s 
visa regime towards the eastern neighbours. On the other hand, Poland actively 
advocated further liberalisation of movement for the nationals of the eastern neighbours. 
The views of Poland were also shared among the new Member States that entered the 
EU in 2004 and 2007. These Member States have historically been either source or 
transit countries of immigration rather than destination. They did not share the concerns 
of the old Member States that have been subject to high levels of migration. Similar to 
the new Member States from the east, Sweden was in favour of further liberalising 
mobility for the citizens of eastern neighbours parallel to its long-standing liberal 
approach with respect to migration.  
 
As shown in Chapter 6 on the negotiations regarding visa liberalisation in the Council, 
the QMV forced the Member States to agree on a common position regarding visas. 
During the Council negotiations in the first half of 2010, certain Member States 
(including France) were interested in starting the visa liberation negotiations with 
Russia as opposed to the new Member States that traditionally prioritise relations with 
Ukraine and Moldova. The negotiations among the EU Member States with respect to 
visa liberalisations further demonstrated that diverging foreign policy priorities of the 
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Member States should be balanced with respect to EU policy towards third countries. 
Rather than an outcome of the lowest common denominator, the consensus in the 
Council on starting ‘the operational phase’ of the visa liberalisation negotiations with 
the eastern neighbours has paved the way for a political agreement. This has been an 
example of compromised decision-making among different actors in the EU. 
 
Although the intergovernmentalist approach to EU decision-making argues that 
different preferences are aggregated at the national level and the Member States defend 
one official policy position at the EU level, the policy preferences of the Foreign Affairs 
Council and the Justice and Home Affairs Council differed.  
 
The state-centric approaches disregard the impact of the EU institutions concerning 
decision-making process and rather focus on intergovernmental bargaining. However, 
the empirical findings of this thesis challenged this argument. The interviews with the 
officials who took part in the negotiations showed that the role of the European 
Commission was very significant during the EU level visa policy negotiations towards 
Ukraine and Moldova. It was clear that the European Commission wanted to reach an 
agreement regarding the visa liberalisations towards eastern neighbours as the main 
negotiator with the partner countries. Due to the reluctance of some Member States 
(such as Austria, Germany, France and the Netherlands), the negotiations could not be 
transferred to an operational stage despite the dialogue. The Commission acted as a 
facilitator between the Member States in respect to adopting ‘the Action Plans’ for visa 
liberalisation negotiations. This prompted the Member States to reach a consensus in the 
Council. Additionally, it is also suspected that the European Parliament will be an 
important actor once the operational stage is concluded bearing in mind that it has 
gained co-decision competences regarding determination of the EU's common visa list 
with the Lisbon Treaty since December 2009.  
 
Labour Migration 
Among the four case studies, the case study on labour migration which focuses on the 
EU decision-making with respect to the Mobility Partnership with Moldova supports 
hypothesis 1 rather than hypothesis 2. The emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation 
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concerning labour migration was stronger compared to the other areas of cooperation 
before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. With respect to the 
development of a labour migration towards the eastern neighbours, the decision-making 
process was subject to strong intergovernmental influence. Due to unanimity 
requirement in the Council concerning the measures on legal migration, the European 
Commission proposal gave the Member States high flexibility with respect to labour 
dimension of cooperation with the neighbours.  
 
Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (which has introduced QMV in the Council 
and co-decision), the unanimous decision-making requirement in the Council paved the 
way for limited legislative development in the area of labour migration as shown in 
Chapter 5. Due to the unanimity requirement, the Member States did not need to make 
any concessions if a policy proposal was not in line with their policy preferences. The 
policy-outcome tended to be the lowest common denominator. The unanimity 
requirement in the Council also discouraged the European Commission to be pro-active 
in the sense that it would not make a proposal that was not supported by all Member 
States. Although the European Commission was the sole initiator, it was not able to 
fully exercise its competences and push for its policy preferences. As a result, the 
legislative developments at the EU level regarding labour migration field have been 
limited given that the focus of immigration cooperation has been centred on managing 
migration flows to the EU. The initiatives concerning labour migration within the 
external relations of immigration have been limited as well. 
 
As shown in Chapter 6, the Mobility Partnerships were initially debated within the G6 
framework as a proposal developed by France and Germany in Paris and Berlin as a 
framework to manage migratory pressures. The German and French interior ministers 
managed to advance their policy preferences regarding the circular migration concept as 
a model that integrates different dimensions of immigration such as temporary 
migration and the fight against irregular migration. This initiative was first presented to 
the European Council in December 2006. The European Commission’s follow-up 
proposal introduced a concept called ‘Mobility Partnerships’ to be negotiated with 
neighbouring countries which was in line with the French-German initiative on circular 
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migration. Moreover, the Mobility Partnership concept was formulated as a highly 
flexible framework. Participation of the Member States to the Mobility Partnerships was 
voluntary. Although certain Member States were not content with the scope of the 
initiative (such as Sweden), Germany and France managed to push for their policy at the 
EU level.  
 
There is a relatively stronger intergovernmental focus concerning the legal migration 
dimension as the impact of the institutions are limited with respect to shaping the policy 
outcomes. The main factor that limited institutional constraints was the unanimity 
requirement in the Council regarding legal migration. The European Commission was 
not able to push for an ambitious policy proposal as it was certain that the proposal 
could easily be vetoed. However, it should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced the QMV in the Council regarding EU measures in the area of labour 
migration as stated in Chapter 5. Although the competence of the Member States 
regarding the volume of labour migrants is protected under the Lisbon Treaty, post-
Lisbon decisions regarding labour migration measures are adopted based on the QMV 
in the Council. Moreover, the influence of the European Parliament is increased under 
the co-decision procedures.  
 
Asylum Cooperation 
The case study regarding asylum cooperation which focuses on the negotiations 
regarding the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) moderately supports the second 
hypothesis.  The negotiations in the EU concerning the development of an external 
dimension of asylum were highly controversial. The initiative was put forward by the 
UK regarding processing asylum applications outside of the EU territory at the 
European Council in March 2003. As detailed in Chapter 5, an agreement was reached 
within the EU regarding the establishment of pilot ‘Regional Protection Programmes’ in 
the EU's eastern dimension (Ukraine) and one in the Southern neighbours (Tanzania) in 
line with emphasis put on the issue by certain Member States. The aim of the RPPs was 
to support the development of legal and institutional infrastructure of the partner 
countries. In line with the first hypothesis, the intergovernmental pressure was strong on 
the EU decision-making process. However, the European Commission and the 
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European Parliament were very influential in the course of the negotiations.  
 
As the management of asylum applications is very significant for the EU Member States 
that have been faced with high levels of asylum applications, the intergovernmental 
pressure on the EU decision-making was high. As shown in Chapter 4, the views of the 
countries that the thesis focused on diverged. The UK was the main Member State that 
pushed for an EU level agreement. However, France, Germany, Poland and Sweden 
were not very supportive of the UK proposal. Following the European Council in March 
2003, the European Commission was asked to prepare a proposal regarding the 
international dimension of asylum. The Commission proposal regarding ‘Protected 
Entry Programmes’ and ‘Resettlement Schemes’ were in line with the UK initiative and 
the European Council conclusions. However, the negotiations were difficult at the EU 
level primarily due to disagreements among the Member States on the transfer of 
competences to third countries.  
 
Despite strong intergovernmental pressure, certain levels of institutional constraints 
were observed. Among the measures that the Commission proposal contained, the main 
controversy was regarding the ‘Protected Entry Programmes’ due to the strong focus on 
transferring responsibility to third countries. The European Commission had a 
considerable role with respect to building a consensus on cooperating with third 
countries in the area of asylum in view of the diverging policy positions of the Member 
States.  
 
On the other hand, as shown in Chapter 6, the European Parliament was able to reflect 
its concerns in relation to the external dimension of asylum. The constitutional and 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament were highly influential in the course of 
the negotiations. Due to pressures, the European Commission did not continue with the 
proposal on ‘Protected Entry Programmes’ due to the lack of an EU level agreement. 
The development of the RRPs in the eastern and southern neighbourhood was rather a 
compromise both within the Council and between Council and the European 
Parliament.  
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7.3. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of the case studies above mainly addresses two key hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis projects that EU decision-making is a result of inter-state bargaining among 
the Member States. In line with H1, the EU institutions have a minimal role and they 
cannot reflect their preferences on policy outcomes. However, the second hypothesis 
takes into account the impact of the decision-making procedures that restrict the impact 
of the Member States and also provide room for institutional influence. The evolution of 
EU policy concerning the Eastern neighbours with respect to external dimension of 
immigration has shown that the decision-making process does not only involve an inter-
state bargaining process. Indeed, the institutional structure of the EU imposes 
considerable constraints.  
 
The level of constraints could be explained by both (i) the legal basis and the decision-
making procedures and (ii) the role and influence of the EU institutions in the course of 
the negotiations due to expertise and resources. Regarding the legal framework, the 
institutional constrains are higher in some case studies in comparison the others. These 
variations are in concern to where the Member States have to decide based on QMV in 
the Council and the areas that the European Parliament has co-decision competences. 
Besides the legal basis, consensus-building has become an important dimension of 
practice in the Council in the area of external dimension of migration in the EU. This 
has also increased the role of the Commission as a facilitator with respect to policy 
debates to prompt the Member States during the Council negotiations. On the other 
hand, EU decision-making in the area of migration is a dynamic process. Ratified in 
December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty has further extended the use of qualified majority 
and co-decision concerning the migration policy area. This demonstrates that the 
Member States are willing to abolish their veto powers with respect to the measures in 
relation to migration.625  
 
The thesis chose four case studies from the migration policy area which has enabled a 
detailed comparative analysis in relation to the specific causal mechanisms within this 
                                               
625 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty regarding EU decision making procedures 
in the area of migration: Steve Peers,  “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence 
and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon,” European Journal of Migration Law 10 (2008): 219-47.  
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policy area. Based on the findings drawn from the four case studies, the research did not 
aim to draw general conclusions that could be horizontally relevant for EU decision-
making processes in different policy areas. Nevertheless, certain relations and dynamics 
that have been identified in the findings are subject to ‘context’ factors that are relevant 
for migration cooperation with third countries. Moreover, a number of findings could be 
relevant for broader cooperation between the EU and its partner countries. In the area of 
cooperation with the neighbours, the research pointed at the growing importance of 
external relations actors. This is particularly linked to the ENP and the Eastern 
Partnership which have empowered the external relations officers. Even in the area of 
migration - a field that has conventionally been considered as ‘high politics’- one could 
observe the increasing importance of the policy actors who are outside of home affairs 
field. This is not only relevant for the European institutions, but also national actors. 
Although the thesis did not attempt to conduct a national level analysis, it was clear that 
the officers who work at the ministries of migration and foreign affairs have different 
preferences over these issues. As opposed to intergovernmentalist approach, the 
preferences of the Member States are not always aggregated at the national level. 
Although at domestic level interior ministries traditionally exert authority in the field of 
migration (more in some countries than others such as Germany and the UK), foreign 
ministry officers could also wield influence through the increased mandate bestowed to 
the Foreign Affairs Council at the EU level.  
 
This outcome points at the importance of intra-institutional decision-making both at the 
EU and national level. Although the main focus of the research was on the broader 
influence of the Member States and the EU’s institutional framework, it can be 
concluded that further research on administrative/bureaucratic dimensions of decision-
making is likely to provide important insights into the study of EU decision-making 
dynamics. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
Table 1. Asylum applications (rounded annual data)1 
Source: Eurostat2  
 
Table 2. Asylum applications (rounded annual data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat4 
                                               
1 In Table 1, (p) indicates ‘provisional value’ and (r) indicates ‘revised value’. 
2 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tps00021HTMLDesc.htm 
The Eurostat provide the following explanation with respect to the data, “These figures refer to all persons who apply on an individual basis for asylum or similar protection, 
irrespective of whether they lodge their application on arrival at the border, or from inside the country, and irrespective of whether they entered the country legally or illegally. 
Due to different methods of collecting the information, data from different countries may not be entirely comparable.” 
3 The UK figures for 2008 and 2009 include only the asylum applicants who have submitted an application for the first time.  
4 2010 Data: Anthony Albertinelli, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications in 2010, Eurostat Data in focus 5 (2011): 2. 
2009 Data: Anthony Albertinelli, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications in 2010, Eurostat Data in focus 18 (2010): 2-3. 
2008 Data: Anthony Albertinelli and Piotr Juchno, Asylum applicants and decisions on asylum applications in Q4 2008, Eurostat Data in focus  9(2008): 2-3. 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Germany  98,654 94,775 78,565 88,285 71,125 50,565 35,605(p) 28,915(p) 21,030(p) 19,165(p) 
France  22,375 30,905 38,745 47,290 51,085 59,770(r) 58,545(p) 49,735(r) 30,750(r) 29,160(p) 
Poland  3,425 3,060 4,660 4,480 5,170 6,810 7,925(p) 5,240(p) 4,225(p) 7,205(p) 
Sweden  12,840 11,220 16,285 23,500 33,015 31,355 23,160(p) 17,530(p) 24,320(p) 36,205(p) 
UK 46,015 71,160 80,315 71,365 103,080 60,045 40,625(p) 30,840(p) 28,320(r) 27,905(p) 
EU 27 313, 645 380,450 406,585 424, 180 421, 470 344, 800 276, 675(p) 234,675(p) 197, 410(p) 222,635 
 2008 2009 2010 
EU27 238,365 260,730 257,815 
Germany 26945 31810 48490 
France 41845 47625 51595 
Poland 8515 10595 6540 
Sweden 24875 24175 31875 
UK3 30545 29820 23715 
